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Preface
The proliferation of social media such as real time microblogging and online rep-
utation systems facilitate real time sensing of social patterns and behavior. In
the last decade, sensing and decision making in social networks have witnessed
significant progress in the electrical engineering, computer science, economics,
finance, and sociology research communities. Research in this area involves the
interaction of dynamic random graphs, socio-economic analysis, and statistical in-
ference algorithms. This monograph provides a survey, tutorial development, and
discussion of four highly stylized examples: social learning for interactive sens-
ing; tracking the degree distribution of social networks; sensing and information
diffusion; and coordination of decision making via game-theoretic learning. Each
of the four examples is motivated by practical examples, and comprises of a litera-
ture survey together with careful problem formulation and mathematical analysis.
Despite being highly stylized, these examples provide a rich variety of models,
algorithms and analysis tools that are readily accessible to a signal processing,
control/systems theory, and applied mathematics audience.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
Research in social networks involves the interplay of complex networks (dynam-
ics of random graphs) and social analysis (stemming from the areas of economics
and sociology). There are seminal books in this area including [132, 249]. In
comparison, this monograph deals with sensing and decision-making in social net-
works. The proliferation of social media such as real-time microblogging services
(Twitter1), online reputation and rating systems (Yelp) together with app-enabled
smartphones, facilitate real time sensing of social activities, social patterns, and
behavior.
Sensing and decision making in social networks is an area that has witnessed
remarkable progress in the last decade in electrical engineering, computer science,
economics, finance, and sociology. It is the aim of this monograph to survey some
important topics in this area and present highly stylized examples that are readily
accessible to a signal processing, control/systems theory, and applied mathematics
audience. Indeed, the main tools used in this monograph are dynamic program-
ming, Bayesian estimation (filtering), stochastic approximation (adaptive filter-
ing) and their convergence analysis (weak convergence and mean square analysis),
game-theoretic learning, and graph theory. There has been much recent activity
in the signal processing community in the area of social networks. “How global
behavior emerges from simple local behavior of boundedly rational agents” has
been an underlying theme of an NSF/UCLA workshop in 2010, special sessions
at ICASSP 2011 and 2012 and the ICASSP 2011 expert summary in [270]. Also,
the recent special issues [227, 268] deal with signal processing of social networks.
1On US Presidential election day in 2012, there were 15 thousand tweets per second resulting
in 500 million tweets in the day. Twitter can be considered as a real-time sensor.
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1.1 Motivation
Social sensing [5, 41, 44, 75] is defined as a process where physical sensors
present in mobile devices such as GPS are used to infer social relationships and
human activities. In this monograph, we work at a higher level of abstraction. We
use the term social sensor or human-based sensor to denote an agent that pro-
vides information about its environment (state of nature) on a social network after
interaction with other agents. Examples of such social sensors include Twitter
posts, Facebook status updates, and ratings on online reputation systems like Yelp
and Tripadvisor. Such social sensors go beyond physical sensors for social sens-
ing [221]. For example, user opinions/ratings (such as the quality of a restaurant)
are available on Tripadvisor but are difficult to measure via physical sensors. Sim-
ilarly, future situations revealed by the Facebook status of a user are impossible to
predict using physical sensors.
Statistical inference using social sensors is relevant in a variety of applica-
tions including localizing special events for targeted advertising [59, 171], mar-
keting [245], localization of natural disasters [222], and predicting sentiment of
investors in financial markets [33, 208]. It is demonstrated in [13] that models
built from the rate of tweets for particular products can outperform market-based
predictors. However, social sensors present unique challenges from a statistical
estimation point of view. First, social sensors interact with and influence other
social sensors. For example, ratings posted on online reputation systems strongly
influence the behaviour of individuals2. Such interactive sensing can result in
non-standard information patterns due to correlations introduced by the structure
of the underlying social network. Second, due to privacy reasons and time con-
straints, social sensors typically do not reveal raw observations of the underlying
state of nature. Instead, they reveal their decisions (ratings, recommendations,
votes) which can be viewed as a low resolution (quantized) function of their raw
measurements and interactions with other social sensors.
As is apparent from the above discussion, there is strong motivation to con-
struct mathematical models that capture the dynamics of interactive sensing in-
volving social sensors. Such models facilitate understanding the dynamics of in-
formation flow in social networks and, therefore, the design of algorithms that
can exploit these dynamics to estimate the underlying state of nature. In this
monograph, social learning [23, 31, 50], game-theoretic learning [92, 121], and
2It is reported in [130] that 81% of hotel managers regularly check Tripadvisor reviews. It is
reported in [187] that a one-star increase in the Yelp rating maps to 5-9 % revenue increase.
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Figure 1.1: Main results and organization of the monograph.
stochastic approximation [167, 263] serve as useful mathematical abstractions for
modelling the interaction of social sensors.
1.2 Main Results and Organization
As can be seen from Figure 1.1, this monograph is organized into four chapters
(excluding this introductory chapter) that provide a survey, tutorial development,
and discussion of four highly stylized examples: social learning for interactive
sensing; tracking the degree distribution of social networks; sensing and informa-
tion diffusion; and coordination of decision-making via game-theoretic learning.
Each of the four chapters is motivated by practical examples, and comprises of
a literature survey together with careful problem formulation and mathematical
analysis. The examples and associated analysis are readily accessible to a signal
processing, control/systems theory, and applied mathematics audience.
In terms of information patterns, Chapter 2 considers Bayesian estimation and
sequential decision making with sequential information flow and then informa-
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tion flow over small directed acyclic graphs. In comparison, Chapter 3 con-
siders stochastic approximation algorithms for large random graphs that evolve
with time. Chapter 4 considers the asymptotics of large graphs with fixed de-
gree distribution but where the state of individual node in the graph evolve over
time—this models information diffusion. The mean field analysis in Chapter 4
results in a stochastic approximation type recursion, and the estimation prob-
lems are Bayesian (nonlinear filtering). Finally, Chapter 5 deals with learning
in non-cooperative repeated games comprising networks of arbitrary size—the
algorithms are of the stochastic approximation type. In all these cases, sensors in-
teract with and influence other sensors. It is the understanding of this interaction
of local and global behaviors in the context of social networks that constitutes the
unifying theme of this monograph.
Below we give a brief synopsis of these four chapters.
1. Social Learning Approach to Interactive Sensing
Chapter 2 presents models and algorithms for interactive sensing in social net-
works where individuals act as sensors and the information exchange between in-
dividuals is exploited to optimize sensing. Social learning is used as a mathemat-
ical formalism to model the interaction between individuals that aim to estimate
an underlying state of nature.
Social learning in multi-agent systems seeks to answer the following question:
How do decisions made by agents affect decisions made by subse-
quent agents?
In social learning, each agent chooses its action by optimizing its local utility
function. Subsequent agents then use their private observations together with the
decisions of previous agents to estimate (learn) the underlying state of nature. The
setup is fundamentally different to classical signal processing in which sensors use
noisy observations to compute estimates.
In the last decade, social learning has been used widely in economics, market-
ing, political science, and sociology to model the behavior of financial markets,
crowds, social groups, and social networks; see [1, 2, 23, 31, 50, 180] and nu-
merous references therein. Related models have been studied in the context of
sequential decision making in information theory [65, 126] and statistical signal
processing [51, 162] in the electrical engineering literature.
Social learning models for interactive sensing can predict unusual behavior.
Indeed, a key result in social learning of an underlying random variable is that
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rational agents eventually herd [31]; that is, they eventually end up choosing the
same action irrespective of their private observations. As a result, the actions con-
tain no information about the private observations and so the Bayesian estimate of
the underlying random variable freezes. For a multi-agent sensing system, such
behavior can be undesirable, particularly if individuals herd and make incorrect
decisions.
In this context, the following questions are addressed in Chapter 2: How can
self-interested agents that interact via social learning achieve a trade-off between
individual privacy and reputation of the social group? How can protocols be de-
signed to prevent data incest in online reputation blogs where individuals make
recommendations? How can sensing by individuals that interact with each other
be used by a global decision maker to detect changes in the underlying state of
nature? Chapter 2 presents an overview, insights and discussion of social learning
models in the context of data incest propagation, change detection, and coordina-
tion of decision making.
Several examples in social networks motivate Chapter 2. Design of protocols
to prevent data incest are motivated by the design of fair online reputation systems
such as Yelp or Tripadvisor. In Online reputation systems, which maintain logs of
votes (actions) by agents, social learning takes place with information exchange
over a loopy graph (where the agents form the vertices of the graph). Due to
the loops in the information exchange graph, data incest (misinformation) can
propagate: Suppose an agent wrote a poor rating of a restaurant on a social media
site. Another agent is influenced by this rating, visits the restaurant, and then also
gives a poor rating on the social media site. The first agent visits the social media
site and notices that another agent has also given the restaurant a poor rating—this
double confirms her rating and she enters another poor rating. In a fair reputation
system, such “double counting” or data incest should have been prevented by
making the first agent aware that the rating of the second agent was influenced by
her own rating.
As an example of change detection, consider measurement of the adoption
of a new product using a micro-blogging platform like Twitter. The adoption of
the technology diffuses through the market but its effects can only be observed
through the tweets of select members of the population. These selected members
act as sensors for the parameter of interest. Suppose the state of nature suddenly
changes due to a sudden market shock or presence of a new competitor. Based
on the local actions of the multi-agent system that is performing social learning,
a global decision maker (such as a market monitor or technology manufacturer)
needs to decide whether or not to declare if a change has occurred. How can the
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global decision maker achieve such change detection to minimize a cost function
comprised of false alarm rate and delay penalty? The local and global decision
makers interact, since the local decisions determine the posterior distribution of
subsequent agents which determines the global decision (stop or continue) which
determines subsequent local decisions.
2. Tracking Degree Distribution of Social Networks
Chapter 3 considers dynamical random graphs. The degree of a node in a network
(also known as the connectivity) is the number of connections the node has in that
network. The most important measure that characterizes the structure of a network
(specially when the size of the network is large and the connections—adjacency
matrix of the underlying graph—are not given) is the degree distribution of the
network. Chapter 3 considers a Markov-modulated duplication-deletion random
graph where, at each time instant, one node can either join or leave the network
with probabilities that evolve according to the realization of a finite state Markov
chain (state of nature). This chapter deals with the following questions:
How can one estimate the state of nature using noisy observations of
nodes’ degrees in a social network? and How good are these esti-
mates?
Chapter 3 comprises of two results. First, motivated by social network appli-
cations, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the degree distribution of the
Markov-modulated random graph. From this degree distribution analysis, we can
study the connectivity of the network, the size and the existence of a large con-
nected component, the delay in searching such graphs, etc. [86, 132, 204, 202].
Second, a stochastic approximation algorithm is presented to track the empirical
degree distribution as it evolves over time. We further show that the stationary
degree distribution of Markov-modulated duplication-deletion random graphs de-
pends on the dynamics of such graphs and, thus, on the state of nature. This
means that, by tracking the empirical degree distribution, the social network can
be viewed as a social sensor to track the state of nature. The tracking performance
of the algorithm is analyzed in terms of mean square error. A functional central
limit theorem is further presented for the asymptotic tracking error.
An important associated problem discussed in Chapter 3 is how to actually
construct random graphs via simulation algorithms. In particular, for large social
networks, only the degree sequence is available, and not the adjacency matrix.
(The degree sequence is a non-increasing sequence of vertex degrees.) Does a
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simple graph exist that realizes a particular degree sequence? How can all graphs
that realize a degree sequence be constructed? Chapter 3 presents a discussion of
these issues.
3. Sensing and Information Diffusion in Social Networks
Chapter 4 considers the following questions:
How does a behavior diffuse over a social network comprising of a
population of interacting agents? and How can an underlying stochas-
tic state be estimated based on sampling the population?
As described in [184], there is a wide range of social phenomena such as diffusion
of technological innovations, cultural fads, and economic conventions [50], where
individual decisions are influenced by the decisions of others. Chapter 4 considers
two extensions of the widely used Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) models
for diffusion of information in social networks [183, 184, 132, 212, 249]. First, the
states of individual nodes evolve over time as a probabilistic function of the states
of their neighbors and an underlying target process. The underlying target process
can be viewed as the market conditions or competing technologies that evolve
with time and affect the information diffusion. Second, the nodes in the social
network are sampled randomly to determine their state. Chapter 4 reviews recent
methods for sampling social networks such as social sampling and respondent-
driven sampling. As the adoption of the new technology diffuses through the
network, its effect is observed via sentiment (such as tweets) of these selected
members of the population. These selected nodes act as social sensors. In signal
processing terms, the underlying target process can be viewed as a signal, and
the social network can be viewed as a sensor. The key difference compared to
classical signal processing is that the social network (sensor) has dynamics due to
the information diffusion. Our aim is to estimate the underlying target state and the
state probabilities of the nodes by sampling measurements at nodes in the social
network. In a Bayesian estimation context, this is equivalent to a filtering problem
involving estimation of the state of a prohibitively large-scale Markov chain in
noise. The key idea is to use mean field dynamics as an approximation (with
provable bounds) for the information diffusion and, thereby, obtain a tractable
model.
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4. Coordination of Decisions as Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Learning
Chapter 5 studies game-theoretic learning in the context of social networks. Game
theory has traditionally been used in economics and social sciences with a focus
on fully rational interactions where strong assumptions are made on the infor-
mation patterns available to individual agents. In comparison, social sensors are
agents with partial information and it is the dynamic interactions among such
agents that is of interest. This, together with the interdependence of agents’
choices, motivates the need for game-theoretic learning models for agents inter-
acting in social networks.
Chapter 5 deals with the question:
When individuals are self-interested and possess limited sensing and
communication capabilities, can a network of such individuals achieve
sophisticated global behavior?
We discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic learning approach for adaptive de-
cision making in social networks. This can be viewed as non-Bayesian social
learning. The aim is to ensure that all agents eventually choose actions from a
common polytope of randomized strategies—namely, the set of correlated equi-
libria [18, 20] of a non-cooperative game. The game-theoretic concept of equi-
librium describes a condition of global coordination where all decision makers
are content with the social welfare realized as the consequence of their chosen
strategies.
We consider two examples of information exchange among individuals. The
first example comprises of fully social agents that can communicate with ev-
ery other agent in the network. This provides a simple framework to present
the “regret-matching” [117, 121] decision making procedure that ensures conver-
gence of the global behavior of the network to the correlated equilibria set. In
the second example, we confine the information flow to social groups—each in-
dividual can only speak with her neighbors. Accordingly, the regret-matching
procedure is revised to adapt to this more practical social network model. Fi-
nally, we consider the case of homogeneous social groups, where individuals share
and are aware of sharing the same incentives. The regret-matching procedures is
then adapted to exploit this valuable piece of information available to individu-
als within each social group. The final result in this chapter considers the scenario
where the non-cooperative game model evolves with time according to the sample
path of a finite-state Markov chain. It is shown that, if the speed of the Markovian
jumps and the learning rate of the regret-matching algorithm match, the global be-
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havior emerging from a network of individuals following the presented algorithms
properly tracks the time-varying set of correlated equilibria.
One of the main ideas in this chapter is that the limit system that represents the
game-theoretic learning algorithms constitutes a differential inclusion. Differen-
tial inclusions are generalization of ordinary differential equations (ODEs)3, and
arise naturally in game-theoretic learning, since the strategies according to which
others play are unknown. This is highly non-standard in the analysis of stochastic
approximation algorithms in which the limit system is usually an ODE.
Chapter 5 ends with an example that shows how the presented algorithms can
be applied in a social sensing application. We consider the problem of estimating
the true value of an unknown parameter via a network of sensors. There have been
a lot of recent works that study diffusion of information over graphs linking a mul-
titude of agents; see [226, 225] and numerous references therein. We particulary
focus on diffusion least mean square (LMS) algorithms [182]: each sensor decides
whether to activate, and if activates, (i) it will exchange estimate with neighbors
and fuse the collected data; (ii) it will use the fused data and local measurements
to refine its estimate via an LMS-type adaptive filter. Using a game-theoretic for-
mulation, an energy-aware activation mechanism is devised that, taking into ac-
count the spatial-temporal correlation of sensors’ measurements, prescribes sen-
sors when to activate. We first show that, as the step-size in the diffusion LMS
approaches zero, the analysis falls under the unifying classical stochastic approx-
imation theme of this chapter and, therefore, can be done using the well-known
ODE method [167]. It is then shown that the proposed algorithm ensures the es-
timate at each sensor converges to the true parameter, yet the global activation
behavior along the way tracks the set of correlated equilibria of the underlying
activation control game.
5. Appendices
The two appendices at the end of this monograph present, respectively, a mean-
square error analysis and weak convergence analysis of two different types of
stochastic approximation algorithms used to track time-varying behavior in so-
cial networks. These analysis are crucial in allowing us to predict the asymptotic
dynamics of such algorithms. The chapters provide sufficient intuition behind
the theorems and the reader can skip the appendices without loss of continuity.
3A generic differential inclusion is of the form dX/dt ∈ F(X, t), where F(X, t) specifies
a family of trajectories rather than a single trajectory as in the ordinary differential equations
dX/dt = F (X, t). See §5.4.3 and Appendix B for more details.
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Appendix A.1 generalizes the asymptotic analysis of duplication deletion ran-
dom graphs in [61] to the case of Markov-modulated graphs. It uses the con-
cept of perturbed Lyapunov functions. The weak convergence analysis presented
in Appendix B generalizes the convergence analysis provided in the seminal pa-
pers [117, 119] to the case where the game-theoretic learning algorithm can track
a time-varying correlated equilibrium. The convergence analysis in both appen-
dices are presented in a tutorial fashion and are readily accessible to researchers
in adaptive filtering, stochastic optimization, and game theory.
Out-of-Scope Topics
Other important problems that have been extensively studied in the literature, but
are outside the scope of this monograph include: consensus formation [132, Chap-
ter 8], [149, 240], metrics for measuring networks (other than degree distribu-
tion) [132, Chapter 2], [253], small world [144, 254, 255], cooperative models of
network formation [131, Chapter 1], [132, Chapter 12], [233], behavior dynamics
in peer-to-peer media-sharing social networks [112, 267], and privacy and security
modeling [169, 179]. The interested reader is referred to the above cited works
and references therein for extensive treatment of the topics.
1.3 Perspective
The social learning and game-theoretic learning formalisms considered in this
monograph can be used either as descriptive tools, to predict the outcome of com-
plex interactions amongst agents in sensing, or as prescriptive tools, to design
social networks and sensing systems around given interaction rules. Informa-
tion aggregation, misinformation propagation and privacy are important issues in
sensing using social sensors. In this monograph, we treat these issues in a highly
stylized manner so as to provide easy accessibility to an electrical engineering
audience. The underlying tools used in this monograph are widely used by the
electrical engineering research community in the areas of signal processing, con-
trol, information theory and network communications. The fundamental theory
of network science is well-documented in seminal books such as [76, 132] and
involves the interplay of random graphs and game theory.
In Bayesian estimation, the twin effects of social learning (information ag-
gregation with interaction amongst agents) and data incest (misinformation prop-
agation) lead to non-standard information patterns in estimating the underlying
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state of nature. Herding occurs when the public belief overrides the private obser-
vations and, thus, actions of agents are independent of their private observations.
Data incest results in bias in the public belief as a consequence of the unintentional
re-use of identical actions in the formation of public belief in social learning—the
information gathered by each agent is mistakenly considered to be independent.
This results in overconfidence and bias in estimates of the state of nature.
Tracking a time-varying parameter that evolves according to a finite-state Markov
chain (state of nature) is a problem of much interest in signal processing [30, 87,
259]. In social networks, sometimes the parameter under study (state of nature)
cannot be sensed by pervasive sensors, e.g., the level of happiness in a commu-
nity, the tendency of individuals to expand their networks, the strength of social
links between individuals, etc. In such cases, social sensors can do much better
than pervasive sensors. A social network with a large number of individuals can
be viewed as an interactive sensing tool to obtain information about individuals or
state of nature; this is a social sensor. Motivated by social network applications,
a social sensor based framework is presented in Chapter 3 to track the degree dis-
tribution of Markov-modulated dynamic networks whose dynamics evolve over
time according to a finite-state Markov chain.
Privacy issues impose important constraints on social sensors. Typically, in-
dividuals are not willing to disclose private observations. Optimizing interactive
sensing with privacy constraints is an important problem. Privacy and trust pose
conflicting requirements on human-based sensing: Privacy requirements result in
noisier measurements or lower resolution actions, while maintaining a high degree
of trust (reputation) requires accurate measurements. Utility functions, noisy pri-
vate measurements, and quantized actions are essential ingredients of the social
and game-theoretic learning models presented in this monograph that facilitate
modelling this trade-off between reputation and privacy.
In social sensor systems, the behavior is driven by the actions of a large num-
ber of autonomous individuals, who are usually self-interested and optimize their
respective objectives. Often, these individuals form social contacts (i.e. links)
by choice, rather than by chance. Further, there are always social and economic
incentives associated with forming such social contacts based on the informa-
tion obtained about the state of the nature or contribution to the diffusion of in-
formation across the network. The social network analysis using the common
graph-theoretic techniques, however, fails to capture the behavior of such self-
interested individuals and the dynamics of their interaction. This motivates the
use of game-theoretic methods. Game-theoretic learning explains how coordina-
tion in the decisions of such self-interested individuals might arise as a conse-
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quence of a long-run process of adaptation and learning in an interactive environ-
ment [94]. Interestingly enough, while each individual has limitations in sensing
and communication, the coordinated behavior amongst individuals can lead to the
manifestation of sophisticated behavior at the network level.
The literature in the areas of social learning, sensing, and networking is ex-
tensive. In each of the following chapters, we provide a brief review of relevant
works together with references to experimental data. The book [50] contains a
complete treatment of social learning models with several remarkable insights.
For further references, we refer the reader to [151, 153, 154, 161, 191]. In [116],
a nice description is given of how, if individual agents deploy simple heuristics,
the global system behavior can achieve “rational” behavior. The related problem
of achieving coherence (i.e., agents eventually choosing the same action or the
same decision policy) among disparate sensors of decision agents without coop-
eration has also witnessed intense research; see [215] and [251]. Non-Bayesian
social learning models are also studied in [79, 80].
There is also a growing literature dealing with the interplay of technological
networks and social networks [55]. For example, social networks overlaid on
technological networks account for a significant fraction of Internet use. Indeed,
as discussed in [55], three key aspects of that cut across social and technological
networks are the emergence of global coordination through local actions, resource
sharing models and the wisdom of crowds (diversity and efficiency gains). These
themes are addressed in the current paper in the context of social learning.
Chapter 2
Social Learning Approach to
Interactive Sensing
2.1 Introduction
This chapter comprises of three parts1:
1. Survey and Review of Social Learning: Section 2.2 presents a brief de-
scription of the classical social learning model. We use social learning as the
mathematical basis for modelling interaction of social sensors. A key result in
social learning is that rational agents eventually herd, that is, they pick the same
action irrespective of their private observation and social learning stops. To de-
lay the effect of herding, and thereby enhance social learning, Chamley [50] (see
also [235] for related work) has proposed a novel constrained optimal social learn-
ing protocol. We describe how self-interested agents performing social learning
can achieve useful behavior in terms of optimizing a social welfare function. Such
problems are motivated by privacy issues in sensing. If an agent reveals less in-
formation in its decisions, it maintains its privacy; on the other hand, as part of a
social group, it has an incentive to optimize a social welfare function that helps
estimate the state of nature. We review this protocol which is formulated as a
sequential stopping time problem. We show that the constrained optimal social
learning proposed by Chamley [50] has a threshold switching curve in the space
of public belief states. Thus, the global decision to stop can be implemented effi-
ciently in a social learning model.
1The chapter is an extended version of the paper [163].
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2. Data Incest in Online Reputation Systems: Section 2.3 deals with the ques-
tion: How can data incest (misinformation propagation) be prevented in online
reputation blogs where social sensors make recommendations?
In the classical social learning model, each agent acts once in a pre-determined
order. However, in online reputation systems such as Yelp or Tripadvisor, which
maintain logs of votes (actions) by agents, social learning takes place with infor-
mation exchange over a loopy graph (where the agents form the vertices of the
graph). Due to the loops in the information exchange graph, data incest (mis-
information) can propagate: Suppose an agent wrote a poor rating of a restaurant
on a social media site. Another agent is influenced by this rating, visits the restau-
rant, and then also gives a poor rating on the social media site. The first agent visits
the social media site and notices that another agent has also given the restaurant a
poor rating—this double confirms her rating and she enters another poor rating.
In a fair reputation system, such “double counting” or data incest should have
been prevented by making the first agent aware that the rating of the second agent
was influenced by her own rating. Data incest results in a bias in the estimate of the
state of nature. How can automated protocols be designed to prevent data incest,
and thereby maintain a fair online reputation system? Section 2.3 describes how
the administrator of a social network can maintain an unbiased (fair) reputation
system.
3. Interaction of Local and Global Decision Makers for Change Detection:
Section 2.4 deals with the question: In sensing, where individual agents perform
social learning to estimate an underlying state of nature, how can changes in the
state of nature be detected? Such sensing problems arise in a variety of applica-
tions such as financial trading, where individuals react to financial shocks [21];
marketing and advertising [183, 184], where consumers react to a new product;
and localization of natural disasters (earthquakes and typhoons) [222].
Consider measurement of the adoption of a new product using a micro-blogging
platform like Twitter. The new technology diffuses through the market but its ef-
fects can only be observed through the tweets of select members of the population.
Suppose the state of nature suddenly changes due to a sudden market shock or
presence of a new competitor. Based on the local actions of the multi-agent sys-
tem that is performing social learning, a global decision maker (such as a market
monitor or technology manufacturer) needs to decide whether or not to declare if
a change has occurred. How can the global decision maker achieve such change
detection to minimize a cost function comprised of false alarm rate and delay
penalty? The local and global decision makers interact, since the local decisions
determine the posterior distribution of subsequent agents which determines the
2.2. MULTI-AGENT SOCIAL LEARNING 17
global decision (stop or continue), which in turn determines subsequent local de-
cisions. We show that this social learning based change detection problem leads to
unusual behavior: The optimal decision policy of the stopping time problem has
multiple thresholds. This is unusual since, if it is optimal to declare that a change
has occurred based on the posterior probability of change, it may not be optimal
to declare a change when the posterior probability of change is higher!
2.2 Multi-Agent Social Learning
This section starts with a brief description of the classical social learning model.
We review Chamley’s novel constrained optimal social learning protocol, which
is formulated as a sequential stopping time problem, and delays the effect of herd-
ing [50, 235].
2.2.1 Motivation: What is social learning?
We start with a brief description of the ‘vanilla’ social learning model2. In social
learning [50], agents estimate the underlying state of nature not only from their
local measurements, but also from the actions of previous agents. (These previous
actions were taken by agents in response to their local measurements; therefore,
these actions convey information about the underlying state). As we will describe
below, the state estimation update in social learning has a drastically different
structure compared to the standard optimal filtering recursion and can result in
unusual behavior.
Consider a countable number of agents performing social learning to estimate
the state of an underlying finite-state Markov chain x. Let X = {1, 2, . . . , X}
denote a finite state space, P the transition matrix and π0 the initial distribution of
the Markov chain.
Each agent acts once in a predetermined sequential order indexed by k =
1, 2, . . .. The index k can also be viewed as the discrete time instant when agent
k acts. A multi-agent system seeks to estimate xk. Assume at the beginning of
2In typical formulations of social learning, the underlying state is assumed to be a random
variable and not a Markov chain. Our description below is given in terms of a Markov chain
since we wish to highlight the unusual structure of the social learning filter to a signal processing
reader who is familiar with basic ideas in Bayesian filtering. Also, we are interested in change
detection problems in which the change time distribution can be modelled as the absorption time
of a Markov chain.
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iteration k, all agents have access to the public belief πk−1 defined in Step (iv)
below. The social learning protocol proceeds as follows [31, 50]:
(i) Private Observation: At time k, agent k records a private observation yk ∈
Y from the observation distribution Biy = P(y|x = i), i ∈ X. Throughout
this chapter, we assume that Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y } is finite.
(ii) Private Belief: Using the public belief πk−1 available at time k − 1 (de-
fined in Step (iv) below), agent k updates its private posterior belief ηk(i) =
P(xk = i|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk) as the following Bayesian update (this is the
classical Hidden Markov Model filter [81]):
ηk =
BykP
′π
1′XByP ′π
, Byk = diag (P(yk|x = i), i ∈ X) . (2.1)
Here, 1X denotes theX-dimensional vector of ones, ηk is anX-dimensional
probability mass function (pmf), and P ′ denotes transpose of the matrix P .
(iii) Myopic Action: Agent k takes action ak ∈ A = {1, 2, . . . , A} to minimize
its expected cost
ak = argmin
a∈A
E{c(x, a)|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk} = argmin
a∈A
{c′aηk}. (2.2)
Here ca = (c(i, a), i ∈ X) denotes an X-dimensional cost vector, and
c(i, a) denotes the cost incurred when the underlying state is i and the agent
chooses action a.
Agent k then broadcasts its action ak to subsequent agents.
(iv) Social Learning Filter: Given the action ak of agent k and the public belief
πk−1, each subsequent agent k′ > k computes the public belief πk according
to the following “social learning filter”:
πk = T (πk−1, ak), where T (π, a) =
RπaP
′π
σ(π, a)
(2.3)
and σ(π, a) = 1′XRπaP ′π is the normalization factor of the Bayesian up-
date. In (2.3), the public belief πk(i) = P(xk = i|a1, . . . ak), and Rπa =
diag(P(a|x = i, π), i ∈ X) has elements
P(ak = a|xk = i, πk−1 = π) =
∑
y∈Y
P(a|y, π)P(y|xk = i)
P(ak = a|y, π) =
{
1, if c′aByP ′π ≤ c′a˜ByP ′π, a˜ ∈ A,
0, otherwise.
(2.4)
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The derivation of the social learning filter (2.3) is given in the discussion be-
low.
2.2.2 Discussion
Let us pause to give some intuition about the above social learning protocol.
1. Information Exchange Structure: The information exchange in the above
social learning protocol is sequential. Agents send their hard decisions (actions)
to subsequent agents. Further, we have assumed that each agent acts once. An-
other way of viewing the social learning protocol is that there are finitely many
agents that act repeatedly in some pre-defined order. If each agent chooses its
local decision using the current public belief, the setting will be identical to the
social learning setup. We also refer the reader to [2] for several recent results in
social learning over several types of network adjacency matrices.
2. Filtering with Hard Decisions: Social learning can be viewed as agents
making hard decision estimates at each time and sending these estimates to sub-
sequent agents. In conventional Bayesian state estimation, a soft decision is made,
namely, the posterior distribution (or equivalently, observation) that is sent to sub-
sequent agents. For example, if A = X and the costs are chosen as ca = −ea
where ea denotes the unit indicator with 1 in the a-th position, then argmina c′aπ =
argmaxa π(a), i.e., the maximum aposteriori probability (MAP) state estimate.
For this example, social learning is equivalent to agents sending the hard MAP
estimates to subsequent agents.
Note that rather than sending a hard decision estimate, if each agent chooses
its action ak = yk (that is, agents send their private observations), the right-hand
side of (2.4) becomes ∑y∈Y I(y = yk)P(y|xk = i) = P(yk|xk = i) and, thus, the
problem becomes a standard Bayesian filtering problem.
It is also important to note that the filtered distributions obtained via social
learning are not commutative in the actions. That is P (x|a1 = a, a2 = a) 6=
P (x|a1 = a, a2 = a). In comparison, for Bayesian estimation of random variable
x with conditionally independent observations, P (x|y1 = y, y2 = y) 6= P (x|y1 =
y, y2 = y).
3. Dependence of Observation Likelihood on Prior: The most unusual fea-
ture of the above protocol (to a signal processing audience) is the social learning
filter (2.3). In standard state estimation via a Bayesian filter, the observation like-
lihood given the state is completely parameterized by the observation noise dis-
tribution and is functionally independent of the current prior distribution. In the
social learning filter, the likelihood of the action given the state (which is denoted
20 CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH
by Rπa ) is an explicit function of the prior π! Not only does the action likelihood
depend on the prior, but it is also a discontinuous function, due to the presence of
the argmin in (2.2).
4. Derivation of Social Learning Filter: The derivation of the social learning
filter (2.3) is as follows: Define the posterior as πk(j) = P(xk = j|a1, . . . , ak).
Then,
πk(j) =
1
σ(πk−1, ak)
P(ak|xk = j, a1, . . . , ak−1)
×
∑
i
P(xk = j|xk−1 = i)P(xk−1 = i|a1, . . . , ak−1)
=
1
σ(πk−1, ak)
∑
y
P(ak|yk = y, a1, . . . , ak−1)
× P(yk = y|xk = j)
∑
i
P(xk = j|xk−1 = i)πk−1(i)
=
1
σ(πk−1, ak)
∑
y
P(ak|yk = y, πk−1)P(yk = y|xk = j)
∑
i
Pijπk−1(i) (2.5)
where the normalization term is
σ(πk−1, ak) =
∑
j
∑
y
P(ak|yk = y, πk−1)
× P(yk = y|xk = j)
∑
i
Pijπk−1(i). (2.6)
The above social learning protocol and social learning filter(2.3) result in in-
teresting dynamics in state estimation and decision making. We will illustrate two
interesting consequences that are unusual to an electrical engineering audience:
• Rational Agents form herds and information cascades and blindly follow
previous agents. This is discussed in §2.2.3 below.
• Making global decisions on change detection in a multi-agent system per-
forming social learning results in multi-threshold behavior. This is dis-
cussed in §2.4 below.
2.2.3 Rational Agents form Information Cascades
The first consequence of the unusual nature of the social learning filter (2.3) is
that social learning can result in multiple rational agents taking the same action
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independently of their observations.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that x is a finite state random variable
(instead of a Markov chain) with prior distribution π0. We start with the following
definitions; see also [50]:
• An individual agent k herds on the public belief πk−1 if it chooses its action
ak = a(πk−1, yk) in (2.2) independently of its observation yk.
• A herd of agents takes place at time k, if the actions of all agents after time
k are identical, i.e., ak = ak for all time k > k.
• An information cascade occurs at time k, if the public beliefs of all agents
after time k are identical, i.e. πk = πk for all k > k.
Note that if an information cascade occurs, then since the public belief freezes,
social learning ceases. Also, from the above definitions, it is clear that an infor-
mation cascade implies a herd of agents, but the reverse is not true; see §2.3 for
an example.
The following result, which is well known in the economics literature [31, 50],
states that if agents follow the above social learning protocol, then after some finite
time k, an information cascade occurs3. The proof follows via an elementary
application of the martingale convergence theorem.
Theorem 2.2.1 ([31]). The social learning protocol described in §2.2.1 leads to
an information cascade in finite time with probability 1. That is, there exists a
finite time k after which social learning ceases, i.e., public belief πk+1 = πk,
k ≥ k, and all agents choose the same action, i.e., ak+1 = ak, k ≥ k.
3A nice analogy is provided in [50]. If I see someone walking down the street with an um-
brella, I assume (based on rationality) that he has checked the weather forecast and is carrying
an umbrella since it might rain. Therefore, I also take an umbrella. Now, there are two people
walking down the street carrying umbrellas. A third person sees two people with umbrellas and,
based on the same inference logic, also takes an umbrella. Even though each individual is rational,
such herding behavior might be irrational since the first person who took the umbrella may not
have checked the weather forecast.
Another example is that of patrons who decide to choose a restaurant. Despite their menu prefer-
ences, each patron chooses the restaurant with the most customers. Therefore, all patrons eventu-
ally herd to one restaurant. The paper [245] quotes the following anecdote on user influence in a
social network which can be interpreted as herding: “... when a popular blogger left his blogging
site for a two-week vacation, the site’s visitor tally fell, and content produced by three invited
substitute bloggers could not stem the decline.”
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Instead of reproducing the proof, let us give some insight as to why Theo-
rem 2.2.1 holds. It can be shown using martingale methods that, at some finite
time k = k, the agent’s probability P(ak|yk, πk−1) becomes independent of the
private observation yk. Then, clearly from (2.4), P(ak = a|xk = i, πk−1) =
P(ak = a|π). Substituting this into the social learning filter (2.3), we see that
πk = πk−1. Thus, after some finite time k, the social learning filter hits a fixed
point and social learning stops. As a result, all subsequent agents k > k com-
pletely disregard their private observations and take the same action ak, thereby
forming an information cascade (and therefore a herd).
2.2.4 Constrained Interactive Sensing: Individual Privacy vs
Group Reputation
The above social learning protocol can be interpreted as follows. Agents seek
to estimate an underlying state of nature; however, they reveal their actions by
maximizing their privacy according to the optimization (2.2). This leads to an
information cascade and social learning stops. In other words, agents are inter-
ested in optimizing their own costs (such as maximizing privacy) and ignore the
information benefits their action provides to others.
Partially Observed Markov Decision Process Formulation
We now describe an optimized social learning procedure that delays herding4.
This approach is motivated by the following question: How can agents assist so-
cial learning by choosing their actions to trade off individual privacy (local costs)
with optimizing the reputation5 of the entire social group? (See [50] for an excel-
lent discussion.)
Suppose agents seek to maximize the reputation of their social group by min-
imizing the following social welfare cost involving all agents in the social group
4In the restaurant problem, an obvious approach to prevent herding is as follows. If a restaurant
knew that patrons choose the restaurant with the most customers, then the restaurant could delib-
erately pay actors to sit in the restaurant so that it appears popular, thereby attracting customers.
The methodology in this section, where herding is delayed by benevolent agents, is a different
approach.
5The papers [197, 110] contain lucid descriptions of quantitative models for trust, reputation
and privacy.
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(compared to the myopic objective (2.2) used in standard social learning):
Jµ(π0) = E
µ
π0
{ ∞∑
k=1
ρk−1c′a(πk−1,yk,µ(πk−1))ηk
}
. (2.7)
In (2.7), a(π, y, µ(π))) denotes the decision rule that agents use to choose their
actions as will be explained below. Also, ρ ∈ [0, 1) is an economic discount
factor, and π0 denotes the initial probability (prior) of the state x. Finally, Pµπ0
and Eµπ0 denote the probability measure and expectation of the evolution of the
observations and underlying state, respectively, which are strategy dependent.
The key attribute of (2.7) is that each agent k chooses its action according to
the privacy constrained rule
ak = a(πk−1, yk, µ(πk−1)). (2.8)
Here, the policy
µ : πk−1 → {1, 2 . . . , L}
maps the available public belief to the set of L privacy values. The higher the
privacy value, the less the agent reveals through its action. This is in contrast
to standard social learning (2.2) in which the action chosen is a(π, y), namely, a
myopic function of the private observation and public belief.
The above formulation can be interpreted as follows: Individual agents seek
to maximize their privacy according to social learning (2.8), but also seek to max-
imize the reputation of their entire social group (2.7).
Determining the policy µ∗ that minimizes (2.7), and thereby maximizes the
social group reputation, is equivalent to solving a stochastic control problem that is
called a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) problem [48, 153].
A POMDP comprises of a noisy observed Markov chain and the dynamics of the
posterior distribution (belief state) is controlled by a policy (µ in our case).
Structure of Privacy Constrained Sensing Policy
In general, POMDPs are computationally intractable to solve [209] and, there-
fore, one cannot say anything useful about the structure6 of the optimal policy
6Characterizing the structure of the optimal policy of a POMDP is a difficult problem. We
refer the reader to [186, 185, 218, 157, 153] for sufficient conditions (based on supermodularity
that yield a monotone optimal policy for a POMDP in terms of the monotone likelihood ratio
stochastic order.
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µ∗. However, useful insight can be obtained by considering the following extreme
case of the above problem. Suppose there are two privacy values and each agent
k chooses action
ak =
{
yk, if µ(πk) = 1 (no privacy),
argmina c
′
aπk−1, if µ(πk) = 2 (full privacy).
(2.9)
That is, an agent either reveals its raw observation (no privacy) or chooses its
action by completely neglecting its observation (full privacy). Once an agent
chooses the full privacy option, then all subsequent agents choose exactly the
same option and therefore herd—this follows since each agent’s action reveals
nothing about the underlying state of nature. Therefore, for this extreme exam-
ple, determining the optimal policy µ∗(π) is equivalent to solving a stopping time
problem: Determine the earliest time for agents to herd (maintain full privacy)
subject to maximizing the social group reputation.
For such a quickest herding stopping time problem, one can say a lot about
the structure of µ∗(π). Suppose the sensing system wishes to determine if the
state of nature is a specific target state (say state 1). Then, [153] shows that, un-
der reasonable conditions on the observation distribution and supermodular con-
ditions on the costs ([193] discusses supermodularity of influence in social net-
works), the dynamic programming recursion has a supermodular structure7 (see
also [154, 155, 157, 186, 218] for related results). This implies that the optimal
policy µ∗ has the following structure: There exists a threshold curve that partitions
the belief space such that, when the belief state is on one side of the curve, it is
optimal for agents to reveal full observations; if the belief state is on the other side
of the curve, then it is optimal to herd. Moreover, the target state 1 belongs to
the region in which it is optimal to herd8. This threshold structure of the optimal
policy means that if individuals deploy the simple heuristic of
“Choose increased privacy when belief is close to target state,”
then the group behavior is sophisticated—herding is delayed and accurate esti-
mates of the state of nature can be obtained.
7The seminal book on supermodularity is [243], also see [10] for a lucid tutorial presentation.
8In standard POMDPs where agents do not perform social learning, it is well known [185] that
the set of beliefs for which it is optimal to stop is convex. Such convexity of the herding set does
not hold in the current problem. But it is shown in [153] that the set of beliefs for which it is
optimal to herd constitute a connected set and so does the set of beliefs for which it is optimal to
reveal full observations.
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Figure 2.1: Example of the information flow in a social network with two agents
over three event epochs. The arrows represent exchange of information.
2.3 Data Incest in Online Reputation Systems
This section generalizes the previous section by considering social learning in a
social network. How can multiple social sensors interacting over a social network
estimate an underlying state of nature? The state could be the position coordinates
of an event [222] or the quality of a social parameter such as quality of a restaurant
or political party.
The motivation for this section can be understood in terms of the following
sensing example. Consider the following interactions in a multi-agent social net-
work where agents seek to estimate an underlying state of nature. Each agent vis-
its a restaurant based on reviews on an online reputation website. The agent then
obtains a private measurement of the state (e.g., the quality of food in a restau-
rant) in noise. After that, he reviews the restaurant on the same online reputation
website. The information exchange in the social network is modeled by a directed
graph. As mentioned in Chapter 1, data incest [160] arises due to the loops in
the information exchange graph. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1: Agents 1 and 2
exchange beliefs (or actions). The fact that there exist two distinct paths between
Agent 1 at time 1 and Agent 1 at time 3 (depicted in red in Figure 2.1) implies that
the information of Agent 1 at time 1 is double counted, thereby leading to a data
incest event.
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How can data incest be removed so that agents obtain a fair (unbiased) esti-
mate of the underlying state? The methodology of this section can be interpreted
in terms of the recent Time article [247], which provides interesting rules for on-
line reputation systems. These include: (i) review the reviewers, and (ii) censor
fake (malicious) reviewers. The data incest removal algorithm proposed in this
section can be viewed as “reviewing the reviews” of other agents to see if they are
associated with data incest or not.
The rest of this section is organized as follows:
1. Section 2.3.1 describes the social learning model that is used to mimic the
behavior of agents in online reputation systems. The information exchange
between agents in the social network is formulated on a family of time-
dependent directed acyclic graphs.
2. In §2.3.2, a fair reputation protocol is presented and the criterion for achiev-
ing a fair rating is defined.
3. Section 2.3.3 presents an incest removal algorithm so that the online repu-
tation system achieves a fair rating. A necessary and sufficient condition is
given on the graph that represents exchange of information between agents
so as to achieve fair ratings.
Related works Collaborative recommendation systems are reviewed and stud-
ied in [4, 147]. In [136], a model of Bayesian social learning is considered in
which agents receive private information about the state of nature and observe ac-
tions of their neighbors in a tree-based network. Another type of misinformation
caused by influential agents (agents who heavily affect actions of other agents
in social networks) is investigated in [2]. Misinformation in the context of this
section is motivated by sensor networks where the term “data incest” is used [39].
Data incest also arises in belief propagation (BP) algorithms [198, 213], which are
used in computer vision and error-correcting coding theory. BP algorithms require
passing local messages over the graph (Bayesian network) at each iteration. For
graphical models with loops, BP algorithms are only approximate due to the over-
counting of local messages [258], which is similar to data incest in social learning.
With the algorithms presented in this section, data incest can be mitigated from
Bayesian social learning over non-tree graphs that satisfy a topological constraint.
The closest work to the current section is [160]. However, in [160], data incest is
considered in a network where agents exchange their private belief states—that is,
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no social learning is considered. Simpler versions of this information exchange
process and estimation were investigated in [19, 36, 97].
2.3.1 Information Exchange Graph
Consider an online reputation system comprised of social sensors {1, 2, . . . , S}
that aim to estimate an underlying state of nature (a random variable). Let x ∈
X = {1, 2, . . . , X} represent the state of nature (such as the quality of a hotel)
with known prior distribution π0. Let k = 1, 2, 3, . . . represent epochs at which
events occur. These events involve taking observations, evaluating beliefs and
choosing actions as described below. The index k marks the historical order of
events, and not necessarily absolute time. However, for simplicity, we refer to k
as “time”.
To model the information exchange in the social network, we will use a family
of directed acyclic graphs. It is convenient also to reduce the coordinates of time
k and agent s to a single integer index n as follows:
n
defn
= s+ S(k − 1), s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . . (2.10)
We refer to n as a “node” of a time-dependent information flow graph Gn that we
define below.
Some Graph Theoretic Definitions
Let
Gn = (Vn, En), n = 1, 2, . . . (2.11)
denote a sequence of time-dependent graphs of information flow in the social
network until and including time k where n = s + S(k − 1). Each vertex in Vn
represents an agent s′ in the social network at time k′, and each edge (n′, n′′) in
En ⊆ Vn × Vn shows that the information (action) of node n′ (agent s′ at time k′)
reaches node n′′ (agent s′′ at time k′′). It is clear that the communication graph Gn
is a sub-graph of Gn+1. This means that the diffusion of actions can be modelled
via a family of time-dependent directed acyclic graphs9.
The algorithms below will involve specific columns of the adjacency matrix
and transitive closure matrix of the graph Gn. The adjacency matrix An of Gn is
9Directed acyclic graphs are directed graph with no directed cycles.
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an n× n matrix with elements An(i, j) given by
An(i, j) =
{
1, if (vj , vi) ∈ E
0, otherwise
, An(i, i) = 0. (2.12)
The transitive closure matrix Tn is the n× n matrix
Tn = sgn((In − An)−1) (2.13)
where for any matrix M , the matrix sgn(M) has elements
sgn(M)(i, j) =
{
0, if M(i, j) = 0,
1, if M(i, j) 6= 0. (2.14)
Note that An(i, j) = 1 if there is a single-hop path between nodes i and j. In
comparison, Tn(i, j) = 1 if there exists a (possibly multi-hop) path between node
i and j.
The information reaching node n depends on the information flow graph Gn.
The following two sets will be used to specify the incest removal algorithms be-
low:
Hn = {m : An(m,n) = 1} , (2.15)
Fn = {m : Tn(m,n) = 1} . (2.16)
Here, Hn denotes the set of previous nodes m that communicate with node n
in a single-hop. In comparison, Fn denotes the set of previous nodes m whose
information eventually arrive at node n. Thus, Fn contains all possible multi-hop
connections by which information from a node m eventually reaches node n.
Note that classical social learning of Sec.2.2.1, is a special case with adjacency
matrix An(i, j) = 1 for j = i+ 1 and An(i, j) = 0 elsewhere.
Example 2.1. To illustrate the above notation consider a social network consist-
ing of S = 2 agents with the following information flow graph for three time points
k = 1, 2, 3. Figure 2.2 depicts the nodes n = 1, 2, . . . , 6, where n = s+2(k− 1).
Note that, in this example, each node remembers all its previous actions as is
apparent from Figure 2.1. The information flow is characterized by the family of
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1
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6
Figure 2.2: Example of an information flow network with two agents (S = 2),
namely, s ∈ {1, 2} and time instants k = 1, 2, 3. Circles represent the nodes
indexed by n = s + S(k − 1) in the social network, and each edge depicts a
communication link between two nodes.
directed acyclic graphs {G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6} with adjacency matrices
A1 =
[
0
]
, A2 =
[
0 0
0 0
]
, A3 =
0 0 10 0 1
0 0 0
 ,
A4 =

0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , A5 =

0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
 .
Since nodes 1 and 2 do not communicate, clearly A1 and A2 are zero matrices.
Nodes 1 and 3 communicate as do nodes 2 and 3, hence, A3 has two ones, etc.
Finally from (2.15) and (2.16),
H5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, F5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
whereH5 denotes all single-hop links to node 5, whereasF5 denotes all multi-hop
links to node 5.
Note that An is always the upper left n × n submatrix of An+1. Also due
to causality with respect to the time index k, the adjacency matrices are always
upper triangular.
2.3.2 Fair Online Reputation System
The aim is to provide each node n with an unbiased estimate
π0n−(i) = P (x = i|{am, m ∈ Fn}) (2.17)
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subject to the following social influence constraint: There exists a fusion algo-
rithm A such that
π0n− = A(πm, m ∈ Hn). (2.18)
We call π0n− in (2.17) the true or fair online rating available to node n. Recall
that Fn, defined in (2.16), denotes all information (multi-hop links) available to
node n. By definition, π0n− is incest free since it is the desired conditional proba-
bility that we want.
The procedure summarized in Protocol 1 aims to evaluate a fair reputation that
uses social learning over a social network by eliminating incest.
If algorithm A is designed so that πn−(i) satisfies (2.17), then the computa-
tion (2.20) and Step (v) yield
ηn(i) = P(x = i|{am, m ∈ Fn}, yn),
πn(i) = P(x = i|{am, m ∈ Fn}, an), i ∈ X (2.22)
which are, respectively, the correct private belief for node n and the correct after-
action public belief.
Discussion of Protocol 1
(i) Data Incest: It is important to note that without careful design of algorithmA,
due to loops in the dependencies of actions on previous actions, the public rat-
ing πn− computed using (2.19) can be substantially different from the fair online
rating π0n− of (2.17). As a result, ηn computed via (2.20) will not be the correct
private belief and incest will propagate in the network. In other words, ηn, πn−,
and πn are defined purely in terms of their computational expressions in Proto-
col 1—at this stage, they are not necessarily the desired conditional probabilities
unless algorithmA is designed to remove incest.
Note that, instead of (2.19), node n could naively (and incorrectly) assume
that the public beliefs πm, m ∈ Hn, that it received are independent. It would
then fuse these public beliefs as
πn− =
∏
m∈Hn πm
1′X
∏
m∈Hn πm
. (2.23)
This, of course, would result in data incest.
(ii) How much does an individual remember?: The above protocol has the
flexibility of modelling cases where either each node remembers some (or all)
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Protocol 1 Incest Removal for Social Learning in Online Reputation Systems
(i) Information from Social Network:
1. Recommendation from friends: Node n receives past actions {am, m ∈ Hn}
from previous nodes m ∈ Hn in the social network. Hn is defined in (2.15).
2. Automated Recommender System: For these past actions {am, m ∈ Hn},
the network administrator has already computed the public beliefs (πm, m ∈
Hn) using Step (v) below.
The automated recommender system fuses public beliefs (πm, m ∈ Hn),
into the single recommendation belief πn− as
πn− = A(πm, m ∈ Hn). (2.19)
The fusion algorithmA will be designed below.
(ii) Observation: Node n records private observation yn from distribution Biy =
P(y|x = i), i ∈ X.
(iii) Private Belief: Node n then uses yn and public belief πn− to update its private
belief via Bayes formula as
ηn =
Bynπn−
1′XByπn−
. (2.20)
(iv) Myopic Action: Node n takes action
an = argmin
a
c′aηn (2.21)
and inputs its action to the online reputation system.
(v) Public Belief Update by Network Administrator: Based on action an, the net-
work administrator (automated algorithm) computes the public belief πn using the
social learning filter (2.3) with P = I .
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of its past actions or none of its past actions. This facilitates modelling cases in
which people forget most of the past except for specific highlights.
(iii) Automated Recommender System: Steps (i) and (v) of Protocol 1 can be
combined into an automated recommender system that maps previous actions of
agents to a single recommendation (rating) πn− of (2.19). This recommender
system can operate completely opaquely to the actual user (node n). Node n
simply uses the automated rating πn− as the current best available rating from the
reputation system.
(iv) Social Influence. Informational Message vs Social Message: In Proto-
col 1, it is important that each individual n deploys AlgorithmA to fuse the beliefs
{πm, m ∈ Hn}; otherwise, incest can propagate. Here, Hn can be viewed as the
“social message”, i.e., personal friends of node n since they directly communicate
to node n, while the associated beliefs can be viewed as the “informational mes-
sage”. The social message from personal friends exerts a large social influence—it
provides significant incentive (peer pressure) for individual n to comply with Pro-
tocol 1, and thereby prevent incest. Indeed, a remarkable recent study described
in [35] shows that social messages (votes) from known friends has significantly
more influence on an individual than the information in the messages themselves.
This study includes comparison of information messages and social messages on
Facebook and their direct effect on voting behavior. To quote [35],
“The effect of social transmission on real-world voting was greater
than the direct effect of the messages themselves. . . ”
(v) Agent Reputation: The cost function minimization in Step (iv) can be in-
terpreted in terms of the reputation of agents in online reputation systems. If an
agent continues to write bad reviews for high quality restaurants on Yelp, his rep-
utation declines among the users. Consequently, other people ignore reviews of
that (low-reputation) agent in evaluating their opinion about the social unit under
study (restaurant). Therefore, agents minimize the penalty of writing inaccurate
reviews (or equivalently increase their reputations) by choosing proper actions.
(vi) Think and act: Steps (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v) of Protocol 1 constitute stan-
dard social learning as described in §2.2.1. The key difference with standard social
learning is Step (i) that is performed by the network administrator. Agents receive
public beliefs from the social network with arbitrary random delays. These delays
reflect the time an agent takes between reading the publicly available reputation
and making its decision. It is typical behavior of people to read published ratings
multiple times and then think for an arbitrary amount of time before acting.
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2.3.3 Incest Removal Algorithm in Online Reputation System
Below we design algorithm A in Protocol 1 so that it yields the fair public rating
π0n− of (2.17).
Fair Rating Algorithm
It is convenient to work with the logarithm of the un-normalized belief10. Accord-
ingly, define
ln(i) ∝ log πn(i), ln−(i) ∝ log πn−(i), i ∈ X. (2.24)
The following theorem shows that the logarithm of the fair rating π0n− defined
in (2.17) can be obtained as linear weighted combination of the logarithms of
previous public beliefs.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Fair Rating Algorithm). Consider the online reputation system
running Protocol 1. Suppose the following algorithm A(lm, m ∈ Hn) is imple-
mented in (2.19) of Protocol 1 by the network administrator:
ln−(i) = w′n l1:n−1(i), where wn = T−1n−1tn. (2.25)
Then, ln−(i) ∝ log π0n−(i). That is, algorithmA computes the fair rating log π0n−(i)
defined in (2.17).
In (2.25), wn is an n − 1 dimensional weight vector. Recall that tn denotes the
first n− 1 elements of the nth column of transitive closure matrix Tn.
Theorem 2.3.1 says that the fair rating π0n− can be expressed as a linear func-
tion of the action log-likelihoods in terms of the transitive closure matrix Tn of the
information flow graph Gn. This is intuitive since π0n− can be viewed as the sum
of information collected by the nodes such that there are paths between all these
nodes and n.
10The un-normalized belief proportional to πn(i) is the numerator of the social learning fil-
ter (2.3). The corresponding un-normalized fair rating corresponding to π0n−(i) is the joint distri-
bution P(x = i, {am,m ∈ Fn}). By taking logarithm of the un-normalized belief, Bayes formula
merely becomes the sum of the log likelihood and log prior. This allows us to devise a data incest
removal algorithm based on linear combinations of the log beliefs.
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Achievability of Fair Rating by Protocol 1
We are not quite done!
• On the one hand, algorithmA at node n specified by (2.19) has access only
to beliefs lm, m ∈ Hn—equivalently, it has access only to beliefs from
previous nodes specified by An(:, n), which denotes the last column of the
adjacency matrix An.
• On the other hand, to provide incest free estimates, algorithm A specified
in (2.25) requires all previous beliefs l1:n−1(i) that are specified by the non-
zero elements of the vector wn.
The only way to reconcile the above points is to ensure that An(j, n) = 0 implies
wn(j) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n− 1. This condition means that the single hop past es-
timates lm, m ∈ Hn, available at node n according to (2.19) in Protocol 1 provide
all the information that is required to compute w′n l1:n−1 in (2.25). This is essen-
tially a condition on the information flow graph Gn. We formalize this condition
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Achievability of Fair Rating). Consider the fair rating algorithm
specified by (2.25). For Protocol 1 with available information (πm, m ∈ Hn), to
achieve the estimates ln− of algorithm (2.25), a necessary and sufficient condition
on the information flow graph Gn is
An(j, n) = 0 =⇒ wn(j) = 0. (2.26)
Therefore, for Protocol 1 to generate incest free estimates for nodes n = 1, 2, . . .,
condition (2.26) needs to hold for each n. (Recall wn is specified in (2.25).)
Note that the constraint (2.26) is purely in terms of the adjacency matrix An
since the transitive closure matrix (2.13) is a function of the adjacency matrix.
Therefore, Algorithm (2.25), together with condition (2.26), ensures that incest
free estimates are generated by Protocol 1.
Example 2.2. Let us continue with Example 2.1, where we already specified the
adjacency matrices of the graphs G1, G2, G3, G4, and G5. Using (2.13), the
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transitive closure matrices Tn obtained from the adjacency matrices are given by:
T1 =
[
1
]
, T2 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, T3 =
1 0 10 1 1
0 0 1
 ,
T4 =

1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , T5 =

1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
 .
Note that Tn(i, j) is non-zero only for i ≥ j due to causality—information sent
by an agent can only arrive at another agent at a later time instant. The weight
vectors are then obtained from (2.25) as
w2 =
[
0
]
,
w3 =
[
1 1
]′
,
w4 =
[
1 1 0
]′
,
w5 =
[−1 −1 1 1]′ .
Let us examine these weight vectors. w2 means that node 2 does not use the
estimate from node 1. This formula is consistent with the constrained information
flow because estimate from node 1 is not available to node 2; see Figure 2.2.
w3 means that node 3 uses estimates from node 1 and 2. w4 means that node 4
uses estimates only from node 1 and node 2 since the estimate from node 3 is not
available at node 4. As shown in Figure 2.2, the mis-information propagation
occurs at node 5. The vector w5 says that node 5 adds estimates from nodes 3 and
4 and removes estimates from nodes 1 and 2 to avoid double counting of these
estimates that are already integrated into estimates from node 3 and 4. Indeed,
using the algorithm (2.25), incest is completely prevented in this example.
Let us now illustrate an example in which exact incest removal is impossible.
Consider the information flow graph of Figure 2.2, but with the edge between
nodes 2 and 5 deleted. Then, A5(2, 5) = 0, while w5(2) 6= 0; therefore, the
condition (2.26) does not hold. Hence, exact incest removal is not possible for
this case.
2.3.4 Summary
In this section, we have outlined a controlled sensing problem over a social net-
work in which the administrator controls (removes) data incest, and thereby main-
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tains an unbiased (fair) online reputation system. The state of nature could be
geographical coordinates of an event (in a target localization problem) or quality
of a social unit (in an online reputation system). As discussed above, data incest
arises due to the recursive nature of Bayesian estimation and non-determinism in
the timing of the sensing by individuals. Details of proofs, extensions and further
numerical studies are presented in [113, 160].
How useful are Bayesian social learning models? Humans often make mono-
tone decisions - the more favorable the private observation, the higher the recom-
mendation. In addition, humans typically convert numerical attributes to ordinal
scales before making a decision. For example, it does not make a difference if
the cost of a meal at a restaurant is $200 or $205; an individual would classify
this cost as “high”. Also credit rating agencies use ordinal symbols such as AAA,
AA, A. It is shown in [154] that if the cost c(x, a) satisfies a single crossing con-
dition11 and the observation likelihoods satisfy a totally positive condition, then
the recommendation an made by node n is monotone increasing in its observation
yn and ordinal. In this sense, even if an agent does not exactly follow a Bayesian
social learning model, its monotone ordinal behavior implies that such a model is
a useful idealization.
2.4 Interactive Sensing for Quickest Change Detec-
tion
In this section, we consider interacting social sensors in the context of detecting a
change in the underlying state of nature. Suppose a multi-agent system performs
social learning and makes local decisions as described in §2.2. Given the public
beliefs from the social learning protocol, how can quickest change detection be
achieved? In other words, how can a global decision maker use the local decisions
from individual agents to decide when a change has occurred? It is shown below
that making a global decision (change or no change) based on local decisions of
individual agents has an unusual structure resulting in a non-convex stopping set.
A typical application of such social sensors arises in the measurement of the
adoption of a new product using a micro-blogging platform like Twitter. The
adoption of the technology diffuses through the market but its effects can only
be observed through the tweets of select individuals of the population. These
11The single crossing condition can be viewed as an ordinal generalization of supermodularity
[10]. Supermodularity is a sufficient condition for a single crossing condition to hold.
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selected individuals act as sensors for estimating the diffusion. They interact and
learn from the decisions (tweeted sentiments) of other members and, therefore,
perform social learning. Suppose the state of nature suddenly changes due to a
sudden market shock or presence of a new competitor. The goal for a market
analyst or product manufacturer is to detect this change as quickly as possible by
minimizing a cost function that involves the sum of the false alarm and decision
delay.
Related works The papers [183, 184] model diffusion in networks over a ran-
dom graph with arbitrary degree distribution. The resulting diffusion is approxi-
mated using deterministic dynamics via a mean-field approach [27]. In the semi-
nal paper [75], a sensing system for complex social systems is presented with data
collected from cell phones. This data is used to recognize social patterns, iden-
tify socially significant locations, and infer relationships. In [222], people using
a microblogging service such as Twitter are considered as sensors. A particle fil-
tering algorithm is then used to estimate the centre of earthquakes and trajectories
of typhoons. As pointed out in [222], an important characteristic of microblog-
ging services such as Twitter is that they provide real-time sensing—Twitter users
tweet several times a day, whereas standard blog users update information once
every several days.
Apart from the above applications in real-time sensing, change detection in
social learning also arises in mathematical finance models. For example, in agent
based models for the microstructure of asset prices in high frequency trading in
financial systems [21], the state denotes the underlying asset value that changes at
a random time τ 0. Agents observe local individual decisions of previous agents via
an order book, combine these observed decisions with their noisy private signals
about the asset, selfishly optimize their expected local utilities, and then make
their own individual decisions (whether to buy, sell or do nothing). The market
evolves through the orders of trading agents. Given this order book information,
the goal of the market maker (global decision maker) is to achieve quickest change
point detection of when a shock occurs to the value of the asset [156].
2.4.1 Classical Quickest Detection
The classical Bayesian quickest time detection problem [214] is as follows: An
underlying discrete-time state process x jump-changes at a geometrically dis-
tributed random time τ 0. Consider a sequence of discrete time random measure-
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ments {yk, k ≥ 1} such that, conditioned on the event {τ 0 = t}, yk, k ≤ t, are in-
dependent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with distributionB1
and yk, k > t, are i.i.d. random variables with distributionB2. The quickest detec-
tion problem involves detecting the change time τ 0 with minimal cost. That is, at
each time k = 1, 2, . . ., a decision uk ∈ {1 (stop and announce change), 2 (continue)}
needs to be made to optimize a tradeoff between false alarm frequency and linear
delay penalty.
To formalize this setup, let
P =
[
1 0
1− P22 P22
]
(2.27)
denote the transition matrix of a two state Markov chain x in which state 1 is
absorbing. Then, it is easily seen that the geometrically distributed change time
τ 0 is equivalent to the time at which the Markov chain enters state 1. That is,
τ 0 = min{k : xk = 1}, and E{τ 0} = 1/(1− P22).
Let τ be the time at which the decision uk = 1 (announce change) is made. The
goal of quickest time detection is to minimize the Kolmogorov–Shiryaev criterion
for detection of a disorder [231]:
Jµ(π0) = dE
µ
π0
{
(τ − τ 0)+}+ fPµπ0 (τ < τ 0) . (2.28)
Here, x+ = x if x ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise. The non-negative constants d and f de-
note the delay and false alarm penalties, respectively. Therefore, waiting too long
to announce a change incurs a delay penalty d at each time instant after the sys-
tem has changed, while declaring a change before it happens incurs a false alarm
penalty f . In (2.28), µ denotes the strategy of the decision maker. Pµπ0 and Eµπ0
are the probability measure and expectation of the evolution of the observations
and Markov state which are strategy dependent. Finally, π0 denotes the initial
distribution of the Markov chain x.
In classical quickest detection, the decision policy µ is a function of the two-
dimensional belief state (posterior probability mass function) πk(i) = P(xk =
i|y1, . . . , yk, u1, . . . , uk−1), i = 1, 2, with πk(1) + πk(2) = 1. It thus suffices
to consider one element, say πk(2), of this probability mass function. Classi-
cal quickest change detection (see for example [214]) says that the policy µ∗(π),
which optimizes (2.28), has the following threshold structure: There exists a
threshold point π∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
µ∗(πk) =
{
2, (continue) if πk(2) ≥ π∗,
1, (announce change) if πk(2) < π∗.
(2.29)
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2.4.2 Multi-agent Quickest Detection Problem
With the above classical formulation in mind, consider now the following multi-
agent quickest change detection problem: Suppose that a multi-agent system per-
forms social learning to estimate an underlying state according to the social learn-
ing protocol of §2.2.1. That is, each agent acts once in a predetermined sequential
order indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . (Equivalently, as pointed out in the discussion
in §2.2.1, a finite number of agents act repeatedly in some pre-defined order and
each agent chooses its local decision using the current public belief.) Given these
local decisions (or equivalently the public belief), the goal of the global decision
maker is to minimize the quickest detection objective (2.28). The problem now
is a non-trivial generalization of classical quickest detection. The posterior π is
now the public belief given by the social learning filter (2.3) instead of a standard
Bayesian filter. There is now interaction between the local and global decision
makers. The local decision ak from the social learning protocol determines the
public belief state πk via the social learning filter (2.3), which determines the
global decision (stop or continue), which determines the local decision at the next
time instant, and so on.
The global decision maker’s policy µ∗ : π → {1, 2} that optimizes the quick-
est detection objective (2.28) and the cost Jµ∗(π0) of this optimal policy are the
solution of “Bellman’s dynamic programming equation”:
µ∗(π) = argmin
{
fπ(2), d(1− π(2)) +
∑
a∈A
V (T (π, a)) σ(π, a)
}
,
V (π) = min
{
fπ(2), d(1 − π(2)) +
∑
a∈A
V (T (π, a)) σ(π, a)
}
,
Jµ∗(π0) = V (π0).
(2.30)
Here, T (π, a) and σ(π, a) are given by the social learning filter (2.3)—recall that
a denotes the local decision. V (π) is called the “value function”—it is the cost
incurred by the optimal policy when the initial belief state (prior) is π. The above
problem is more complex than a standard partially observed Markov decision pro-
cess (POMDP) since the belief state update T (π, a) now involves the social learn-
ing filter instead of the standard hidden Markov model filter. In particular, as
we will illustrate in the numerical example below, unlike in POMDPs, V (π) is
no longer concave. Also the optimal policy µ∗(π) has a very different structure
compared to the classical quickest detection.
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Example 2.3. We now illustrate the unusual multi-threshold property of the global
decision maker’s optimal policy µ∗(π) in multi-agent quickest detection with so-
cial learning.
Consider the social learning model of §2.2.1 with the following parameters:
The underlying state is a 2-state Markov chain x with state space X = {1, 2} and
transition probability matrix
P =
[
1 0
0.05 0.95
]
.
Therefore, the change time τ 0 (i.e., the time the Markov chain jumps from state 2
into absorbing state 1) is geometrically distributed with E{τ 0} = 1/0.05 = 20.
Social Learning Parameters: Individual agents observe the Markov chain x
in noise with the observation symbol set Y = {1, 2}. Suppose the observation
likelihood matrix with elements Biy = P(yk = y|xk = i) is
B =
[
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
]
.
Agents can choose their local actions a from the action set A = {1, 2}. The
state-dependent cost matrix of these actions is
c = (c(i, a), i ∈ X, a ∈ A) =
[
4.57 5.57
2.57 0
]
.
Agents perform social learning with the above parameters. The intervals [0, π∗1]
and [π∗2, 1] in Figure 2.3a are regions where the optimal local actions taken by
agents are independent of their observations. For π(2) ∈ [π∗2, 1], the optimal
local action is 2 and, for π(2) ∈ [0, π∗1], the optimal local action is 1. There-
fore, individual agents herd for belief states in these intervals (see the definition
in §2.2.3) and the local actions do not yield any information about the underly-
ing state. Moreover, the interval [0, π∗1] depicts a region where all agents herd12
(again see the definition in §2.2.3), meaning that once the belief state is in this
region, it remains so indefinitely and all agents choose the same local action 1.
Global Decision Making: Based on the local actions of the agents perform-
ing social learning, the global decision maker needs to perform quickest change
12Note that even if the agent k herds so that its action ak provides no information about its
private observation yk, the public belief still evolves according to the predictor πk+1 = P ′πk.
Therefore, an information cascade does not occur in this example.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal global decision policy for social learning based quickest time
change detection for geometric distributed change time. The parameters are spec-
ified in §2.3. The optimal policy µ∗(π) ∈ {1 (announce change) , 2 (continue) }
is characterized by a triple threshold—that is, it switches from 1 to 2 three times
as the posterior π(2) increases. As explained in the text, for π(2) ∈ [0, π∗1], all
agents herd, while for π(2) ∈ [π∗2 , 1] individual agents herd.
detection. The global decision maker uses the delay penalty d = 1.05 and false
alarm penalty f = 3 in the objective function (2.28). The optimal policy µ∗(π) of
the global decision maker where π = [1 − π(2), π(2)]′ is plotted versus π(2) in
Figure 2.3a. Note π(2) = 1 means that no change has occurred with certainty,
while π(2) = 0 means a change has occurred with certainty. The policy µ∗(π) was
computed by constructing a uniform grid of 1000 points for π(2) ∈ [0, 1] and then
implementing the dynamic programming equation (2.30) via a fixed point value
iteration algorithm for 200 iterations. The horizontal axis π(2) is the posterior
probability of no change. The vertical axis denotes the optimal decision: u = 1
denotes stop and declare change, while u = 2 denotes continue.
The most remarkable feature of Figure 2.3a is the multi-threshold behavior
of the global decision maker’s optimal policy µ∗(π). Recall π(2) depicts the
posterior probability of no change. Consider the region where µ∗(π) = 2 and
sandwiched between two regions where µ∗(π) = 1. Then, as π(2) (posterior
probability of no change) increases, the optimal policy switches from µ∗(π) = 2
to µ∗(π) = 1. In other words, the optimal global decision policy “changes its
mind”—it switches from no change to change as the posterior probability of a
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change decreases! Thus, the global decision (stop or continue) is a non-monotone
function of the posterior probability obtained from local decisions.
Figure 2.3b shows the associated value function obtained via stochastic dy-
namic programming (2.30). Recall that the value function V (π) is the cost in-
curred by the optimal policy with initial belief state π. Unlike standard sequential
detection problems, in which the value function is concave, the figure shows that
the value function is non-concave and discontinuous. To summarize, Figure 2.3
shows that social learning based quickest detection results in fundamentally dif-
ferent decision policies compared to classical quickest time detection (which has
a single threshold). Thus, making global decisions (stop or continue) based on
local decisions (from social learning) is non-trivial. In [154], a detailed analysis
of the problem is given together with the characterization of this multi-threshold
behavior. More general phase-distributed change times are further considered
in [154].
2.5 Closing Remarks
In this chapter, we used social learning as a model for interactive sensing with
social sensors. We summarize here some extensions of the social learning frame-
work that are relevant to interactive sensing.
Wisdom of Crowds Surowiecki’s book [238] is an excellent popular piece that
explains the wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis. The wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis
predicts that the independent judgments of a crowd of individuals (as measured
by any form of central tendency) will be relatively accurate, even when most of
the individuals in the crowd are ignorant and error prone. The book also studies
situations (such as rational bubbles) in which crowds are not wiser than individu-
als.
Collect enough people on a street corner staring at the sky, and ev-
eryone who walks past will look up.
Such herding behavior is typical in social learning.
In which order should agents act? In the social learning protocol, we assumed
that the agents act sequentially in a pre-defined order. However, in many social
networking applications, it is important to optimize the order in which agents
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act. For example, consider an online review site where individual reviewers with
different reputations make their reviews publicly available. If a reviewer with high
reputation publishes its review first, this review will unduly affect the decision of a
reviewer with lower reputation. In other words, if the most senior agent “speaks”
first, it will unduly affect the decisions of more junior agents. This could lead
to an increase in bias of the underlying state estimate13. On the other hand, if
the most junior agent is polled first, since its variance is large, several agents will
need to be polled in order to reduce the variance. We refer the reader to [207] for
an interesting description of who should speak first in a public debate14. It turns
out that, for two agents, the seniority rule is always optimal for any prior—that is,
the senior agent speaks first followed by the junior agent; see [207] for the proof.
However, for more than two agents, the optimal order depends on the prior and
the observations in general.
Global Games for Coordinating Sensing In the classical Bayesian social learn-
ing model of §2.2, agents act sequentially in time. The global games model that
has been studied in economics during the last two decades, considers multiple
agents that act simultaneously by predicting the behavior of other agents. The
theory of global games was first introduced in [45] as a tool for refining equilibria
in economic game theory; see [192] for an excellent exposition. Global games are
an ideal method for decentralized coordination amongst agents. They have been
used to model speculative currency attacks and regime change in social systems;
see [12, 138, 192].
The most widely studied form of a global game is a one-shot Bayesian game
which proceeds as follows: Consider a continuum of agents in which each agent
i obtains noisy measurements yi of an underlying state of nature x. Assume all
agents have the same observation likelihood density p(y|x); however, the indi-
vidual measurements obtained by agents are statistically independent of those ob-
tained by other agents. Based on its observation yi, each agent takes an action
ai ∈ {1, 2} to optimize its expected utility E{U(ai, α)|yi}, where α ∈ [0, 1] de-
13To quote a recent paper from Haas School of Business, U.C. Berkeley [11]: “In 94% of cases,
groups (of people) used the first answer provided as their final answer... Groups tended to commit
to the first answer provided by any group member.” People with dominant personalities tend to
speak first and most forcefully “even when they actually lack competence”.
14As described in [207], seniority is considered in the rules of debate and voting in the U.S.
Supreme Court. “In the past, a vote was taken after the newest justice to the Court spoke. With
the justices voting in order of ascending seniority largely, it was said, to avoid the pressure from
long-term members of the Court on their junior colleagues.”
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notes the fraction of all agents that take action 2. Typically, the utility U(1, α) is
set to zero.
For example, suppose x (state of nature) denotes the quality of a social group
and yi denotes the measurement of this quality by agent i. The action ai = 1
means that agent i decides not to join the social group, while ai = 2 means that
agent i joins the group. The utility function U(ai = 2, α) for joining the social
group depends on α, where α is the fraction of people that decide to join the
group. In [138], the utility function is chosen as follows: If α ≈ 1, i.e., too many
people join the group, then the utility to each agent is small since the group is too
congested and agents do not receive sufficient individual service. On the other
hand, if α ≈ 0, i.e., too few people join the group, then the utility is also small
since there is not enough social interaction.
Since each agent is rational, it uses its observation yi to predict α, i.e., the
fraction of other agents that choose action 2. The main question is then: What is
the optimal strategy for each agent i to maximize its expected utility?
It has been shown that, for a variety of measurement noise models (obser-
vation likelihoods p(y|x)) and utility functions U , the symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the global game is unique and has a threshold structure in the ob-
servation. This means that, given its observation yi, it is optimal for each agent i
to choose its actions as follows:
ai =
{
1, if yi < y∗
2, if yi ≥ y∗ (2.31)
where the threshold y∗ depends on the prior, noise distribution, and utility func-
tion.
In the above example of joining a social group, this result means that, if agent
i receives a measurement yi of the quality of the group and yi exceeds a thresh-
old y∗, then it should join. This is yet another example of simple local behavior
(act according to a threshold strategy) resulting in global sophisticated behavior
(Bayesian Nash equilibrium). As can be seen, global games provide a decentral-
ized way of achieving coordination amongst social sensors. In [12], the above
one-shot Bayesian game is generalized to a dynamic (multi-stage) game operat-
ing over a possibly infinite horizon. Such games facilitate modelling the dynamics
of how people join, interact, and leave social groups.
The papers [151, 152] use global games to model networks of sensors and cog-
nitive radios. In [138], it has been shown that the above threshold structure (2.31)
for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium breaks down if the utility function U(2, α) de-
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creases too rapidly due to congestion. The equilibrium structure becomes much
more complex and can be described by the following quotation [138]:
“Nobody goes there anymore. It’s too crowded” – Yogi Berra
Chapter 3
Tracking Degree Distribution in
Dynamic Social Networks
3.1 Introduction
Social networks can be viewed as complex sensors that provide information about
interacting individuals and an underlying state of nature1. In this chapter, we
consider a dynamic social network where at each time instant one node can join or
leave the network. The probabilities of joining or leaving evolve according to the
realization of a finite state Markov chain that represents the state of nature. This
chapter presents two results. First, motivated by social network applications, the
asymptotic behavior of the degree distribution of the Markov-modulated random
graph is analyzed. Second, using noisy observations of nodes’ connectivity, a
“social sensor” is designed for tracking the underlying state of nature as it evolves
over time.
3.1.1 Motivation
Why analyze the degree distribution? The degree distribution yields useful
information about the connectivity of the random graph [8, 150, 203]. The de-
gree distribution can further be used to investigate the diffusion of information
or disease through social networks [184, 249]. The existence of a “giant com-
1For example, real-time event detection from Twitter posts is investigated in [222] or the early
detection of contagious outbreaks via social networks is studied in [60].
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ponent”2 in complex networks can be studied using the degree distribution. The
size and existence of a giant component has important implications in social net-
works in terms of modeling information propagation and spread of human dis-
ease [86, 202, 204]. The degree distribution is also used to analyze the “search-
ability” of a network. The “search” problem arises when a specific node in a
network faces a problem (request) whose solution is at other node, namely, des-
tination (e.g., delivering a letter to a specific person, or finding a web page with
specific information) [3, 249]. The searchability of a social network [249] is the
average number of nodes that need to be accessed to reach the destination. De-
gree distribution is also used to investigate the robustness and vulnerability of a
network in terms of the network response to attacks on its nodes or links [43, 128].
The papers [252, 253] further use degree-dependent tools for classification of so-
cial networks.
Social sensors for tracking a Markovian target: Tracking a time-varying
parameter that evolves according to a finite-state Markov chain has several appli-
cations in target tracking [87], change detection [30], multi-user detection in wire-
less systems [259], and economics [164]. In this chapter, we consider a dynamic
social network where the interactions between nodes evolve over time according
to a Markov process that undergoes infrequent jumps (the state of nature). An ex-
ample of such social networks is the friendship network among residents of a city,
where the dynamics of the network change in the event of a large festival. (Fur-
ther examples are provided in Chapter 4.) In this chapter, we introduce Markov-
modulated random graphs to mimic social networks where the interactions among
nodes evolve over time due to the underlying dynamics (state of nature). These
social networks can be used as a social sensor for tracking the underlying state
of nature. That is, using noisy measurements of the degree distribution of the
network, the jumps in the underlying state of nature can be tracked.
3.1.2 Main Results
Markov-modulated random graphs are introduced in §3.2. We then provide a
degree distribution analysis for such graph in §3.3 that allows us to determine the
relation between the structure of the network (in terms of connectivity) and the un-
derlying state of nature. Indeed, it will be shown in §3.3 that there exists a unique
2A giant component is a connected component with size O(n), where n is the total number
of vertices in the graph. If the average degree of a random graph is strictly greater than one, then
there exists a unique giant component with probability one [61], and the size of this component
can be computed from the expected degree sequence.
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Figure 3.1: Tracking the underlying state of nature using a Markov-modulated
random graph as a social sensor.
stationary degree distribution for the Markov-modulated graph for each state of
the underlying Markov chain. It thus suffices to estimate the degree distribution
in order to track the underlying state of nature. Next, a stochastic approximation
algorithm is proposed to track the empirical degree distribution of the Markov-
modulated random graph. In particular, we address the following two questions
in §3.5:
• How can a social sensor estimate (track) the empirical degree distribu-
tion using a stochastic approximation algorithm with no knowledge of the
Markovian dynamics?
• How accurate are the estimates generated by the stochastic approximation
algorithm when the random graph evolves according to the duplication-
deletion model with Markovian switching?
By tracking the degree distribution of a Markov-modulated random graph, we
can design a social sensor to track the underlying state of nature using the noisy
measurements of nodes’ connectivity; see Figure 3.1.
3.1.3 Related Works
For the background and fundamentals on social and economic networks, we refer
to [132]. The reader is also referred to [167] for a comprehensive development
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of stochastic approximation algorithms. Adaptive algorithms and stochastic ap-
proximations are used in a wide range of applications such as system identifica-
tion, control theory, adaptive filtering, state estimation, and wireless communica-
tions [188, 196, 69]. Tracking capability of regime switching stochastic approx-
imation algorithms is further investigated in [260] in terms of the mean square
error. Different applications of social sensors in detection and estimation are in-
vestigated in [222, 60, 7]. The differences between social sensors, social sensing,
and pervasive sensors along with challenges and open areas in social sensors are
further presented in [221].
Here, the related literature on dynamic social networks is reviewed briefly.
The book [74] provides a detailed exposition of random graphs. The dynam-
ics of random graphs are investigated in the mathematics literature, for example,
see [61, 84, 178] and the reference therein. In [211], a duplication model is pro-
posed where at each time step a new node joins the network. However, the dy-
namics of this model do not evolve over time. In [61], it is shown that the degree
distribution of such networks satisfies a power law. In random graphs which sat-
isfy the power law, the number of nodes with an specific degree depends on a
parameter called “power law exponent” [133, 250]. A generalized Markov graph
model for dynamic social networks along with its application in social network
synthesis and classification is also presented in [253].
Experimental Studies:
1) Degree distribution analysis: The degree distribution analysis of real-world
networks has attracted much attentions recently, [6, 64, 77, 105, 204, 201, 148].
A large network dataset collection can be found in [174], which includes datasets
from social networks, web graphs, road networks, internet networks, citation net-
works, collaboration networks, and communication networks. The paper [201]
investigates the structure of scientific collaboration networks in terms of degree
distribution, existence of giant component, and the average degree of separation.
In the scientific collaboration networks, two scientists are connected if they have
co-authored a paper. Another example is the degree distribution of the affiliation
network of actors.
2) Social Networks as Social Sensors: With a large number of rational agents,
social networks can be viewed as social sensors for extracting information about
the world or people. For example, the paper [222] presents a social sensor (based
on Twitter) for real-time event detection of earthquakes in Japan, namely, the tar-
get event. They perform semantic analysis on tweets (which are related to the
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target event) in order to detect the occurrence and the location of the target event
(earthquake). Another example is the use of the social network as a sensor for
early detection of contagious outbreaks [60]. Using the fact that central individu-
als in a social network are likely to be infected sooner than others, a social sensor
is designed for the early detection of contagious outbreaks in [60]. The perfor-
mance of this social sensor was verified during a flu outbreak at Harvard College
in 2009—the experimental studies showed that this social sensor provides a sig-
nificant additional time to react to epidemics in the society.
3.2 Markov-Modulated Random Graphs
To mimic dynamic social networks, we consider Markov-modulated random graphs
of the duplication-deletion type. Let n = 0, 1, 2, . . . denote discrete time. Denote
by θn a discrete-time Markov chain with state space
M = {1, 2, ...,M}, (3.1)
evolving according to the M ×M transition probability matrix
Aρ = I + ρQ, (3.2)
and initial probability distribution π0. Here, I is an M ×M identity matrix, ρ is a
small positive real number, and Q is an irreducible generator of a continues-time
Markov chain satisfying
qij > 0, for i 6= j, and Q1 = 0 (3.3)
where 1 and 0 represent column vectors of ones and zeros, respectively. The
transition probability matrix Aρ is therefore close to identity matrix. Here and
henceforth, we refer to such a Markov chain θn as a “slow” Markov chain.
A Markov-modulated duplication-deletion random graph is parameterized by
the 7-tuple (M,Aρ, π0, r, p, q, G0). Here, p and q are M-dimensional vectors with
elements p(i) and q(i) ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . ,M , where p(i) denotes the connection
probability, and q(i) denotes the deletion probability. Also, r ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the probability of duplication step, and G0 denotes the initial graph at time 0. In
general, G0 can be any finite simple connected graph. For simplicity, we assume
that G0 is a simple connected graph with size N0.
The duplication-deletion random graph3 is constructed via Algorithm 2.
3For convenience in the analysis, assume that a node generated in the duplication step cannot
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Algorithm 2 Markov-modulated Duplication-deletion Graph parameterized by
(M,Aρ, π0, r, p, q, G0)
At time n, given the graph Gn and Markov chain state θn, simulate the following
events:
Step 1: Duplication step: With probability r implement the following steps:
• Choose node u from graph Gn randomly with uniform distribution.
• Vertex-duplication: Generate a new node v.
• Edge-duplication:
– Connect node u to node v. (A new edge between u and v is added to
the graph.)
– Connect each neighbor of node u with probability p(θn) to node v.
These connection events are statistically independent.
Step 2: Deletion Step: With probability q(θn) implement the following steps:
• Edge-deletion: Choose node w randomly from Gn with uniform distribu-
tion. Delete node w along with the connected edges in graph Gn.
• Duplication Step: Implement Step 1.
Step 3: Denote the resulting graph by Gn+1.
Generate θn+1 (Markov chain) using transition matrix Aρ.
Step 4: Network Manager’s Diagnostics: The network manager computes the
estimates of the expected degree distribution.
Set n→ n+ 1 and go to Step 1.
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The Markov-modulated random graph generated by Algorithm 2 mimics so-
cial networks where the interactions between nodes evolve over time due to the
underlying dynamics (state of nature) such as seasonal variations (e.g., the high
school friendship social network evolving over time with different winter/summer
dynamics). In such cases, the connection/deletion probabilities p, q depend on the
state of nature and evolve with time. Algorithm 2 models these time variations as
a finite state Markov chain θn with transition matrix Aρ.
Discussion:
The connection/deletion probabilities p, q can be determined by the solution of
a utility maximization problem. Let U join : [0, 1] × M → R denote a utility
function that gives payoff to an individual who considers to expand his neighbors
in “Edge-duplication step” of Algorithm 2 as a function of (p, θ). Similarly, let
U leave : [0, 1] × M → R denote a utility function that pays off to an individ-
ual who considers to leave the network in “Deletion step” of Algorithm 2 as a
function of (q, θ). With the above utility functions, the probabilities of connec-
tion/deletion when the state of nature is θ can be viewed as the solutions of the
following maximization problems:
p(θ) = argmax
p
{
U join(p, θ)
}
,
q(θ) = argmax
q
{
U leave(q, θ)
}
.
(3.4)
These utility functions can be interpreted in terms of mutual benefits and privacy
concerns. One example could be U join(p, θ) = bjoin(p, θ)− v, where bjoin(p, θ) is
the benefit one obtains by expanding his network with probability p when the un-
derlying state of nature is θ, and v is the cost incurred by sacrificing his “privacy”.
In this example, when an individual decides to leave the network, the utility he
obtains will be U leave(q, θ) = bleave(q, v)− c(θ), where bleave(q, v) is the benefit he
earns by preserving privacy and c(θ) is the benefit he loses by leaving the network
when the underlying state of nature is θ.
be eliminated in the deletion step immediately after its generation—that is, the new node, which
is generated in the vertex-duplication step of Step 2, remains unchanged in Step 3. Also, the
nodes whose degrees are changed in the edge-deletion part of Step 3, remain unchanged in the
duplication part of Step 3 at that time instant. To prevent the isolated nodes, assume that the
neighbor of a node with degree one cannot be eliminated in the deletion step. The duplication step
in Step 2 ensures that the graph size does not decrease.
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3.3 Degree Distribution Analysis of
Markov-modulated Random Graphs
This section presents degree distribution analysis of the fixed size Markov-modulated
duplication-deletion random graph generated according to Algorithm 2. As we
will show shortly, the expected degree distribution of such a graph depends on
the underlying dynamics of the model that follow the state of nature. Therefore,
the expected degree distribution of the graph generated can be used to track the
state of nature. Therefore, the entire social network forms a social sensor. Before
proceeding, let us introduce some notation.
Notation. At each time n, let Nn denote the number of nodes of graph Gn.
Also, let fn(i) denote the number of vertices of graph Gn with degree i. Clearly,∑
i≥1 fn(i) = Nn. Define the “empirical vertex degree distribution” as
gn(i) =
fn(i)
Nn
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ Nn. (3.5)
Note that gn(i) can be viewed as a probability mass function since gn(i) ≥ 0 and∑
i gn(i) = 1. Let gn = E{gn} denote the “expected vertex degree distribution,”
where gn is the empirical degree distribution defined in (3.5).
Consider the sequence of finite duplication-deletion random graphs {Gn},
generated by Algorithm 2 with r = 0. Clearly, the number of vertices in the
graph satisfies Nn = N0 for n = 1, 2, . . ., i.e., size of the graph is fixed. The
following assumption characterizes the Markovian dynamics of the state of the
nature.
Assumption 3.1. The slow Markov chain θn evolves according to the transition
matrix Aρ = I + ρQ, where ρ is a small positive real number and Q = [qij ] is an
irreducible4 generator matrix satisfying
qij ≥ 0, if i 6= j, and
M∑
j=1
qij = 0, ∀i.
The initial distribution π0 is further independent of ρ.
4The irreducibility assumption implies that there exists a unique stationary distribution π ∈
R
M×1 for this Markov chain such that π′ = π′Aρ.
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Theorem 3.3.1 below asserts that the expected degree distribution of the fixed
size Markov-modulated duplication-deletion random graph satisfies a recursive
equation. Using this recursive equation, one can solve for the expected degree
distribution.
Theorem 3.3.1. Consider the fixed size Markov-modulated duplication-deletion
random graph generated according to Algorithm 2, where Aρ = I + ρQ and
r = 0. Let gθn = E{gn|θn = θ} denote the expected degree distribution of nodes
when the state of the underlying Markov chain is θn = θ. Then, gθn satisfies the
following recursion
gθn+1 = (I +
1
N0
L′(θ))gθn (3.6)
where C ′ denotes transpose of a matrix C, and L(θ) is a generator matrix5 with
elements (for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N0):
lji(θ) =

0, j < i− 1,
q(θ)p(θ)i−1 + q(θ)
(
1 + p(θ)(i− 1)), j = i− 1,
iq(θ)p(θ)i−1(1− p(θ))− q(θ)(i+ 2 + p(θ)i), j = i,
q(θ)
(
i+1
i−1
)
p(θ)i−1(1− p(θ))2 + q(θ)(i+ 1), j = i+ 1,
q(θ)
(
j
i−1
)
p(θ)i−1(1− p(θ))j−i+1, j > i+ 1.
(3.7)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 3.3.1 shows that evolution of the expected degree distribution in a
fixed size Markov-modulated duplication-deletion random graph satisfies (3.6).
One can rewrite (3.6) as
gθn+1 = B
′
N0
(θ)gθn (3.8)
where BN0(θ) = I + 1N0L(θ). Since L(θ) is a generator matrix, BN0(θ) can be
considered as the transition matrix of a slow Markov chain. It is also straightfor-
ward to show that for each θ ∈ M, BN0(θ) is irreducible and aperiodic. Hence,
for each state of the Markov chain θ ∈ M, there exists a unique stationary distri-
bution g(θ) such that
g(θ) = B′N0(θ)g(θ). (3.9)
Note that the underlying Markov chain {θn} depends on the small parameter
ρ. The main idea is that, although θn is time-varying but it is piecewise con-
stant (since ρ is small parameter)—it changes slowly over time. Further, in light
5That is, each row adds to zero and each non-diagonal element of L(θ) is positive.
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of (3.6), the evolution of gθn depends on 1N0 . Our assumption throughout this chap-
ter is that ρ≪ 1
N0
. Therefore, the evolution of gθn is faster than the evolution of θn.
That is, gθn reaches its stationary distribution g(θ) before the state of θn changes.
From (3.9), the expected degree distribution of the fixed size Markov-modulated
duplication-deletion random graph can be uniquely computed for each state of the
underlying Markov chain θn = θ. This allows us to track the state of nature θn via
estimating the expected degree distribution as will be shown in §3.5.
3.4 Case Study: Power Law Analysis of Infinite Graph
So far in this chapter, a degree distribution analysis is provided for the fixed size
Markov-modulated random graph generated according to Algorithm 2 with r = 0.
Motivated by applications in social networks, this section extends this analysis
to the infinite duplication-deletion random graphs without Markovian dynamics.
Here, we investigate the random graph generated according to Algorithm 2 with
r = 1, and when there are no Markovian dynamics (M = 1). Since r = 1 for
n ≥ 0, Gn+1 has an extra vertex as compared to Gn. In particular, since G0 is an
empty set, Gn has n nodes, i.e., Nn = n. In the rest of this section, employing the
same approach as in the proof of Theorem 3.3.1, it will be shown that the infinite
duplication-deletion random graph without Markovian dynamics satisfies a power
law. An expression is further derived for the power law exponent.
Let us first define the power law:
Definition 3.1 (Power Law). Consider the infinite duplication-deletion random
graph without Markovian dynamics generated according to Algorithm 2. Let nk
denote the number of nodes of degree k in a random graph Gn. Then, Gn satisfies
a power law distribution if nk is proportional to k−β for a fixed β > 1, i.e.,
lognk = α− β log k
where α is a constant. β is called the power law exponent.
The power law distribution is satisfied in many networks such as WWW-
graphs, peer-to-peer networks, phone call graphs, co-authorship graph and var-
ious massive online social networks (e.g. Yahoo, MSN, Facebook) [24, 34, 63,
88, 145, 232, 236]. The power law exponent describes asymptotic degree distri-
bution of networks from which characteristics of networks such as maximum de-
gree, searchability, existence of giant component, and diameter of the graph can
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be investigated [61, 249]. The following theorem states that the graph generated
according to Algorithm 2 with r = 1 and M = 1 satisfies a power law.
Theorem 3.4.1. Consider the infinite random graph with Markovian dynamicsGn
obtained by Algorithm 2 with 7-tuple (1, 1, 1, 1, p, q, G0) with the expected degree
distribution gn. As n→∞, Gn satisfies a power law. That is,
lim
n→∞
log gn(i) = α− β log i (3.10)
where the power law exponent, β, can be computed from
(1 + q)(pβ−1 + pβ − p) = 1 + βq. (3.11)
Here, p and q are the probabilities defined in duplication and deletion steps, re-
spectively.
Proof. The detailed proof is provided in [114]. Here, we only present an outline of
the proof that comprises of two steps: (i) finding the power law exponent, and (ii)
showing that the degree distribution converges to a power law with the computed
compnent as n → ∞. To find the power law exponent, we derive a recursive
equation for the number of nodes with degree i + 1 at time n + 1, denoted by
fn+1(i+ 1), in terms of the degrees of nodes in graph Gn. Then, rearranging this
recursive equation yields an equation for the power law exponent. To prove that
the degree distribution satisfies a power law, we define a new parameter hn(i) =
1
n
∑i
k=1E{fn(k)} and show that limn→∞ hn(i) =
∑i
k=1Ck
−β
, where β is the
power law exponent computed in the first step.
Theorem 3.4.1 asserts that the infinite duplication-deletion random graph with-
out Markovian dynamics generated by Algorithm 2 satisfies a power law and pro-
vides an expression for the power law exponent. The significance of this theorem
is that it ensures, with use of one single parameter (the power law exponent),
we can describe the degree distribution of large numbers of nodes in graphs that
model social networks. The above result slightly extends [62, 211], where only
a duplication model is considered. However, a graph generated by any arbitrary
pure duplication step may not satisfy the power law6. Theorem 3.4.1 allows us
to explore characteristics (such as searchability, diffusion, and existence/size of
the giant component) of large networks which can be modeled with the infinite
duplication-deletion random graphs.
6Bebek et al. in [25] provide conditions on the dynamics of the duplication process such that
the resulting graph satisfies a power law.
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Figure 3.2: The power law exponent for the non-Markovian random graph gener-
ated according to Algorithm 2 obtained by (3.11) for different values of p and q in
Algorithm 2.
Remark 3.1 (Power Law Exponent). Let β∗ denote the solution of (3.11). Then,
the power law exponent is defined as β = max{1, β∗}. Figure 3.2 shows the
power law exponent and β∗ versus p for different values of probability of deletion
q. As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the power law exponent is increasing in q and
decreasing in p.
3.5 Social Network as a Social Sensor
In §3.3, a degree distribution analysis has been provided for the fixed size Markov-
modulated duplication-deletion random graph generated by Algorithm 2. It was
further shown in §3.3 that there exists a unique stationary degree distribution for
each state of the underlying Markov chain {θn} which represents state of nature.
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In this section, we assume that the empirical degree distribution of the graph,
gn, is observed in noise. Motivated by social sensor applications, the aim here
is to track the unknown state of nature—without knowing the dynamics of the
graph—using noisy observations of degree distribution. Since the expected degree
distribution of the Markov-modulated duplication-deletion random graph depends
on the underlying Markov chain, the state of nature can be estimated via tracking
the expected degree distribution; see (3.7). Here, the social network is used to
track the underlying state of nature. Therefore, the entire social network forms a
social sensor.
The degree distribution of the network generated according to Algorithm 2 is
measured in noise as follows
f̂n = fn + ωn. (3.12)
Here, at each time n, the elements ωn(i) of the noise vector are integer-valued
zero mean random variables, and
∑
i≥1 ωn(i) = 0. The zero sum assumption
ensures that f̂n is a valid empirical distribution. The observation process can be
viewed as counting the number of nodes with specific degree by the administrator
of the network. In terms of the empirical vertex distribution, one can rewrite this
measurement process as
yn(i) =
f̂n(i)∑
i≥0 f̂n(i)
=
f̂n(i)
N0
= gn(i) +
1
N0
ωn(i).
That is, the vertex distribution gn of the graph Gn is measured in noise:
yn = gn + en (3.13)
where en = ωnN0 . Recall that Nn = N0 when r = 0. The normalized noisy
observations yn are used to estimate the empirical probability mass function of the
degree of each node. To estimate a time-varying probability mass function (pmf),
the following stochastic approximation algorithm with (small positive) constant
step-size ε is used
ĝn+1 = ĝn + ε (yn − ĝn) . (3.14)
Note that the stochastic approximation algorithm (3.14) does not assume any
knowledge of the Markov-modulated dynamics of the graph (state of nature). The
Markov chain assumption for the random graph dynamics is only used in our con-
vergence and tracking analysis. By means of the stochastic approximation (3.14),
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the social sensor can track the expected degree distribution and, consequently, the
underlying state of nature.
Example 3.1. Consider the scenario that the underlying Markov chain (state of
nature) has M = 2 states with slow transition matrix Aρ = I + ρQ. Assume
that the size of the graph N0 is sufficiently large such that the evolution of gθn is
faster than the evolution of θn. This means that the expected degree distribution
gθn reaches its stationary distribution (g(θ)) before the state of θn changes. The
stationary distribution in this example, which can be computed from (3.6), can
be either g(1) (if the state of nature is θ = 1) or g(2) (if the state of nature is
θ = 2). Assume that there exist a network administrator who has access to noisy
measurements of nodes’ degrees yn (e.g., by counting the number of nodes with
specific degrees). Then, by use of the stochastic approximation algorithm (3.14),
the network administrator is able to precisely track the expected degree distri-
bution. From the estimated degree distribution, the network administrator can
estimate the current state of nature. In this example, the social network is used
to estimate the unknown state of nature from noisy observations recorded from
the network, therefore, can be viewed as a social sensor. In the next subsection,
we show that the distance from the expected degree distribution and the estimates
obtained by stochastic approximation algorithm (3.14) is bounded.
3.5.1 Tracking Error of the Stochastic Approximation Algo-
rithm
The goal here is to analyze how well the algorithm tracks the empirical degree
distribution of the graph (and consequently the state of nature). To this end, we
analyze the asymptotic behavior of the estimated degree distribution. Define the
tracking error as g˜n = ĝn− g(θn). Theorem 3.5.1 below shows that the difference
between the sample path and the expected probability mass function is small—
implying that the stochastic approximation algorithm can successfully track the
Markov-modulated node distribution given the noisy measurements. We again
emphasize that no knowledge of the Markov chain parameters are required in the
algorithm. It also finds the order of this difference in terms of ε and ρ.
Theorem 3.5.1. Consider the random graph (M,Aρ, π0, p, q, r, G0). Suppose7
that ρ2 = o(ε). Then, for sufficiently large n, the tracking error of the stochastic
7In this chapter, we assume that ρ = O(ε). Therefore, ρ2 = o(ε).
60 CHAPTER 3. TRACKING DEGREE DISTRIBUTION
approximation algorithm (3.14) satisfies
E|g˜n|2 = O
(
ε+ ρ+
ρ2
ε
)
. (3.15)
Proof. The proof uses the perturbed Lyapunov function method and is provided
in Appendix A.2.
As a corollary of Theorem 3.5.1, we obtain the following mean square error
convergence result.
Corollary 3.1. Under the conditions of Theorem 3.5.1, if ρ = O(ε),
E|g˜n|2 = O(ε).
Therefore,
lim sup
ε→0
E|g˜n|2 = 0.
3.5.2 Limit System Characterization
The following theorem asserts that the sequence of estimates generated by the
stochastic approximation algorithm (3.14) follows the dynamics of a Markov-
modulated ordinary differential equation (ODE).
Before proceeding with the main theorem below, let us recall a definition.
Definition 3.2 (Weak Convergence). Let Zk and Z be Rr-valued random vectors.
We say Zk converges weakly to Z (Zk ⇒ Z) if for any bounded and continuous
function f(·), Ef(Zk)→ Ef(Z) as k →∞.
Weak convergence is a generalization of convergence in distribution to a func-
tion space8.
Theorem 3.5.2. Consider the Markov-modulated random graph generated ac-
cording to Algorithm 2, and the sequence of estimates {ĝn}, generated by the
stochastic approximation algorithm (3.14). Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds and
ρ = O(ε). Define the continuous-time interpolated process
ĝε(t) = ĝn, θ
ε(t) = θn for t ∈ [nε, (n+ 1)ε). (3.16)
8We refer the interested reader to [167, Chapter 7] for further details on weak convergence and
related matters. Appendix A.3 contains a brief outline.
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Then, as ε → 0, (ĝε(·), θε(·)) converges weakly to (ĝ(·), θ(·)), where θ(·) is
a continuous-time Markov chain with generator Q, ĝ(·) satisfies the Markov-
modulated ODE
dĝ(t)
dt
= −ĝ(t) + g(θ(t)), ĝ(0) = ĝ0 (3.17)
and g(θ) is defined in (3.9).
The above theorem asserts that the limit system associated with the stochastic
approximation algorithm (3.14) is a Markovian switched ODE (3.17). As men-
tioned in §3.3, this is unusual since typically in the averaging theory analysis of
stochastic approximation algorithms, convergence occurs to a deterministic ODE.
The intuition behind this somewhat unusual result is that the Markov chain evolves
on the same time-scale as the stochastic approximation algorithm. If the Markov
chain evolved on a faster time-scale, then the limiting dynamics would indeed be a
deterministic ODE weighed by the stationary distribution of the Markov chain. If
the Markov chain evolved slower than the dynamics of the stochastic approxima-
tion algorithm, then the asymptotic behavior would also be a deterministic ODE
with the Markov chain being a constant.
3.5.3 Scaled Tracking Error
Next, we study the behavior of the scaled tracking error between the estimates
generated by the stochastic approximation algorithm (3.14) and the expected de-
gree distribution. The following theorem states that the tracking error should also
satisfy a switching diffusion equation and provides a functional central limit theo-
rem for this scaled tracking error. Let νk = ĝk−E{g(θk)}√ε denote the scaled tracking
error.
Theorem 3.5.3. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. Define νε(t) = νk for t ∈
[kε, (k + 1)ε). Then, (νε(·), θε(·)) converges weakly to (ν(·), θ(·)) such that ν(·)
is the solution of the following Markovian switched diffusion process
ν(t) = −
∫ t
0
ν(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ
1
2 (θ(τ))dω(τ). (3.18)
Here, ω(·) is an RN0-dimensional standard Brownian motion. The covariance
matrix Σ(θ) in (3.18) can be explicitly computed as
Σ(θ) = Z(θ)′D(θ) +D(θ)Z(θ)−D(θ)− g(θ)g′(θ). (3.19)
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Here, D(θ) = diag(g(θ, 1), . . . , g(θ,N0)) and Z(θ) = (I − BN0(θ) + 1g′(θ))−1,
where BN0(θn) and g(θ) are defined in (3.3) and (3.9), respectively.
For general switching processes, we refer to [263]. In fact, more complex
continuous-state dependent switching rather than Markovian switching are con-
sidered there. Equation (3.19) reveals that the covariance matrix of the tracking
error depends on BN0(θ) and g(θ) and, consequently, on the parameters p and q
of the random graph. Recall from §3.3 that BN0(θ) is the transition matrix of the
Markov chain which models the evolution of the expected degree distribution in
Markov modulated random graphs and can be computed from Theorem 3.3.1. The
covariance of the tracking error, which can be explicitly computed from (3.19), is
useful for computational purposes.
3.6 A Note on Degree-based Graph Construction
The first step in numerical studies of social networks is the graphical modeling
of such networks. A graph can be uniquely determined by the adjacency matrix
(also known as the connectivity matrix) of the graph. However, in the graphical
modeling of social networks (specially when the size of the network is relatively
large), the only available information is the degree sequence of nodes, and not the
adjacency matrix of the network.
Definition 3.3. The degree sequence, denoted by d, is a non-increasing sequence
comprising of the vertex degrees of the graph vertices.
The degree sequence, in general, does not specify the graph uniquely; there
can be a large number of graphs that realize a given degree sequence. It is straight-
forward to show that not all integer sequences represent a true degree sequence of
a graph. For example, sequence d = {2, 1, 1} represents a tree with two edges, but
d = {3, 2, 1} cannot be realized as the degree sequence of a simple graph. Mo-
tivated by social network applications, this section addresses the following two
questions given a degree sequence d:
• Existence Problem: Is there any simple graph that realizes d?
• Construction Problem: How can we construct all simple graphs that realize
a true degree sequence d?
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There are two well-known results that address the existence problem: (i) the
Erdo¨s-Gallai theorem [82] and the Havel-Hakimi theorem [123, 111]. These the-
orems provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sequence of non-negative
integers to be a true degree sequence of a simple graph. Here, we recall these
results without proofs.
Theorem 3.6.1 (Erdo¨s-Gallai, [82]). Let d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dn > 0 be integers.
Then, the degree sequence d = {d1, · · · , dn} is graphical if and only if
1.
∑n
i=1 di is even;
2. for all 1 ≤ k < n:
k∑
i=1
di ≤ k(k − 1) +
n∑
i=k+1
min {k, di}. (3.20)
It is shown in [244] that there is no need to check (3.20) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1;
it suffices to check (3.20) for 1 ≤ k ≤ s, where s is chosen such that ds ≥ s and
ds+1 < s + 1. Note that, in degree-based graph construction, we only care about
nodes of degree greater than zero; zero-degree nodes are isolated nodes which can
be added to the graph consisting of nodes of degree greater than zero.
The Havel-Hakimi theorem also provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for a degree sequence to be graphical. It also gives a greedy algorithm to construct
a graph from a given graphical degree sequence.
Theorem 3.6.2 (Havel-Hakimi, [123, 111]). Let d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dn > 0 be
integers. Then, the degree sequence d = {d1, · · · , dn} is graphical if and only
if the degree sequence d′ = {d2 − 1, d3 − 1, · · · , dd1+1 − 1, dd1+2, · · · , dn} is
graphical.
In the following, we provide algorithms to construct a simple graph from a
true degree sequence. In the construction problem, the degree sequence is treated
as a collection of half-edges; a node with degree di has di half-edges. One end of
these half-edges are fixed at node i, but the other ends are free. An edge between
node i and node j is formed by connecting a half-edge from node i to a half-
edge from node j. The aim is to connect all these half edges such that no free
half-edge is left. The Havel-Hakimi theorem provides a recursive procedure to
construct a graph from a graphical degree sequence. This procedure is presented
in Algorithm 3
Using Algorithm 3, one can sample from graphical realizations of a given
degree sequence. In this algorithm, each vertex is first connected to nodes with
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Algorithm 3 Creating a sample graph from a given degree sequence
Given a graphical sequence d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dn > 0:
Start from i = 1
(i) Initialize k = n.
(ii) Connect (one half-edge of) node i to (a half-edge of) node k
(iii) Check that the resulting degree sequence is graphical
– if Yes:
1. Let k = k − 1.
2. Repeat (i).
– if No:
1. Save the connection between node i and node k
2. If node i has any half-edges left, let k = k − 1 and repeat (i)
(iv) If i < n, then, i← i+ 1 and repeat (i).
lower degrees. Therefore, Algorithm 3 generates graphs where high-degree nodes
tend to connect to low-degree nodes; the resulting graph has assortative prop-
erty [143, 202]. To overcome this problem, one way is to perform edge swapping
repeatedly such that the final graph looses its assortative property. In the edge
swapping method, two edges (for example (1,2) and (3,4)) can be swapped (to
(1,4) and (2,3)) without changing the degree sequence. Edge swapping method is
also used to generate all samples from a given degree sequence; one sample is gen-
erated via Algorithm 3 and then, by use of Markov chain Monte-Carlo algorithm
based on edge swapping [242], other samples from the graphical realizations of
the degree sequence are obtained.
In [143] a swap-free algorithm is proposed to generate all graphical realiza-
tions of a true degree sequence. Before proceeding to Algorithm 4, we first pro-
vide definitions which will be used in this algorithm.
Definition 3.4. Let d = {d1, · · · , dn} be a degree sequence of a simple graph and
N(i) be the set of adjacent nodes of node i. Then, the degree sequence reduced
by N(i) is denoted by d|N(i) = {d1|N(i), · · · , dn|N(i)} with elements defined as
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follows
dk|N(i) =
{
dk − 1, if k ∈ N(i),
0, if k = i,
dk, otherwise.
(3.21)
Definition 3.5. Let (a1, a2, . . . , an) and (b1, b2, . . . , bn) be two sequences. Then,
(a1, a2, . . . , an) <CR (b1, b2, . . . , bn) if and only if there exists an index m such
that 1 ≤ m ≤ n and am < bm and ai = bi for all m < i ≤ n.
Let d be a non-increasing graphical degree sequence. In order to construct
the graph, we need to find all possible neighbors N(i) (“allowed set”) of each
node i such that if we connect this node to its allowed set, then the resulting re-
duced degree sequence d|N(i) is also graphical, i.e., the graphicality is preserved.
Algorithm 4 provides a systematic way (swap-free) to generate all graphical real-
izations of a true degree sequence (by means of finding all possible neighbors of
each node).
3.7 Numerical Examples
In this section, numerical examples are given to illustrate the results from §3.3
and §3.5. The main conclusions are:
1. The infinite duplication-deletion random graph without Markovian dynam-
ics generated by Algorithm 2 satisfies a power law as stated in Theorem 3.4.1.
This is illustrated in Example 3.2 below.
2. The degree distribution of the fixed size duplication-deletion random graph
generated by Algorithm 2 can be computed from Theorem 3.3.1. This is
shown in Example 3.3 below.
3. The estimates obtained by stochastic approximation algorithm (3.14) follow
the expected probability distribution precisely without information about
the Markovian dynamics. This is illustrated in Example 3.4 below.
Example 3.2. Consider an infinite duplication-deletion random graph without
Markovian dynamics generated by Algorithm 2 with p = 0.5 and q = 0.1. Theo-
rem 3.4.1 implies that the degree sequence of the resulting graph satisfies a power
law with exponent computed using (3.11). Figure 3.3 shows the number of nodes
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Algorithm 4 Constructing all graphs from a graphical degree sequence [143]
Given a graphical sequence d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dn > 0
Start from i = 1
Step 1: Find neighbors with highes index of node i
The aim is to find AR(i):
(i) Initialize k = n.
(ii) Connect node i to node k
(iii) Check that the resulting degree sequence is graphical
– if Yes:
1. Let k = k − 1
2. Repeat (i).
– if No:
1. Save the connection between node i and node k
2. If node i has any stubs left, let k = k − 1 and repeat (i)
Step 2: Find all possible neighbors of node i
With <CR defined in (3.5), the aim is to find
A(i) = {N(i) = {v1, · · · , vdi};N(i) <CR AR(i) and d|N(i) is graphical}
(i) Find all sets of nodes who are colexicographically smaller than AR(1)
(prospective neighbor sets).
(ii) Connect node i to those neighbors and check if the resulting degree se-
quence is graphical.
Step 3: For every N(i) ∈ A(i):
• Connect node i to N(i)
• Discard node i and compute the reduced degree sequence d|N(i)
• Create all graphs from degree sequence d|N(i) using this algorithm
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Duplication-deletion random graph generated by Algorithm 1
A line with slope −β = −2.68 obtained by Eq. (2.3)
Figure 3.3: The degree distribution of the duplication-deletion random graph sat-
isfies a power law. The parameters are specified in Example 3.2 of §3.7.
with specific degree on a logarithmic scale for both horizontal and vertical axes.
It can be inferred from the linearity in Figure 3.3 (excluding the nodes with very
small degree), that the resulting graph from duplication-deletion process satisfies
a power law. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, the power law is a better approximation
for the middle points compared to the both ends.
Example 3.3. Consider the fixed size duplication-deletion random graph obtained
by Algorithm 2 with r = 0, N0 = 10, p = 0.4, and q = 0.1. (We consider
no Markovian dynamics here to illustrate Theorem 3.3.1.) Figure 3.5 depicts the
degree distribution of the fixed size duplication-deletion random graph obtained
by Theorem 3.3.1. As can be seen in Figure 3.5, the computed degree distribution
is close to that obtained by simulation.
Example 3.4. Consider the fixed size Markov-modulated duplication-deletion ran-
dom graph generated by Algorithm 2 with r = 0 and N0 = 500. Assume that the
underlying Markov chain has three states, M = 3. We choose the following val-
ues for probabilities of connection and deletion: state (1): p = q = 0.05, state
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Figure 3.4: The estimated degree distribution obtained by the stochastic approxi-
mation algorithm (3.14) and the expected degree distribution computed from (3.9).
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Figure 3.5: The degree distribution of the fixed size Markov-modulated
duplication-deletion random graph. The parameters are specified in Example 3.3
of §3.7.
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(2): p = 0.2 and q = 0.1, and state (3): p = 0.4, q = 0.15. The sample path of
the Markov chain jumps at time n = 3000 from state (1) to state (2) and at time
n = 6000 from state (2) to state (3). As the state of the Markov chain changes, the
expected degree distribution, g(θ), obtained by (3.9) evolves over time. Only one
element of the expected degree distribution vector is shown in Figure 3.4 via a dot-
ted line. The estimated probability mass function, ĝn, obtained by the stochastic
approximation algorithm (3.14) is plotted in Figure 3.4 using a solid line. The fig-
ure shows that the estimates obtained by the stochastic approximation algorithm
(3.14) follow the expected degree distribution obtained by (3.9) precisely without
any information about the Markovian dynamics.
3.8 Closing Remarks
Summary
The interaction between nodes in dynamic social networks is not always fixed and
may evolve over time. An example of such time-varying dynamics is the seasonal
variations in friendship among college students. The Markov-modulated random
graph generated by Algorithm 2 mimics such networks where the dynamics (the
connection/deletion probabilities p, q) depend on the state of nature and evolve
over time. Algorithm 2 models these time variations as a finite state Markov chain
{θn}. This model forms our basis to analyze social networks.
We analyzed Markov-modulated duplication-deletion random graphs in terms
of degree distribution. When the size of graph is fixed (r = 0) and ρ is small, the
expected degree distribution of the Markov-modulated duplication-deletion ran-
dom graph can be uniquely computed from (3.6) for each state of the underlying
Markov chain. This result allows us to express the structure of network (degree
distribution) in terms of the dynamics of the model.
We also showed that, when the size of the graph is fixed and there is no Marko-
vian dynamics (M = 1, r = 1), the random graph generated according to Algo-
rithm 2 satisfies a power law with exponent computed from (3.11). The impor-
tance of this result is that a single parameter (power law exponent) characterizes
the structure of a possibly very large dynamic network.
We further used a stochastic approximation algorithm to estimate the empir-
ical degree distribution of random graphs. The stochastic approximation algo-
rithm (3.14) does not assume any knowledge of the Markov-modulated dynam-
ics of the graph (state of nature). Since the expected degree distribution can be
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uniquely computed, a social sensor can be designed based on (3.14) to track the
state of nature using the noisy observations of nodes’ degrees. Theorem 3.5.1
showed that the tracking error of the stochastic approximation algorithm is small
and is in order of O(ε).
Finally, a discussion on graph construction was provided for simulation pur-
poses.
Extensions
Here, we discuss some possible extensions of the framework used in this chapter
and avenues for future research which are relevant to social sensors.
In addition to degree distribution, there are some other measures that charac-
terize large networks such as diameter, average path length, clustering, and cen-
trality [132]; for example, [253] uses degree distribution and clustering coefficient
to classify social networks. An extension to this work is to use stochastic approxi-
mation algorithms and graph theoretic tools employed in this chapter for tracking
other characteristics of large networks.
In this chapter, we used probabilistic sampling to obtain measurements from
degree distribution. That is, some nodes are randomly chosen and enquired about
the number of their neighbors. Another extension to this work is to employ
Respondent-driven sampling (RDS) [124, 125, 172] as an approach for sampling
from hidden networks in the society. To quote [124],
“hidden populations have two characteristics: first, no sampling frame
exists so that the size and boundaries of the population are unknown
and second, there exist strong privacy concerns, because membership
involves stigmatized or illegal behavior, leading individuals to refuse
to cooperate or provide unreliable answers to protect their privacy.”
An example of hidden populations is the network of active injection drug users.
Algorithm 2 mimics these hidden populations as well: A person usually becomes
active injection drug user through another active drug user. Then, he expands
his network by connecting to other drug users in this population. An extension
to this work is to employ RDS9 to record observations about nodes’ connectivity
in hidden populations in order to track the structure (degree distribution) of such
populations.
9RDS is described in Chapter 4 of this monograph.
Chapter 4
Sensing with Information Diffusion
in Complex Social Networks
4.1 Introduction
This chapter considers how a behavior diffuses over a social network comprising
of a population of interacting agents and how an underlying stochastic state can be
estimated based on sampling the population. As described in [184], there is a wide
range of social phenomena such as diffusion of technological innovations, cultural
fads, and economic conventions [50] where individual decisions are influenced by
the decisions of others. A large body of research on social networks has been
devoted to the diffusion of information (e.g., ideas, behaviors, trends) [108], and
particularly on finding a set of target nodes so as to maximize the spread of a given
product [193, 56].
Consider a social network where the states of individual nodes evolve over
time as a probabilistic function of the states of their neighbors and an underlying
target process. The evolution in the state of agents in the network can be viewed
as diffusion of information in the network. Such Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
(SIS) models for diffusion of information in social networks has been extensively
studied in [132, 183, 184, 212, 249] to model, for example, the adoption of a new
technology in a consumer market.
In this chapter we consider two extensions of the SIS model: First, the states of
individual nodes evolve over time as a probabilistic function of the states of their
neighbors and an underlying target process. The underlying target process can
be viewed as the market conditions or competing technologies that evolve with
71
72 CHAPTER 4. SENSING WITH INFORMATION DIFFUSION
time and affect the information diffusion. Second, the nodes in the social network
are sampled randomly to determine their state. (We will review two recent meth-
ods for sampling social networks, namely, social sampling and respondent-driven
sampling.) As the adoption of the new technology diffuses through the network,
its effect is observed via sentiments (such as tweets) of these selected members of
the population. These selected nodes act as social sensors. In signal processing
terms, the underlying target process can be viewed as a signal, and the social net-
work can be viewed as a sensor. The key difference compared to classical signal
processing is that the social network (sensor) has dynamics due to the information
diffusion.
4.1.1 Aim
Our aim is to estimate the underlying target state and the state probabilities of the
nodes by sampling measurements at nodes in the social network. In a Bayesian
estimation context, this is equivalent to a filtering problem involving estimation
of the state of a prohibitively large scale Markov chain in noise. The key idea
is to use mean field dynamics as an approximation (with provable bounds) for
the information diffusion and, thereby, obtain a tractable model. Such mean field
dynamics1 have been studied in [27] and applied to social networks in [183, 184,
249]. For an excellent recent exposition of interacting particle systems comprising
of agents each with a finite state space, see [9], where the more apt term “Finite
Markov Information Exchange (FMIE) process” is used.
4.1.2 Motivation
A typical application of such social sensors arises in the measurement of the adop-
tion of a new product using a micro-blogging platform like Twitter. The adoption
of the technology diffuses through the market but its effects can only be observed
through the tweets of select individuals of the population. These selected indi-
viduals act as sensors for estimating the diffusion. They interact and learn from
the decisions (tweeted sentiments) of other members. (This is similar to social
learning.) Suppose the state of nature changes suddenly due to a sudden market
shock or presence of a new competitor. The goal for a market analyst or product
1Recently, there has also been substantial interest in mean field games [129]. These are outside
the scope of the current monograph.
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manufacturer is to estimate the target state so as to detect the market shock or new
competitor. This is a Bayesian filtering problem2.
To quote from Wikipedia: “Sentiment analysis refers to the use of natural
language processing, text analysis and computational linguistics to identify and
extract subjective information in source materials.” The following excerpt from
[28] illustrates the increasing importance of social sentiment with the growth of
social networking:
• “53% of people on Twitter recommend companies and/or products in their
Tweets, with 48% of them delivering on their intention to buy the product.
(ROI Research for Performance, June 2010)
• The average consumer mentions specific brands over 90 times per week in
conversations with friends, family, and co-workers. (Keller Fay, WOMMA,
2010)
• Consumer reviews are significantly more trusted—nearly 12 times more—
than descriptions that come from manufacturers, according to a survey of
US mom Internet users by online video review site EXPO. (eMarketer,
February 2010)
• In a study conducted by social networking site myYearbook, 81% of re-
spondents said they had received advice from friends and followers relating
to a product purchase through a social site; 74% of those who received such
advice found it to be influential in their decision. (ClickZ, January 2010)
As another example, [222] considers each Twitter user as a sensor and uses a
particle filtering algorithm to estimate the centre of earthquakes and trajectories of
typhoons. As pointed out in [222], an important characteristic of microblogging
services such as Twitter is that they provide real-time sensing—Twitter users tweet
several times a day, whereas standard blog users update information once every
several days.
2A more general approach (which we will not elaborate on) is to formulate the problem as a
Bayesian quickest detection problem (or more generally a stopping time problem) that seeks to
minimize a cost function that involves the sum of the false alarm and decision delay. Bayesian
filtering is of course an integral part of such change detection.
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4.1.3 Experimental Studies
Here, we mention papers that investigate the diffusion of information in real-world
social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and Blogs. Motivated by marketing ap-
plications, [237] studies the diffusion (contagion) behaviour in Facebook3. Using
data on around 260000 Facebook pages4, [237] analyzes how information diffuses
on Facebook. The topological and temporal characteristics of information diffu-
sion on weblogs are also studied in [176]. Twitter with around 200 million active
users and 400 million tweets per day, has become a powerful information sharing
tool [168, 256].
4.2 Social Network Model
A social network is modelled as a graph with N vertices:
G = (V,E), where V = {1, 2, . . . , N}, and E ⊆ V × V. (4.1)
Here, V denotes the finite set of vertices, and E denotes the set of edges. In
social networks, it is customary to use the terminology network, nodes and links
for graph, vertices and edges, respectively.
We use the notation (m,n) to refer to a link between node m and n. The
network may be undirected in which case (m,n) ∈ E implies (n,m) ∈ E. In
undirected graphs, to simplify notation, we use the notation m,n to denote the
undirected link between node n and m. If the graph is directed, then (m,n) ∈ E
does not imply that (n,m) ∈ E. We will assume that self loops (reflexive links)
of the form i, i are excluded from E.
An important parameter of a social network G = (V,E) is the connectivity
of its nodes. Let N (m) and D(m) denote the neighbourhood set and degree (or
connectivity) of a node m ∈ V , respectively. That is, with | · | denoting cardinality,
N (m) = {n ∈ V : m,n ∈ E}, D(m) = ∣∣N (m)∣∣. (4.2)
For convenience, we assume that the maximum degree of the network is uniformly
bounded by some fixed integer D.
3In US in 2010, $1.7 billion was spent on advertising through social media. The share of
Facebook is 53% in this market [220].
4Facebook pages usually advertise products, services, bands, celebrities, etc.
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Let N(d) denote the number of nodes with degree d, and let the degree dis-
tribution P (d) specify the fraction of nodes with degree d. That is, for d =
0, 1, . . . , D,
N(d) =
∑
m∈V
I
{
D(m) = d
}
, P (d) =
N(d)
N
.
Here, I {·} denotes the indicator function. Note that ∑d P (d) = 1. The degree
distribution can be viewed as the probability that a node selected randomly with
uniform distribution on V has a connectivity d.
Random graphs generated to have a degree distribution P that is Poisson were
formulated by Erdo¨s and Renyi [83]. Several recent works show that large scale
social networks are characterized by connectivity distributions that are different to
Poisson distributions. For example, the internet, www have a power law connec-
tivity distribution P (d) ∝ d−γ , where γ ranges between 2 and 3. Such scale free
networks are studied in [24]. In the rest of this chapter, we assume that the degree
distribution of the social network is arbitrary but known—allowing an arbitrary
degree distribution facilities modelling complex networks.
4.2.1 Target Dynamics
Let k = 0, 1, . . . denote discrete time. Assume the target process s is a finite state
Markov chain with transition probability
Ass′ = P (sk+1 = s
′|sk = s) . (4.3)
In the example of technology diffusion, the target process can denote the avail-
ability of competition or market forces that determine whether a node adopts the
technology. In the model below, the target state will affect the probability that an
agent adopts the new technology.
4.2.2 Diffusion of Information in Social Network
The model we present below for the diffusion of information in the social network
is called the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model [212, 249]. The diffu-
sion of information is modelled by the time evolution of the state of individual
nodes in the network. Let x(m)k ∈ {0, 1} denote the state at time k of each node
m in the social network. Here, x(m)k = 0 if the agent at time k is susceptible and
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x
(m)
k = 1 if the agent is infected. At time k, the state vector of the N nodes is
xk =
[
x
(1)
k , . . . , x
(N)
k
]′
∈ {0, 1}N . (4.4)
Assume that the process x evolves as a discrete time Markov process with
transition law depending on the target state s. If node m has degree D(m) = d,
then the probability of node m switching from state i to j is
P
(
x
(m)
k+1 = j|x(m)k = i, x(i−)k , sk = s
)
= pij(d, A
(m)
k , s), i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
(4.5)
Here, A(m)k denotes the number of infected neighbors of node m at time k. That
is,
A
(m)
k =
∑
n∈N(m)
I
{
n : x
(m)
k = 1
}
. (4.6)
In words, the transition probability of an agent depends on its degree distribution
and the number of active neighbors.
With the above probabilistic model, we are interested in modelling the evolu-
tion of infected agents over time. Let ρk(d) denote the fraction of infected nodes
at each time k with degree d. We call ρ as the infected node distribution. So
ρk(d) =
1
N(d)
∑
m∈V
I
{
D(m) = d, x
(m)
k = 1
}
, d = 0, 1, . . . , D (4.7)
We assume that the infection spreads according to the following dynamics:
1. At each time instant k, a single agent, denoted by m, amongst the N agents
is chosen uniformly. Therefore, the probability that the chosen agent m
is infected and of degree d is ρk(d)P (d). The probability that the chosen
agent m is susceptible and of degree d is (1− ρk(d))P (d).
2. Depending on whether its state x(m)k is infected or susceptible, the state of
agent m evolves according to the transition probabilities specified in (4.5).
With the Markov chain transition dynamics of individual agents specified above,
it is clear that the infected distribution ρk =
(
ρk(1), . . . , ρk(D)
)
is an
∏D
d=1N(d)
state Markov chain. Indeed, given ρk(d), due to the infection dynamics specified
above
ρk+1(d) ∈
{
ρk(d)− 1
N(d)
, ρk(d) +
1
N(d)
}
. (4.8)
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Our aim below is to specify the transition probabilities of the Markov chain ρ. Let
us start with the following statistic that forms a convenient parametrization of the
transition probabilities. Given the infected node distribution ρk at time k, define
θ(ρk) as the probability that at time k a uniformly sampled link in the network
points to an infected node. We call θ(ρk) as the infected link probability. Clearly
θ(ρk) =
∑D
d=1 (# of links from infected node of degree d)∑D
d=1 (# of links of degree d)
=
∑D
d=1 d P (d) ρk(d)∑D
d d P (d)
. (4.9)
In terms of the infected link probability θ, we can now specify the scaled
transition probabilities5 of the process ρ:
p01(d, θk, s)
defn
=
1
P (d)
P
(
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d) +
1
N(d)
∣∣∣sk = s)
= (1− ρk(d))
d∑
a=0
p01(d, a, s)P(a out of l neighbors infected)
= (1− ρk(d))
d∑
a=0
p01(d, a, s)
(
d
a
)
θak(1− θk)d−a (4.10)
p10(d, θk, s)
defn
=
1
P (d)
P
(
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d)− 1
N(d)
∣∣∣sk = s)
= ρk(d)
d∑
a=0
p10(d, a, s)
(
d
a
)
θak(1− θk)d−a. (4.11)
In the above, the notation θk is the short form for θ(ρk). The transition probabili-
ties p01 and p10 defined above model the diffusion of information about the target
state s over the social network. We have the following martingale representation
theorem for the evolution of Markov process ρ.
Let Fk denote the sigma algebra generated by {ρ0, . . . , ρk, s0, . . . sk}.
5The transition probabilities are scaled by the degree distribution P (d) for notational conve-
nience. Indeed, since N(d) = NP (d), by using these scaled probabilities we can express the
dynamics of the process ρ in terms of the same-step size 1/N as described in Theorem 4.2.1.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the degree distribution P (d), d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}, is uni-
formly bounded away from zero. That is, mind P (d) > ǫ for some positive constant ǫ.
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Theorem 4.2.1. For d = 1, 2, . . . , D, the infected distributions evolve as
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d) +
1
N
[p01(d, θ(ρk), sk)− p10(d, θ(ρk), sk) + wk+1] (4.12)
where w is a martingale increment process, that is E{wk+1|Fk} = 0. Recall s is
the finite state Markov chain that models the target process.
The above theorem is a well-known martingale representation of a Markov
chain [78]—it says that a discrete time Markov process can be obtained by dis-
crete time filtering of a martingale increment process. The theorem implies that
the infected distribution dynamics resemble what is commonly called a stochastic
approximation (adaptive filtering) algorithm in statistical signal processing: the
new estimate is the old estimate plus a noisy update (the “noise” being a mar-
tingale increment) that is weighed by a small step size 1/N when N is large.
Subsequently, we will exploit the structure in Theorem 4.2.1 to devise a mean
field dynamics model which has a state of dimension D. This is to be compared
with the intractable state dimension
∏D
d=1N(d) of the Markov chain ρ.
Remark 4.1 (Data Incest). In the above susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS)
model, the following sequence of events that is similar to a data incest event
(discussed in §2.3) is possible: Node m infects its neighbor node n; then, node
m switches in state from infected to susceptible; then, node n re-infects node
m. Therefore, misinformation can propagate in the network according to such
loops. An alternative model is the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model
where each node has three states: susceptible, infected, and recovered. If the
recovered state is made absorbing, then such incest events can be eliminated.
Example 4.1. We discuss examples of transition probabilities pij(d, A(m)k , s) de-
fined in (4.5) for information diffusion. These examples are provided in [183] and
deal with how the use of a new technology/product spreads in a social network.
Let the state of agent m be x(m)k = 0 if the agent at time k has not adopted the
new technology, and x(m)k = 1 if the agent has adopted the new technology. As
mentioned earlier, the target state sk determines the availability of a competing
technology/product or, alternatively, the available market for the product.
In deciding whether to adopt the new technology, each agent m considers the
following costs and rewards:
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1. The cost nodem pays for adopting the new technology is c(m). Assume that,
at time k, the costs c(m), m = 1, . . . , N are independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables with cumulative distribution function Pc,sk. The
fact that this distribution depends on the target state sk (competing technol-
ogy that evolves as a Markov chain) permits correlation of the costs c over
time.
2. If an agentm hasA(m)k neighbors at time k, then it obtains a benefit of rA
(m)
k
for adopting the technology, where r is a positive real number.
The agent is a myopic optimizer and, hence, chooses to adopt the technology only
if c(m) > rA(m)k . Therefore, the transition probabilities in (4.5) are
p01(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = P
(
c(m) > rA
(m)
k
)
= 1− Pc,sk
(
rA
(m)
k
)
. (4.13)
Assume that if the product deteriorates/fails, the agent can no longer use the prod-
uct (and will then need to reconsider the possibility of adopting it). If the product
fails with probability pF , then
p10(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = pF . (4.14)
Notice that the transition probabilities in (4.13) do not depend on the node’s
connectivity d. Constructing cases where the transition probabilities depend on
d is straightforward. For example, suppose a node picks a single neighbor uni-
formly from its d neighbors and then receives a benefit of r if this randomly
chosen neighbour has adopted the product. The probability of choosing an ac-
tive neighbor from A(m)k active neighbors, given a total of d neighbors, is clearly
A
(m)
k /d. Then, assuming the agent acts as a myopic optimizer, it will adopt the
product if P
(
c(m) > rA
(m)
k /d
)
. Therefore,
p01(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = 1− Pc,sk
(
rA
(m)
k
d
)
. (4.15)
4.3 Sentiment-Based Sensing Mechanism
We now describe the sensing mechanism used to measure the active link proba-
bility distribution ρk and target state in the above social network.
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If node m has state x(m)k = x at time k, and the target state is sk = s, then
node m communicates with message y(m)k where
y
(m)
k ∼ Bxy, where y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Y }. (4.16)
That is, the message yk is generated according to the conditional probabilities
Bxy = P
(
y
(m)
k = y|x(m)k = x
)
. These elements correspond to the number of
tweets or sentiment of node m about the product based on its current state. It is
assumed that y(m)k is statistically independent of y
(n)
k , n 6= m.
An important question regarding sensing in a social network is: How can one
construct a small but representative sample of a social network with a large num-
ber of nodes? Leskovec & Faloutsos in [175] study and compare several scale-
down and back-in-time sampling procedures. The simplest possible sampling
scheme for a population is uniform sampling. We also briefly describe social
sampling and respondent-driven sampling which are recent methods that have be-
come increasingly popular.
4.3.1 Uniform Sampling
Consider the following sampling-based measurement strategy. At each period k,
α(d) individuals are sampled6 independently and uniformly from the population
N(d) comprising of agents with connectivity degree d. That is, a uniform dis-
tributed i.i.d. sequence of nodes, denoted by{ml, l = 1 : α(d)}, is generated from
the population N(d). The messages y(ml)k of these α(d) individuals are recorded.
From these independent samples, the empirical sentiment distribution zk(d) of
degree d nodes at each time k is obtained as
zk(d, y) =
1
α(d)
α(d)∑
l=1
I
{
y
(ml)
k = y
}
, y = 1, . . . , Y. (4.17)
At each time k, the empirical sentiment distribution zk can be viewed as noisy
observations of the infected distribution ρk and target state process sk.
4.3.2 Non-Uniform Social Sampling
Social sampling is an extensive area of research; see [66] for recent results. In
social sampling, participants in a poll respond with a summary of their friend’s
6For large population sizes N , sampling with and without replacement are equivalent.
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responses. This leads to a reduction in the number of samples required. If the
average degree of nodes in the network is d, then the savings in the number of
samples is by a factor of d, since a randomly chosen node summarizes the re-
sults form d of its friends. However, the variance and bias of the estimate depend
strongly on the social network structure7. In [66], a social sampling method is
introduced and analyzed where nodes of degree d are sampled with probability
proportional to 1/d. This is intuitive since weighing neighbors’ values by the re-
ciprocal of the degree undoes the bias introduced by large degree nodes. It then
illustrates this social sampling method and variants on the LIVEJOURNAL net-
work (livejournal.com) comprising of more than 5 million nodes and 160 million
directed edges.
4.3.3 MCMC Based Respondent-Driven Sampling (RDS)
Respondent-driven sampling (RDS) was introduced by Heckathorn [124, 125,
172] as an approach for sampling from hidden populations in social networks
and has gained enormous popularity in recent years. There are more than 120
RDS studies worldwide involving sex workers and injection drug users [190]. As
mentioned in [106], the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
recently selected RDS for a 25-city study of injection drug users that is part of the
National HIV Behavioral Surveillance System [170].
RDS is a variant of the well known method of snowball sampling where cur-
rent sample members recruit future sample members. The RDS procedure is as
follows: A small number of people in the target population serve as seeds. Af-
ter participating in the study, the seeds recruit other people they know through
the social network in the target population. The sampling continues according to
this procedure with current sample members recruiting the next wave of sample
members until the desired sampling size is reached. Typically, monetary compen-
sations are provided for participating in the data collection and recruitment.
RDS can be viewed as a form of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sam-
pling (see [106] for an excellent exposition). Let {ml, l = 1 : α(d)} be the
realization of an aperiodic irreducible Markov chain with state space N(d) com-
prising of nodes of degree d. This Markov chain models the individuals of degree
7In [66], a nice intuition is provided in terms of intent polling and expectation polling. In
intent polling, individual are sampled and asked who they intend to vote for. In expectation polling,
individuals are sampled and asked who they think would win the election. For a given sample size,
one would believe that expectation poling is more accurate than intent polling since in expectation
polling, an individual would typically consider its own intent together with the intents of its friends.
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d that are snowball sampled, namely, the first individual m1 is sampled and then
recruits the second individual m2 to be sampled, who then recruits m3 and so on.
Instead of the independent sample estimator (4.17), an asymptotically unbiased
MCMC estimate is then generated as∑α(d)
l=1
I(y
(ml)
k
=y)
π(ml)∑α(d)
l=1
1
π(ml)
(4.18)
where π(m), m ∈ N(d), denotes the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
For example, a reversible Markov chain with prescribed stationary distribution is
straightforwardly generated by the Metropolis Hastings algorithm.
In RDS, the transition matrix and, hence, the stationary distribution π in the
estimator (4.18) is specified as follows: Assume that edges between any two nodes
m and n have symmetric weights W (m,n) (i.e., W (m,n) = W (n,m), equiva-
lently, the network is undirected). In RDS, node m recruits node n with transition
probabilityW (m,n)/
∑
nW (m,n). Then, it can be easily seen that the stationary
distribution is π(m) =
∑
n∈V W (m,n)/
∑
m∈V,n∈V W (m,n). Using this station-
ary distribution, along with the above transition probabilities for sampling agents
in (4.18), yields the RDS algorithm.
It is well known that a Markov chain over a non-bipartite connected undirected
networkG is aperiodic. Then, the initial seed for the RDS algorithm can be picked
arbitrarily, and the above estimator is an asymptotically unbiased estimator.
Note the difference between RDS and social sampling: RDS uses the network
to recruit the next respondent, whereas social sampling seeks to reduce the number
of samples by using people’s knowledge of their friends’ (neighbors’) opinions.
4.3.4 Extrinsic Observations
In addition to the above sentiment based observation process, often extrinsic mea-
surements of the target state are available. For example, if the target state denotes
the price/availability of products offered by competitors or the current market,
then economic indicators yield noisy measurements. Let ok denote noisy mea-
surements of the target state sk at time k. These observations are obtained as
ok ∼ Bso defn= P(ok = o|sk = s), where o ∈ {1, 2, . . . , O}. (4.19)
Remark 4.2. The reader may be familiar with the DARPA network challenge in
2009 where the locations of 10 red balloons in the continental US were to be
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determined using social networking. In this case, the winning MIT Red Balloon
Challenge Team used a recruitment based sampling method. The strategy can also
be viewed as a variant of the Query Incentive Network model of [146].
4.4 Mean Field Dynamics for Social Sensing
The aim here is to construct statistical signal processing algorithms for computing
the minimum mean square error estimate of the infected distribution ρk and target
state sk given the sequence of sentiment observations z1:k = {z1, . . . , zk}. This
problem is intractable due to the dimension
∏D
d=1N(d) of the state ρk when the
number of agents N is large. Fortunately, the mean field dynamics approximation
of the information diffusion has a state dimension of D and will be shown to be
an excellent approximation as the number of agents N becomes large. This is the
subject of the current section.
Depending on the time scale on which the target state s evolves, there are two
possible asymptotic limits for the mean field dynamics for information diffusion
in the social network:
1. Diffusion matched to target dynamics;
2. Diffusion faster than target dynamics.
We consider both these cases below and formulate estimation of the states ρk, sk,
given the sequence of sentiment observations z1:k, as a nonlinear filtering prob-
lem. The main consequence is that the resulting mean field dynamics filtering
problem can be solved straightforwardly via the use of sequential Markov chain
Monte-Carlo methods. This is in contrast to the original filtering problem which
is intractable as N →∞.
4.5 Mean Field Dynamics: Information Diffusion
Matched to Target State Dynamics
The main assumption here is that the diffusion of information flow in the social
network, namely ρ, evolves on the same time-scale as the target state s. This is
made explicit in the following assumption.
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Assumption 4.1. The target state sk has transition probability matrix A = I +
1
N
Q, where Q is a generator matrix, i.e., qij ≥ 0 for i 6= j and Q1 = 0, where 1
and 0 are column vectors of ones and zeros, respectively.
4.5.1 Mean Field Dynamics
The mean field dynamics state that as the number of agents N grows to infin-
ity, the dynamics of the infected distribution ρ, described by (4.12), in the social
network evolves according to an ordinary differential equation that is modulated
by a continuous-time Markov chain which depends on the target state evolution
s. More specifically, under Assumption 4.1, the mean field dynamics for the sys-
tem (4.12) are as follows: For d = 1, 2, . . . , D,
dρt(d)
dt
= p01(d, θ(ρt), st)− p10(d, θ(ρt), st) (4.20)
p01(d, θ, st) = (1− ρt(d))
d∑
a=0
p01(d, a, st)
(
d
a
)
θa(1− θ)d−a
p10(d, θ, st) = ρt(d)
d∑
a=0
p10(d, a, st)
(
d
a
)
θa(1− θ)d−a
θ(ρt) =
∑D
d=1 d P (d) ρt(d)∑D
d d P (d)
where st is a continuous time Markov chain with generator Q.
That the above mean field dynamics follow from (4.12) is intuitive. Such av-
eraging results are well known in the adaptive filtering community where they are
deployed to analyze the convergence of adaptive filters. The difference here is
that the limit mean field dynamics are not deterministic but Markov modulated.
Moreover, the mean field dynamics here constitute a model for information dif-
fusion, rather than the asymptotic behavior of an adaptive filtering algorithm. As
mentioned earlier, from an engineering point of view, the mean field dynamics
yield a tractable model for estimation.
To formalize the convergence of the discrete time dynamics (4.12) of the in-
fected distribution to the mean field dynamics (4.20) as the number of agents
N → ∞, we first need to re-write the discrete time process ρk in (4.12) as a
continuous time process. This is straightforwardly done by constructing a piece-
wise linear interpolation between the discrete-time points—in classical signal pro-
cessing, this constitutes what is commonly called a first-order hold interpolation.
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Define the sampling period as 1/N and then define the continuous time linear
interpolated process8 associated with ρk as
ρ˜Nt (d) = ρk(d) +
t− k/N
1/N
(ρk+1(d)− ρk(d)) (4.21)
for continuous time t ∈ [ k
N
, (k+1)
N
)
, k = 0, 1, . . ..
We then have the following exponential bound result for the error
∥∥ρ˜Nt − ρt∥∥∞;
recall ρt is given the mean field dynamics (4.20) while the actual system’s infected
distribution is ρ˜Nt :
Theorem 4.5.1. Suppose Assumption 4.1 holds. Then, for N sufficiently large,
P
{
max
0≤t≤T
∥∥ρ˜Nt − ρt∥∥∞ ≥ ǫ} ≤ C1 exp(−C2ǫ2N) (4.22)
where C1 and C2 are positive constants and T is any finite time horizon.
The proof of the above theorem follows from [27, Lemma 1]. The exponential
bound follows from an application of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. The above
theorem provides an exponential bound (in terms of the number of agents N) for
the probability of deviation of the sample path of the infected distribution from
the mean field dynamics for any finite time interval T .
Remark: For the signal processing reader more familiar with discrete-time
averaging theory, given the discrete time system (4.12), the discrete-time mean
field dynamics are:
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d) +
1
N
[p01(d, θ(ρk), sk)− p10(d, θ(ρk), sk)] . (4.23)
Then the following is the discrete time equivalent of Theorem 4.5.1: For a discrete
time horizon of T points, the deviation between the mean field dynamics ρk in
(4.23) and actual infected distribution in ρk (4.12) satisfies
P
{
max
0≤k≤T
‖ρk − ρk‖∞ ≥ ǫ
}
≤ C1 exp(−C2ǫ2N) (4.24)
providing T = O(N).
8One can also consider a piecewise constant interpolation as widely used in [167] for weak
convergence analysis of stochastic approximation algorithms; then, the appropriate function space
is the space of Ca`dla`g functions, which is usually denoted D[0, T ].
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Some Perspective
The stochastic approximation and adaptive filtering literature [29, 167] has several
averaging analysis methods for recursions of the form (4.12). The well studied
mean square error analysis [29, 167] computes bounds on E‖ρ˜Nt − ρt‖2 instead
of the maximum deviation in Theorem 4.5.1. A mean square error analysis of
estimating a Markov modulated empirical distribution is given in [260]. Such
mean square analysis assume a finite but small step size 1/N in (4.12). Another
powerful class of analysis methods involves weak convergence. These seek to
prove that limN→∞ P
{
supt≤T ‖ρ˜Nt − ρt‖ ≥ ǫ
}
= 0. Weak convergence methods
are powerful enough to tackle Markovian noise, whereas in Theorem 4.5.1 the
noise term is a much simpler martingale increment.
On the other hand, unlike weak convergence results, Theorem 4.5.1 offers
an exponential bound. This is useful in the important problem of determining
the asymptotic behavior as T → ∞ and then taking the limit N → ∞. (In
comparison, the above analysis characterizes the behavior as N → ∞ for finite
time T .) In general it is not true that the limits N →∞ and T → ∞ can be
interchanged. Weak convergence proofs for the asymptotic behavior in T require
construction of perturbed Lyapunov functions [167]. In comparison, as explained
in [27], since the exponential bound ∑N exp(−CN) is summable, the Borel-
Cantelli lemma applies. This facilities concluding important results on the exit
times of the process ρ˜Nt . In particular, given an open set U ∈ RD, define the exit
time as the random variable
τN(U) = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : ρ˜Nt /∈ U
}
. (4.25)
Let γ+(ρ) denote the closure of the set of states visited by the mean field trajectory
ρt, t ≥ 0. Then, from Theorem 4.5.1, it can be shown that [27, Proposition 1]
P
{
lim
N→∞
τN (U) =∞
}
= 1. (4.26)
In words, the exit time of the infected process from any neighbourhood of the
mean field dynamics trajectory is probabilistically very large. Indeed, Benaı¨m &
Weibull in [27] go on to conclude that attractors of the mean field dynamics are
good predictors of the stochastic process when the initial conditions are close.
4.5.2 Sentiment-Based Observations
Next, consider the sensing mechanism with observations defined in §4.3. Assum-
ing the sample size is sufficiently large, it follows from the central limit theorem
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(for i.i.d. processes, in the case of independent sampling, and for Markov pro-
cesses, in the case of MCMC sampling) that
zk(d, y) ≈ H(y) ρk(d) +D(y) + vk(d, y) (4.27)
where
D(y) = B0yP (d),
H(y) = (B1y − B0y)P (d),
vk(d, y) ∼ N(0, σ2(ρk(d), y)). (4.28)
For i.i.d. sampling, the variance is easily evaluated as
σ2(ρk(d), y) =
1
α(d)
(H(y) ρk(d) +D(y))
× (1−H(y) ρk(d)−D(y)) .
(4.29)
For MCMC sampling, the variance is evaluated by approximating an infinite series
(alternatively, excellent bounds exist [40]).
We can then define the following observation process
zk(y)
defn
=
∑D
d=1 d P (d)zk(d, y)∑D
d=1 d P (d)
. (4.30)
The key point is that zk(y) is a linear combination of zk(d, y). It then follows
from (4.9) that
zk(y) = θk + vk(y) (4.31)
where
vk(y) ∼ N(0, σ2(y)),
σ2(y) =
∑D
d=1 d P (d)σ
2(ρk(d), y)∑D
d=1 d P (d)
.
4.5.3 Bayesian Filtering Problem
Given the extrinsic and sentiment observations described above, how can the in-
fected degree distribution ρk and target state sk be estimated at each time instant?
Below we discuss estimation of ρk and sk as a Bayesian filtering problem.
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The partially observed state space model with continuous time dynamics (4.20)
and discrete time observations (4.31) and (4.19), constitutes a system with con-
tinuous time dynamics and discrete time observations. Alternatively, the partially
observed state space model with discrete time dynamics (4.23) and observation
equation (4.31), and (4.19) constitutes a system with discrete time dynamics and
discrete time observations. In either case, computing the conditional mean esti-
mate of st, ρt in the continuous time case or sk, ρk in the discrete time case, given
the observation sequence (z1:k, o1:k) is a Bayesian filtering problem. In fact, fil-
tering of such jump Markov linear systems have been studied extensively in the
signal processing literature [68, 181] and can be solved via the use of sequential
Markov chain Monte-Carlo methods.
For large N in the mean field dynamics (4.23), it is reasonable to expect that
a linearized approximation in ρ to the dynamics is accurate. Denote the resulting
linearized model as
ρk+1 = F (sk)ρk. (4.32)
In the special case when only extrinsic observations ok of sk are available (recall
the extrinsic observations are defined in (4.19)), computing the filtered estimate
E{θk|o1:k} can be done via a finite-dimensional filtering algorithm. Indeed, this
model coincides with the so-called image-based tracking model that has widely
been studied in signal processing [73, 158, 159, 239].
4.6 Mean Field Dynamics: Fast Information Diffu-
sion and Slow Target State Dynamics
The assumption here is that the diffusion of information flow, namely ρ, in the
social network occurs on a faster time-scale compared to the evolution of the
target state s. That is, the transition matrix A of the Markovian target s is almost
identity and the target state displays piecewise constant behavior with infrequent
jumps from one state to another. This is made explicit in the following assumption.
Assumption 4.2. The target state sk has transition probability matrix A = I +
1
N2
Q where Q is a generator matrix.
Considering the diffusion dynamics (4.12) together with Assumption 4.2, it is
clear that we have a two-time-scale system, where the target process s evolves on
a slower time scale as compared with the information diffusi
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For this two-time-scale case, we have the following mean field dynamics for the
infected distribution:
Suppose Assumption 4.2 holds. Then, for d = 1, 2, . . . , D,
dρt(d)
dt
= p01(d, θ(ρt), sτ )− p10(d, θ(ρt), sτ ), 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞. (4.33)
In the above equation, sτ is a constant on the time-scale t; it evolves as a continu-
ous time Markov chain with generator Q on the slow time scale τ .
A similar exponential probability bound to Theorem 4.5.1 can be proved for
the above mean field dynamics system comprised of D Markov modulated differ-
ential equations (4.33). Also, in analogy to (4.23), for large N , the discrete time
mean field dynamics read:
ρk+1(d) = ρk(d) +
1
N
[p01(d, θ(ρk), sk′)− p10(d, θ(ρk), sk′)] . (4.34)
Here, k indexes a fast time scale and k′ indexes a slow time scale. In particular,
the slow process sk′ is a constant on the fast time scale k; it evolves as a discrete
time Markov chain with transition matrix A = I + 1
N2
Q on the slow time scale k′.
The sentiment based observation process is modelled as in (4.31), and the
extrinsic observation process ok′ on the slow time-scale k′ is modelled as in (4.19).
4.6.1 Bayesian Filtering Problem
In the case of fast information diffusion and slow target dynamics, estimating
the slow target state s and fast infected distribution ρ are decoupled due to the
two-time-scale nature of the problem. In particular, at the slow time-scale k′,
the conditional mean estimate E{sk′|o1:k′} is obtained using a Hidden Markov
model filter (or Wonham filter in continuous time) [78]. Then, estimating the
state ρk given noisy observations zk(y) becomes a nonlinear regression problem
since there is no state noise process driving (4.23). Alternatively, a stochastic
approximation algorithm can be used to track the Markov chain; see [259] for
details.
4.6.2 Numerical Example
Below we illustrate the mean field dynamics model for the case of fast information
diffusion and slow target dynamics. In this example, we simulate the diffusion of
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information through a network comprising of N = 100 nodes (with maximum
degree D = 17) in two different scenarios as described below. We further assume
that at time k = 0, 5% of nodes are infected. The mean field dynamics model
is investigated in terms of the infected link probability (4.9). The infected link
probability for the case of fast information diffusion and slow target dynamics can
be computed by
θ(ρk) =
∑D
d=1 d P (d) ρk(d)∑D
d d P (d)
. (4.35)
Here, ρk is obtained via discrete-time mean field dynamics (4.34).
Scenario 1: Assume each agent is a myopic optimizer and, hence, chooses
to adopt the technology only if c(m) > A(m)k ; r = 1. At time k, the costs c(m),
m = 1, 2, . . . , 100, are i.i.d. random variables simulated from uniform distribution
U [0, C(sk)]. Therefore, the transition probabilities in (4.5) are
p01(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = P
(
c(m) > A
(m)
k
)
=
{
A
(m)
k
)
C(sk)
, A
(m)
k ≤ C(sk),
1, A
(m)
k > C(sk).
The probability that a product fails is pF = 0.3, i.e.,
p10(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = 0.3.
The infected link probabilities obtained from network simulation (4.9) and from
the discrete-time mean field dynamics model (4.35) are illustrated in Figure 4.1a.
To illustrate that the infected link probability computed from (4.35) follows the
true one (obtained by network simulation), we assume that the value of C jumps
from 1 to 10 at time k = 200, and from 10 to 1 at time k = 500. As can be seen
in Figure 4.1a, the mean field dynamics provide an excellent approximation to the
true infected distribution.
Scenario 2: The transition probabilities in (4.5) depend on the node’s connec-
tivity d. These probabilities are
p01(d, A
(m)
k , sk) =
{
A
(m)
k
)
dC(sk)
, A
(m)
k ≤ dC(sk),
1, A
(m)
k > dC(sk).
(4.36)
and
p10(d, A
(m)
k , sk) = 0.3. (4.37)
The infected link probability obtained from network simulation (4.9) and from
the discrete-time mean field dynamics model (4.35) are illustrated in Figure 4.1b.
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Figure 4.1: The infected link probability obtained from network simulation com-
pared to the one obtained from the mean field dynamics model (4.35) in two differ-
ent scenarios: (a) The transition probabilities in (4.13) depend only on the number
of infected neighbors A(m)k (the parameters are defined in Scenario 1). (b) The
transition probabilities in (4.13) depend on the node’s connectivity d and the num-
ber of infected neighbors A(m)k (the parameters are defined in Scenario 2).
Similar to Scenario 1, here, we assume that the value of C jumps from 1 to 10
at time k = 500, and from 10 to 1 at time k = 1200 to show that the infected
link probability computed from (4.35) follows the one obtained from network
simulation. Again the mean field dynamics provide an excellent approximation to
the actual infected distribution.
4.7 Closing Remarks
This chapter has shown how the dynamics of the spread of information in a graph
can be asymptotically modelled via Markov modulated differential equations.
These mean field dynamics serve as a tractable model for filtering of underly-
ing states of the network. As an immediate extension, one can consider sequential
change detection and, more generally, control of the mean field dynamics.
Below we outline two extensions.
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Reactive Information Diffusion
A key difference between social sensors and conventional sensors in statistical
signal processing is that social sensors are reactive: A social sensor uses addi-
tional information gained to modify its behavior. Consider the case where the
sentiment-based observation process is made available in a public blog. Then,
these observations will affect the transition dynamics of the agents and, therefore,
the mean field dynamics.
How Does Connectivity Affect Mean Field Equilibrium?
The papers [183, 184] examine the structure of fixed points of the mean field
differential equation (4.20) when the underlying target process s is not present
(equivalently, s is a one state process). They consider the case where the agent
transition probabilities are parameterized by p01(d, a) = µF (d, a) and p10 = pF ;
see (4.14). Then, defining λ = µ/pF , they study how the following two thresholds
behave with the degree distribution and diffusion mechanism:
1. Critical threshold λc: This is defined as the minimum value of λ for which
there exists a fixed point of (4.20) with positive fraction of infected agents,
i.e., ρ∞(d) > 0 for some d and, for λ ≤ λc, such a fixed point does not
exist.
2. Diffusion threshold λd: Suppose the initial condition ρ0 for the infected
distribution is infinitesimally small. Then, λd is the minimum value of λ for
which ρ∞(d) > 0 for some d, and such that, for λ ≤ λd, ρ∞(d) = 0 for all
d.
Determining how these thresholds vary with degree distribution and diffusion
mechanism is very useful for understanding the long term behavior of agents in
the social network.
Chapter 5
Non-Cooperative Game-Theoretic
Learning
5.1 Introduction
Many social and economic situations involve interactive decision making with
possibly diverging interests. Often there is an advantage to having individuals
coordinate on their decisions [264]. For instance, a person may choose the same
cellphone carrier as the majority of family and friends to take advantage of the free
talk times. Social networks spread information, thereby facilitate coordination
of such self-interested units by speeding up the resolution of uncertainties. For
instance, individuals form friendship groups within which members are able to
observe others’ decisions.
This chapter examines how global coordination can be obtained among a
group of decision makers when each decision maker has limited awareness of the
outside world and is only capable of ‘simple’ local behavior. Such coordination
can potentially lead to higher social welfare to each individual decision maker,
and hence equilibrates the social network. We focus on no (or low) internal regret
algorithms as a strategy of play in game-theoretic learning. The internal regret1
compares the loss of a strategy to the loss of a modified strategy, which con-
sistently replaces one action by another—for example, “every time you bought
Windows, you should have bought Apple instead.” We refer the reader to [32] for
an excellent discussion of internal and external regret-based algorithms.
1In comparison, the external regret compares the performance of a strategy selecting actions to
the performance of the best of those actions in hindsight.
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Game theory has traditionally been used in economics and social sciences with
a focus on fully rational interactions where strong assumptions are made on the
information patterns available to individual agents. In comparison, social sensors
are agents with partial information and it is the dynamic interactions between
agents that are of interest. This, together with the interdependence of decision-
makers’ choices, motivates the need for game-theoretic learning models for agents
interacting in social networks.
Learning dynamics in games can be typically classified into Bayesian learn-
ing [1, 52], adaptive learning [118], and evolutionary dynamics [127, 178]. This
chapter focuses on adaptive learning where individuals deploy simple rule-of-
thumb strategies. The aim is to determine if such simple individual behaviour can
result in sophisticated global behaviour. We finish this chapter with an example to
show how the presented regret-based rule-of-thumb strategies can be employed to
devise an energy-aware sensing mechanism for parameter estimation va diffusion
least mean squares.
5.1.1 Literature
The theory of learning in games formalizes the idea that equilibrium arises as
a result of players learning from experience. It further examines how and what
kind of equilibrium might arise as a consequence of a long-run process of adap-
tation and learning in an interactive environment [94]. Due to space limitations,
this chapter focuses on adaptive learning models in which players try to maxi-
mize their own payoffs while simultaneously learning about others’ play2. The
question is then when self-interested learning and adaptation will result in the
emergence of equilibrium behavior. The literature on game-theoretic learning has
relied on the idea that learning rules should strike a balance between performance
and complexity [94]. That is, simple learning rules are expected to perform well
in simple environments, whereas larger and more complex environments call for
more sophisticated learning mechanisms.
The simplest setting is one in which players’ decisions can be observed by all
other players at the end of each round. Fictitious play [92] is a simple stylized
model of learning in non-cooperative repeated games with such communication
model. The player behaves as if she is Bayesian. That is, she believes that the
2The evolutionary game theory also provides a rich framework for modeling the dynamics
of adaptive opponent strategies for large population of players. The interested reader is referred
to [127, 223] for recent surveys.
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opponents’ play corresponds to draws from an unknown stationary distribution
and simply best responds to her belief about such a distribution3. Another simple
model, namely, stochastic fictitious play [92], forms beliefs as in fictitious play,
however, chooses actions according to a stochastic best-response function. This
new model brings about two advantages: (i) it avoids the discontinuity inherent in
fictitious play, where a small change in the belief can lead to an abrupt change in
behavior; (ii) it is “Hannan-consistent” [115]: its time average payoff is at least
as good as maximizing against the time-average of opponents’ play, which is not
true for fictitious play.
Regret-matching [117, 119] as a strategy of play in long-run interactions has
been long known to guarantee convergence to the correlated equilibria set [20].
The regret-based adaptive procedure in [117] assumes a complete connectivity
graph4 for information exchange among players, whereas the regret-based rein-
forcement learning algorithm in [119] assumes a set of isolated players who rely
only on their realized payoffs. This chapter is inspired by the work of Hart &
Mas-Colell in [117, 119] and focuses on learning algorithms in scenarios where
players form social groups and disclose information of their decisions only within
their social groups.
The concept of regret, well-known in the decision theory, has also been intro-
duced to the realm of random sampling [70, 71]. These methods are of particular
interest in the multi-armed bandit literature, which is concerned with optimizing
the cumulative objective function values realized over a period of time [16, 17],
and the pure exploration problem [15], which involves finding the best arm after a
given number of arm pulls. In such problems, the regret value of a candidate arm
measures the worst-case consequence that might possibly result from selecting an-
other arm. Such a regret is sought to be minimized via devising random sampling
schemes that establish a proper balance between exploration and exploitation.
5.1.2 Experimental Studies
Parallel to the growing interest in social networks, a new game-theoretic paradigm
has been developed to incorporate some aspects of social networks such as infor-
mation exchange and influence structure into a game formalism. One such exam-
ple is the so-called graphical games, where each player’s influence is restricted to
3Obviously, if all players make decisions according to the fictitious play, the actual environment
is not stationary, hence, players have the wrong model of the environment.
4A complete graph is a simple undirected graph in which every pair of distinct vertices is
connected by a unique edge.
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his immediate neighbors [139, 140]. Early experimental studies on these games
indicate significant network effects. For instance, Kearns et al. present in [141]
the results of experiments in which human subjects solved a version of the vertex
coloring problem5 that was converted into a graphical game. Each participant had
control of a single vertex in the network. One task was to coordinate (indirectly)
with their neighbors so that they all had the same color.
Griffin & Squicciarini in [109] tackle the problem of information release in
social media via a game-theoretic formulation. They analyze the dynamics of so-
cial identity verification protocols and, based on some real-world data, develop
a deception model for online users. The proposed model captures a user’s will-
ingness to release, withhold or lie about information depending on the behavior
of the user’s circle of friends. The empirical study infers a relationship between
the qualitative structure of the game equilibria and the automorphism group of the
social network.
The correlated equilibrium arguably provides a natural way to capture confor-
mity to social norms [46]. It can be interpreted as a mediator instructing people to
take actions according to some commonly known probability distribution. Such
a mediator can be thought of as a social norm that assigns roles to individuals
in a society [257]. If it is in the interests of each individual to assume the role
assigned to him by the norm, then the probability distribution over roles is a cor-
related equilibrium [20, 67, 89]. The Fact that actions are conditioned on signals
or roles indicates how conformity can lead to coordinated actions within social
groups [134, 228]. Norms of behavior are important in various real-life behavioral
situations such as public good provision6, resource allocation, and the assignment
of property rights; see [38] for an extensive treatment of public good games in
social networks.
The works [47, 72] further report results from an experiment that explores
the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium. It is found in [72] that when the
private recommendations from the mediator are not available to the players, the
global behavior is characterized well by mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Their
main finding, however, was that players follow recommendations from the third
5The vertex coloring problem is an assignment of labels (colors) to the vertices of a graph
such that no two adjacent vertices share the same label. The model has applications in scheduling,
register allocation, pattern matching, and community identification in social networks [241, 189].
6The public good game is a standard of experimental economics. In the basic game, players
secretly choose how many of their private tokens to put into a public pot and keep the rest. The
tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor (greater than one) and this “public good” payoff is
evenly divided among players.
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party only if those recommendations are drawn from a correlated equilibrium that
is “payoff-enhancing” relative to the available Nash equilibria.
5.2 Non-Cooperative Games
and Correlated Equilibrium
This section starts with introducing the standard representation of non-cooperative
games in §5.2.1. We then proceed to introduce and elaborate on two prominent
solution concepts of such games in §5.2.2.
5.2.1 Strategic Form Non-Cooperative Games
The initial step in performing a non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis is to
frame the situation in terms of all conceivable actions of agents and their asso-
ciated payoffs. The standard representation of a non-cooperative game G, known
as normal form or strategic form game [194, 206], comprises three elements:
G =
(
N , (An)
n∈N ,
(
Un
)
n∈N
)
. (5.1)
Each element is described as follows:
(i) Player Set: N = {1, · · · , N}. Essentially, a player models an entity that is
entitled to making decisions, and whose decisions affect others’ decisions. Players
may be people, organizations, firms, etc., and are indexed by n ∈ N .
(ii) Action Set: An = {1, · · · , An}, that denotes the actions, also referred to
as pure strategies, available to player n at each decision point. A generic action
taken by player n is denoted by an, where an ∈ An. The actions of players may
range from deciding to establish or abolish links with other agents [22] to choosing
among different products/technologies [269].
Subsequently, a generic element of the action profile of all players is denoted
by a =
(
a1, · · · , aN), and belongs to the setA = A1×· · ·×AN , where× denotes
the Cartesian product. Following the common notation in game theory, one can
rearrange the action profile as a =
(
an, a−n
)
, where a−n =
(
a1, · · · , an−1, an+1,
· · · , aN) denotes the action profile of all players excluding player n.
(iii) Payoff Function: Un : A → R is bounded, and gives payoff to player n
as a function of the action profile a ∈ A taken by all players. The interpretation
of such a payoff is the sum of rewards and costs associated with the chosen action
as the outcome of the interaction. The payoff function can be quite general. For
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instance, it could reflect reputation or privacy, using the models in [110, 197], or
benefits and costs associated with maintaining links in a social network, using the
model in [22, 266]. It could also reflect benefits of consumption and the costs of
production, download, and upload in content production and sharing over peer-
to-peer networks [107, 210], or the capacity available to users in communication
networks [135, 173].
In contrast to the pure strategy that specifies a possible decision or action, a
mixed strategy is a probability distribution that assigns to each available action in
the action set a likelihood of being selected. More precisely, a mixed strategy for
player n is of the form
pn =
(
pn(1), · · · , pn(An)), 0 ≤ pn(i) ≤ 1, ∑i∈An pn(i) = 1. (5.2)
A mixed strategy can be interpreted as how frequently each action is to be played
in a repeated game. Note that, even if the set of pure strategies is finite, there are
infinitely many mixed strategies. The set of all mixed strategies available to player
n forms an An-simplex, denoted by ∆An. An individual uses a mixed strategy
only when: (i) he/she is indifferent between several pure strategies; (ii) keeping
the opponent guessing is desirable, i.e., the opponent can benefit from knowing
the next move; (iii) the player needs to experiment in order to learn his/her optimal
strategy. The significance of mixed strategies becomes more clear when we talk
about existence of Nash equilibrium in §5.2.2.
In framing the game-theoretic analysis, another important issue is the informa-
tion available to individuals at each decision point. This essentially has bearing
on the timing of interactions and is ascertained via answering the following ques-
tions:
(i) Is the interaction repeated? Repeated games refer to a situation where the
same base game, referred to as stage game, is repeatedly played at successive de-
cision points. For instance, suppliers and buyers make deals repeatedly, nations
engage in ongoing trades, bosses try to motivate workers on an ongoing basis, etc.
Repeated interaction allows for socially beneficial outcomes, essentially substitut-
ing for the ability to make binding agreements. It further allows learning as the
outcome of each interaction conveys information about actions and preferences of
other players.
(ii) Do players make decisions simultaneously or sequentially? Simultaneous
move games arise when players make decisions simultaneously, without being
aware of the choices and preferences of others. For instance, two firms inde-
pendently decide whether to develop and market a new product, or individuals
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independently make a choice as which social club to join. In contrast, moving
after another player in sequential games gives the advantage of knowing and ac-
counting for the previous players’ actions prior to taking an action.
(iii) What does each player realize/observe once the interaction is concluded?
Embodied in the answer to this question is the social knowledge of each player.
With the prevalence of social networks, individuals may obtain information about
the preferences and choices of (some of) other decision makers in addition to the
payoff that they realize as the outcome of making choices. A particular choice
made by a self-interested rational player is understood to be a best response to his
limited perception of the outside world. Observing such choices, other players
could adjust their strategies so as to maximize their payoffs via decreasing others.
In this chapter, we concentrate on simultaneous move non-cooperative games
that are infinitely repeated. Three different models will be studied for the informa-
tion flow and social knowledge of players. The first model assumes social agents
who observe the decisions of all agents playing the same game. The second model
considers social groups, within which agents share their decisions. Hence, each
agent is only aware of successive decisions of a subset of the agents who play the
same game. The third model assumes formation of homogeneous social groups,
where agents share identical interests and exchange their beliefs.
5.2.2 Solution Concepts: Correlated vs. Nash Equilibrium
Having framed the interactions as a non-cooperative game, one can then make
predictions about the behavior of decision makers. Strategic dominance is the
most powerful analytical tool to make behavioral predictions. A dominant strategy
is one that ensures the highest payoff for an agent irrespective of the action profile
of other players. A more precise definition is provided below.
Definition 5.1 (Dominant Strategy). An action an
d
∈ An is a dominant strategy
for player n if for all other actions an ∈ An − {an
d
}
:
Un
(
an
d
, a−n
)
> Un
(
an, a−n
)
, ∀a−n ∈ A−n. (5.3)
Dominant strategies make game-theoretic analysis relatively easy. They are
also powerful from the decision makers perspective since no prediction of others’
behavior is required. However, such strategies do not always exist, hence, one
needs to resort to equilibrium notions in order to make behavioral predictions.
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The Nash equilibrium [199] and its refinements are without doubt the most
well-known game-theoretic equilibrium notion in both economics and engineer-
ing. One can classify Nash equilibria into two types: (i) Pure strategy Nash equi-
libria, where all agents are playing pure strategies, and (ii) Mixed strategy Nash
equilibria, where at least one agent is playing a mixed strategy. The underlying
assumption in Nash equilibrium is that players act independently. That is, the
probability distribution on the action profiles is a product measure. More pre-
cisely,
p
(
i1, · · · , iN
) defn
= P
(
a1 = i1, · · · , aN = iN
)
=
N∏
k=1
pn(in) (5.4)
where pn(in) denotes the probability of agent n playing action in.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile with the property that no single player
can benefit by deviating unilaterally to another strategy; see below for precise
definitions.
Definition 5.2 (Nash Equilibrium). An action profile a = (an, a−n) is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium if
Un
(
an, a−n
) ≥ Un(an, a−n), ∀an ∈ An, ∀n ∈ N . (5.5)
A profile of mixed strategies p = (p1, · · · ,pN) forms a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium if for all an ∈ An and n ∈ N :∑
an,a−n
p
(
an, a−n
)
Un
(
an, a−n
) ≥∑
a−n
p
(
ak, a−n
)
Un
(
an, a−n
)
. (5.6)
John F. Nash proved in his famous paper [199] that every game with a finite set
of players and actions has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. However,
as asserted by Robert J. Aumann7 in the following extract from [20], “Nash equi-
librium does make sense if one starts by assuming that, for some specified reason,
each player knows which strategies the other players are using.” Evidently, this as-
sumption is rather restrictive and, more importantly, is rarely true in any strategic
interactive situation. He adds:
“Far from being inconsistent with the Bayesian view of the world,
the notion of equilibrium is an unavoidable consequence of that view.
7Robert J. Aumann was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2005 for his
work on conflict and cooperation through game-theoretic analysis. He is the first to conduct a
full-fledged formal analysis of the so-called infinitely repeated games.
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It turns out, though, that the appropriate equilibrium notion is not
the ordinary mixed strategy equilibrium of Nash (1951), but the more
general notion of correlated equilibrium.” – Robert J. Aumann
This, indeed, is the very reason why correlated equilibrium [20] best suits and
is central to the analysis of strategic decision-making in social networks in this
chapter.
Correlated equilibrium is a generalization of the well-known Nash equilibrium
and describes a condition of competitive optimality among decision makers. It
can most naturally be viewed as imposing equilibrium conditions on the joint
action profile of agents (rather than on individual actions as in Nash equilibrium).
An intuitive interpretation of correlated equilibrium is coordination in decision-
making as described by the following example: Consider a traffic game where
two drivers meet at an intersection and have to decide whether to “go” or “wait”.
If they simultaneously decide to go, they will crash and both incur large losses.
If one waits and the other one goes, the one that passes the intersection receives
positive utility, whereas the one who waits receive zero utility. Finally, if they
both decide to wait, they both will receive small negative utilities due to wasting
their time. The natural solution is the traffic light. In game-theoretic terminology,
the traffic light serves as a fair randomizing device that recommends actions to
the agents—signals one of the cars to go and the other one to wait; it is fair in the
sense that at different times it makes different recommendations.
In light of the above example, suppose that a mediator is observing a non-
cooperative game being repeatedly played among a number of agents. The medi-
ator, at each round of the game, gives private recommendations as what action to
choose to each agent. The recommendations are correlated as the mediator draws
them from a joint probability distribution on the action profile of all agents; how-
ever, each agent is only given recommendations about her own action. Each agent
can freely interpret the recommendations and decide if to follow. A correlated
equilibrium results if neither of agents wants to deviate from the provided recom-
mendation. That is, in correlated equilibrium, agents’ decisions are coordinated
as if there exists a global coordinating device that all agents trust to follow.
Let us now formally define the set of correlated equilibrium for the game G,
defined in §5.2.1.
Definition 5.3 (Correlated Equilibrium). Let p denote a probability distribution
on the space of action profiles A, i.e.,
0 ≤ p(a) ≤ 1, ∀a ∈ A, and ∑
a
p(a) = 1. (5.7)
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The set of correlated ǫ-equilibria is the convex polytope
Cǫ =
{
p :
∑
a−n
pn
(
i,a−n
) [
Un
(
j,a−n
)− Un(i,a−n)] ≤ ǫ,∀i, j ∈ An, n ∈ N} (5.8)
where pn
(
i, a−n
)
denotes the probability of player n playing action i and the rest
playing a−n. If ǫ = 0 in (5.8), the convex polytope represents the set of correlated
equilibria and is denoted by C.
There is much to be said about correlated equilibrium; see Aumann [18, 20]
for rationality arguments. Some advantages that make it ever more appealing
include:
1. Realistic: Correlated equilibrium is realistic in multi-agent learning. In-
deed, Hart and Mas-Colell observe in [119] that for most simple adaptive
procedures, “. . . there is a natural coordination device: the common history,
observed by all players. It is thus reasonable to expect that, at the end,
independence among players will not obtain;”
2. Structural Simplicity: The correlated equilibria set constitutes a compact
convex polyhedron, whereas the Nash equilibria are isolated points at the
extrema of this set [200];
3. Computational Simplicity: Computing correlated equilibrium only requires
solving a linear feasibility problem (linear program with null objective func-
tion) that can be done in polynomial time, whereas computing Nash equi-
librium requires finding fixed points;
4. Payoff Gains: The coordination among agents in the correlated equilibrium
can lead to potentially higher payoffs than if agents take their actions inde-
pendently (as required by Nash equilibrium) [20];
5. Learning: There is no natural process that is known to converge to a Nash
equilibrium in a general non-cooperative game that is not essentially equiv-
alent to exhaustive search. There are, however, natural processes that do
converge to correlated equilibria (the so-called law of conservation of coor-
dination [120]), e.g., regret-matching [117].
Existence of a centralized coordinating device neglects the distributed essence
of social networks. Limited information at each agent about the strategies of oth-
ers further complicates the process of computing correlated equilibria. In fact,
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Figure 5.1: Equilibrium notions in non-cooperative games. Enlarging the equilib-
ria set weakens the behaviorial sophistication on the player’s part to distributively
reach equilibrium through repeated plays of the game.
even if agents could compute correlated equilibria, they would need a mecha-
nism that facilitates coordinating on the same equilibrium state in the presence of
multiple equilibria—each describing, for instance, a stable coordinated behavior
of manufacturers on targeting influential nodes in the competitive diffusion pro-
cess [248]. This highlights the significance of adaptive learning algorithms that,
through repeated interactive play and simple strategy adjustments by agents, en-
sure reaching correlated equilibrium. The most well-known of such algorithms,
fictitious play, was first introduced in 1951 [219], and is extensively treated in [92].
It, however, requires monitoring the behavior of all other agents that contradicts
the information exchange structure in social networks. The focus of this chap-
ter is on the more recent regret-matching learning algorithms [26, 42, 117, 119].
We use tools from stochastic approximation [167], to adapt these algorithms to
the information exchange structure in social networks, and Markov-switched sys-
tems [261, 263], to track time-varying equilibria under evolution of the environ-
ment and the social network.
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the various notions of equilibrium are related in
terms of the relative size and inclusion in other equilibria sets. As discussed ear-
lier in this subsection, dominant strategies and pure strategy Nash equilibria do not
always exist—the game of “Matching Pennies” being a simple example. Every
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finite game, however, has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. There-
fore, the “nonexistence critique” does not apply to any notion that generalizes
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in Figure 5.1. A Hannan consistent strat-
egy (also known as “universally consistent” strategies [91]) is one that ensures,
no matter what other players do, the player’s average payoff is asymptotically no
worse than if she were to play any constant strategy for in all previous periods.
Hannan consistent strategies guarantee no asymptotic external regrets and lead
to the so-called “coarse correlated equilibrium” [195] notion that generalizes the
Aumann’s correlated equilibrium.
5.3 Local Adaptation and Learning
This section presents an adaptive decision-making procedure that, if locally fol-
lowed by every individual decision maker, leads to rational global behavior. The
global behavior is meant to capture the decision strategies of all individuals taking
part in the decision-making process, and will be made clear in the next section.
This procedure is viewed as particularly simple and intuitive as no sophisticated
updating, prediction, or fully rational behavior is essential on the part of agents.
The procedure can be simply described as follows: At each period, an agent may
either continue with the same action as the previous period, or switch to other
actions, with probabilities that are proportional to a “regret measure” [117]; see
Figure 5.2. Willingness to proceed with the previous decision mimics the “inertia”
that is existent in human’s decision-making process. In what follows, we present
three algorithms, in the ascending level of sophistication, that adapt this simple
procedure to various social network architectures.
The communication among agents (hence, the level of “social knowledge”)
can be captured by a connectivity graph . Below, a formal definition is given:
Definition 5.4 (Connectivity Graph). It is an undirected graphG = (V,E), where
V = N is the set of agents, and
n, l ∈ E ⇔ n knows alk and l knows ank at the end of period k.
Accordingly, the neighborhood of each agent n is defined as:
Open Neighborhood: Nn defn= {l ∈ N ; (n, l) ∈ E}
Closed Neighborhood: Nnc
defn
= Nn ∪ {n} (5.9)
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Figure 5.2: Regret-based local adaptation and learning. Individuals update regrets
after observing the outcome of the previous decisions and, accordingly, make next
decisions. These new decisions will then be shared within social groups.
The communication protocol which allows agents to exchange information only
with neighbors is referred to as neighborhood monitoring [102]. This generalizes
the perfect monitoring assumption, standard in the game theory literature [118],
where agents share decisions with all other agents at the end of each period8.
5.3.1 Case I: Fully Social Players
For simplicity of exposition, we start with the adaptive learning procedure for the
scenario with the highest level of social knowledge: perfect monitoring. That is,
once a decision is made by an agent, it is observable by all other agents9. More
precisely,
The graph G is complete and Nnc = N . (5.10)
Although this is a rather impractical assumption in the emerging large-scale so-
cial networks, it sheds light and provides insight on the grounds of the decision-
making procedure and how it can be deployed in environments with more complex
connectivity architecture.
8Note that sharing actions differs from exchanging strategies according to which decisions are
made; the latter is more cumbersome and less realistic, however, conveys information about the
payoff functions of opponents, hence, can lead to faster coordination.
9In certain situations, the aggregate decisions of all agents affects individual agent’s strategy
update, e.g., proportion of neighbors adopting a new technology or proportion of neighboring
sensors that have chosen to activate. Therefore, one can assume that this aggregate information is
available to each agent (instead of individual decisions) at the end of each period.
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Suppose the game G, defined in §5.2.1, is being repeatedly played over time:
k = 1, 2, . . .. At time k, each agent n makes a decision ank ∈ An according to a
probability distribution pnk , which is defined via the following “regret-matching”
procedure [117]:
Let I{·} denote the indicator operator and 0 < ε < 1 be a small parameter.
Define the matrix Rnk , where each element rnk (i, j) records
rnk (i, j) = ε
∑
τ≤k
(1− ε)k−τ [Un(j, a−nτ )− Un(aτ)] I {anτ = i} . (5.11)
The above expression for rnk (i, j) has a clear interpretation as a measure of the
“regret” that agent n would experience for not having played action j, every time
action i was picked in the past. The strategy pnk =
(
pnk(1), · · · , pnk(An)
)
is then
defined as follows
pnk(i)
defn
= P
(
ank = i
∣∣ank−1 = j)
=
{
1
µn
∣∣rnk (j, i)∣∣+, i 6= j
1−∑j 6=i pnk(j), i = j
(5.12)
where |x|+ = max{0, x}, and µn > 0 is a large enough number so that pnk is a
valid probability mass function10.
Intuitively speaking, the regret-matching procedure governs the decision-making
process by propensities to depart from the current decision. It is natural to postu-
late that, if a decision maker decides to switch her action, it should be to actions
that are perceived as being better. The regret-matching procedure assigns posi-
tive probabilities to all such better choices. In particular, the better an alternative
action seems, the higher will be the probability of choosing it next time. More pre-
cisely, the probabilities of switching to different actions are proportional to their
regrets relative to the current action.
The regret-matching procedure in the case of fully social players is summa-
rized in Algorithm 5.
10It suffices to let µn > An |Unmax − Unmin|, where Unmax and Unmin represent the upper and lower
bounds on the payoff function Un(·) for agent n, respectively.
5.3. LOCAL ADAPTATION AND LEARNING 107
Algorithm 5 Local Adaptation and Learning for Social Players
Let 1N = [1, · · · , 1]T denote an N × 1 column vector of ones, Unmax and Unmin
represent the upper and lower bounds on the payoff function Un(·) for agent n,
respectively, and I{·} denote the indicator function.
Initialization: Set µn > An |Unmax − Unmin|, pn0 = 1An · 1An , and Rn0 = 0.
Step 1: Action Selection. Choose ank ∼ pnk , where
pnk(i) =
{
1
µn
∣∣rnk(ank−1, i)∣∣+ , i 6= ank−1
1−∑j 6=i pnk(j), i = ank−1 (5.13)
where |x|+ = max{0, x}.
Step 2: Information Exchange. Share decisions ank with others.
Step 3: Regret Update.
Rnk+1 = R
n
k + ε [B
n (ak)−Rnk ] (5.14)
where Bn (ak) =
[
bnij (ak)
]
is an An × An matrix with elements
bnij (ak) =
[
Un
(
j, a−nk
)− Un(i, a−nk )] · I {ank = i} . (5.15)
Step 4: Recursion. Set k ← k + 1, and go Step 1.
Discussion and Intuition:
1) Adaptive Behavior: In (5.11), ε serves as a forgetting factor to foster adaptiv-
ity to the evolution of the non-cooperative game parameters or the social network
architecture. That is, as agents repeatedly take actions, the effect of the old un-
derlying parameters on their current decisions vanishes; see §5.5 for a somewhat
detailed treatment of regime switching non-cooperative games.
2) Inertia: The choice of µn guarantees that there is always a positive proba-
bility of playing the same action as the last period. Therefore, µn can be viewed as
an “inertia” parameter: A higher µn yields switching with lower probabilities. It
plays a significant role in breaking away from bad cycles. It is worth emphasizing
that the speed of convergence to the correlated equilibria set is closely related to
this inertia parameter.
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3) Better-reply vs. Best-reply: In light of the above discussion, the most dis-
tinctive feature of the regret-matching procedure, that differentiates it from other
works such as [90, 92, 93], is that it implements a better-reply rather than a best-
reply strategy11. This inertia assigns positive probabilities to any actions that are
just better. Indeed, the behavior of a regret-matching decision maker is very far
from that of a rational decision maker that makes optimal decisions given his
(more or less well-formed) beliefs about the environment. Instead, it resembles
the model of a reflex-oriented individual that reinforces decisions with “pleasur-
able” consequences [119].
(4) Computational Complexity: The computational burden (in terms of cal-
culations per iteration) of the “regret-matching” procedure is small. It does not
grow with the number of agents, hence, is scalable. At each iteration, each agent
needs to execute two multiplications, two additions, one comparison and two ta-
ble lookups (assuming random numbers are stored in a table) to calculate the next
decision. Therefore, it is suitable for implementation in sensors with limited local
computational capability.
(5) Decentralized Adaptive Filtering: As will be seen later in §5.4, if every
agent follows Algorithm 5, the global behavior converges to the set of correlated
equilibria. Theoretically, finding a correlated equilibrium in a game is equivalent
to solving a linear feasibility problem; see (5.8). Algorithm 5 is thus an adaptive
filtering algorithm for solving this problem, which is quite interesting due to its
decentralized nature.
5.3.2 Case II: Social Groups
As pointed out above, the “perfect monitoring” assumption is quite restrictive
in the emerging large-scale social networks. A natural extension is to devise an
adaptive learning procedure that relies on the “neighborhood monitoring” model
for exchange of information among agents. That is, once a decision is made by
agent n, it is only observable by her neighbors Nn on the connectivity graph G;
see Definition 5.4. In fact, agents are oblivious to the existence of other agents
except their neighbors.
Social groups are characterized by the coalition of agents that perform the
same localized task and interact locally. However, not only does the payoff of
each agent depend on her local interaction and contribution to carrying out the
11This has the additional effect of making the behavior continuous, without need for approxi-
mations [117].
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local tasks, but also it is affected by the inherent interaction with those outside
her social group. In particular, the payoff that each agent receives as the outcome
of her decision comprises of two terms: (i) Local payoff, due to local interaction
(e.g., performing tasks) within social groups; (ii) Global payoff, due to the implicit
strategic global interaction with agents outside social group. More precisely, the
payoff function can be expressed as [102]
Un
(
an, a−n
)
= UnL
(
an, aN
n)
+ UnG
(
an, aS
n)
. (5.16)
Here, Sn = N −Nnc denotes the set of “non-neighbors” of agent n.
Now, suppose the game G, defined in §5.2.1, with payoff function (5.16) is
being repeatedly played over time: k = 1, 2, . . .. At time k, each agent n makes a
decision ank and receives a payoff12 Unk
(
ank
)
. Assume that agents know their local
payoff functions; hence, knowing the action profile of neighbors, they are able to
evaluate their local stage payoffs. In contrast, even if agents know their global
payoff functions, they could not directly compute global payoffs as they do not
acquire the action profile of agents outside their social groups. However, they can
compute their realized global payoffs by
UnG,k
(
ank
) defn
= Unk
(
ank
)− UnL(an, aNnk ). (5.17)
The “revised regret-matching” procedure, depicted in Figure 5.3, is then as
follows [102, 119]: The local regret matrix RL,nk is defined as before; that is, each
element rL,nk (j, i) records
rL,nk (j, i) = ε
∑
τ≤k
(1− ε)k−τ [UnL(j, aNnτ )− UnL(anτ , aNnτ )] I {anτ = i} . (5.18)
However, since agent n knows neither her global payoff function nor the decisions
aS
n
k of those outside her social group, she is unable to perform the thought exper-
iment to evaluate global payoffs for alternative actions as she does in (5.18). She
thus employs an unbiased estimator RG,nk of the global regrets, which relies only
on the realizations of global payoffs
{
UnG,k(a
n
k)
}
. More precisely, each element
rG,nk (j, i) can be expressed as follows:
rG,nk (j, i) =ε
∑
τ≤k
(1− ε)k−τ
×
[
pnτ (i)
pnτ (j)
UnG,τ
(
anτ
)
I {anτ = j} − UnG,τ
(
anτ
)
I {anτ = i}
]
.
(5.19)
12Note that Unk (·) = Un
(·, a−nk ), i.e., the time-dependency of Unk (·) corresponds to the time-
variations of other agents’ action profile a−nk .
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Figure 5.3: Game-theoretic learning within social groups. Circles represent indi-
viduals in the social network. Agent 5 exchanges decision with her social group
members N5 = {1, 2, 4}. The exchanged decisions, together with agent 5’s real-
ized payoff, are then fed into the regret-matching adaptive filter to determine the
next action for agent 5.
The agent combines local and global regrets
Rnk
defn
= RL,nk +R
G,n
k (5.20)
to update her strategy pnk as follows: Let 0 < δ < 1, and recall An represents the
cardinality of the action set An. The play probabilities are then given by
pnk(i) = P
(
ank = i
∣∣ank−1 = j)
=
{
(1− δ)min
{
1
µn
∣∣rnk (j, i)∣∣+, 1An}+ δAn , i 6= j
1−∑j 6=i pnk(j), i = j
(5.21)
where, as before, |x|+ = max{0, x}, and µn > 0 is a large enough number.
The local adaptation and learning algorithm within social groups is summa-
rized in Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 Local Adaptation and Learning Within Social Groups
Initialization: Set 0 < δ < 1, µn > An |Unmax − Unmin|, pn0 = 1An · 1An , and
RL,n0 = R
G,n
0 = 0.
Step 1: Action Selection. Choose ank according to the mixed strategy pnk :
pnk(i) =
{
(1− δ)min
{
1
µn
∣∣rnk (ank−1, i)∣∣+ , 1An}+ δAn , i 6= ank−1
1−∑j 6=i pnk(j), i = ank−1 (5.22)
where |x|+ = max{0, x}.
Step 2: Information Exchange. Share decisions ank with neighbors Nn.
Step 3: Regret Update.
(i) For m ∈ {L,G}:
Rm,nk+1 = R
m,n
k + ε [B
m,n (ak)−Rm,nk ] (5.23)
where Bm,n (ak) =
[
bm,nij (ak)
]
is an An ×An matrix:
bL,nij (ak) =
[
UnL
(
j, a−n
)− UnL(i, a−n)] I {ank = i}
bG,nij (ak) =
[
pnk(i)
pnk(j)
UnG,k
(
ank
)
I {ank = j} − UnG,k
(
ank
)
I {ank = i}
] (5.24)
(ii) Combine local and global regrets:
Rnk = R
L,n
k +R
G,n
k . (5.25)
Step 4: Recursion. Set k ← k + 1, and go Step 1.
Discussion and Intuition:
Before proceeding, we should emphasize that the remarks on the “regret-matching”
procedure [119], discussed in §5.3.1, will continue to hold for the revised regret-
matching algorithm in the presence of social groups.
(1) Global Regret Estimate: Close scrutiny of (5.19) reveals that the second
term is similar to the second term in (5.18), and simply evaluates the weighted
average global payoffs realized in periods when action i was picked. The first
term, roughly speaking, estimates the weighted average global payoffs if action j
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replaced action i in exactly those periods when action i was chosen13. To this end,
it only uses realized payoffs of those periods when action j was actually played.
The normalization factor pnτ (i)/pnτ (j), intuitively speaking, makes the lengths of
the respective periods comparable [119].
(2) Play Probabilities: The randomized strategy (5.21) is simply a weighted
average of two probability vectors: The first term, with weight 1 − δ, is propor-
tional to the positive part of the combined regrets
∣∣RL,nk + RG,nk ∣∣+ in a manner
similar to (5.12). Taking the minimum with 1
An
guarantees that pnk is a valid prob-
ability distribution, i.e.,
∑
i p
n
k(i) = 1. The second term, with weight δ, is just a
uniform distribution over the action space An [102, 119].
(3) Reinforcement Learning: Assuming that no player is willing to form a so-
cial group, Algorithm 6 simply implements a reinforcement learning procedure
that only requires the realized payoff to prescribe the next decision. The probabil-
ity of choosing a particular action i at time k + 1 gets “reinforced” by picking i
at time k, while the probabilities of the other actions j 6= i decrease. In fact, the
higher the payoff realized as the consequence of choosing i at time k, the greater
will be this reinforcement [119].
(4) Exploration vs. Exploitation: The second term, with weight δ, simply
forces every action to be played with some minimal frequency (strictly speaking,
with probability δ/An). The “exploration” factor14 δ is essential to be able to
estimate the contingent payoffs using only the realized payoffs; it can, as well, be
interpreted as exogenous statistical “noise.”
5.3.3 Case III: Homogeneous Social Groups
Next, we consider non-cooperative games in the presence of social groups with
closer and more intense ties: Individuals in each social group have identical in-
terests in the sense that they all share, and are aware of sharing, the same payoff
function. This opens up opportunity for agents to collaborate within social groups
to optimize their payoffs, while retaining their autonomy [100].
More precisely, agents form S non-overlapping communities Cs ⊂ N , s ∈
13Strictly speaking, the limit sets of the process (5.19) and the true global regret updates (if
agents observed the action profile of agents outside their social group) coincide; see [102] for
details. Alternatively, the conditional expectation of the difference between the global regret esti-
mates and the true global regrets can be proved to be zero; see [119] for details.
14As will be discussed later, larger δ will lead to the convergence of the global behavior to a
larger ǫ-distance of the correlated equilibria set.
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S = {1, · · · , S}, each with cardinality Js and identical payoff functions15, i.e.,
Un(·) = U l(·)⇔ n, l ∈ Cs for some s ∈ S. (5.26)
Accordingly, agents have to take actions from the same action set within each
community, i.e.,
An = Al(·)⇔ n, l ∈ Cs for some s ∈ S. (5.27)
For notational convenience, denote by Us(·) andAs the payoff function and action
set, respectively, of community Cs. Let further As =
∣∣As∣∣, where | · | denotes the
cardinality operator.
Within communities, agents form social groups. For notational convenience,
we continue to use the connectivity graph G in Definition 5.4 to represent such
“homogeneous social groups.” Individuals in a social group are more closely tied
in the sense that they have identical interests and are willing to share the extra (and
strategically of great value) piece of information that they share the same payoff
function16. In particular,
(n, l) ∈ E in graph G⇔ agents n and l both know Un(·) = U l(·). (5.28)
The social group for each agent n is represented by the set of neighbors Nnc on
the connectivity graph G; see (5.9). Finally, for clarity of exposition and without
loss of generality, we adopt the “perfect monitoring” [118] model for information
exchange among agents; see (5.10). It is straightforward for the interested reader
to extend the local adaptation and learning algorithm that follows to the case of
“neighborhood monitoring,” which was discussed in §5.3.2.
Example 5.1. Consider the problem of multi-target tracking using a network of
ZigBee-enabled sensors [161]. Sensors close to each target share the same goal,
i.e., to localize the same target, hence, have identical payoff functions. The entire
network thus incorporates several communities of sensors with identical payoff
functions, each localizing a particular target. The measurements collected by such
communities of sensors are correlated both in time and space. Therefore, nodes
can save battery power by choosing to sleep while their neighbors are active. Two
15Without loss of generality, agents belonging to the same community are assumed to have
identical action sets.
16Note that, although individuals within the same social group are mindful of sharing the same
payoff function, they are unaware of the strategies according to which group members make their
decisions.
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advantages directly follow by letting such sensors become social and exchange
information within the social groups that they form: (i) Sharing regrets will lead
to faster coordination of their activation behavior; (ii) Sharing local estimates
will lead to improved localization performance.
In what follows, inspired by the idea of diffusion least mean squares [182,
225], we enforce cooperation among individuals in each social group via exchang-
ing and fusing regret information. Such diffusion of regret information within
social groups is rewarding for all members as they all share the same payoff func-
tion. This provably leads to faster coordination among agents and enables them to
respond in real time to changes in the game.
The regret matrix Rn is defined as in §5.3.1; see (5.11). The cooperative diffu-
sion protocol is then implemented as follows: Agents exchange regret information
within social groups and fuse the collected data via a linear combiner. More pre-
cisely, define the weight matrix for each community Cs as W s = [wsnl] satisfying
W s = IJs + µQ
s, 0 < µ < 1 (5.29)
where IN denotes the N ×N identity matrix, the matrix Qs = [qsnl] is symmetric,
i.e., [Qs]′ = Qs where ′ denotes the transpose operator, and satisfies
(i) |qsnl| ≤ 1;
(ii) qsnl > 0 if and only if (k, l) ∈ E;
(iii) Qs1 = 0, where 1 and 0 are column vectors of ones and zeros, respectively.
Each row n of the matrix W s simply gives the weights that agent n assigns to the
regret information collected from neighbors. These weights may depend on the
reputation of the group members [95, 205, 265]. The fused regret matrix for agent
n at time k, denoted by Rnk , is then computed via
R
n
k =
∑
l∈Nnc
wsnlR
l
k. (5.30)
Recall that all neighbors of agent Nnc belong to the same community as agent
n. Therefore, they all share the same payoff function. The fused regrets are
then promptly fed back into the stochastic approximation algorithm that updates
regrets:
Rnk+1 = R
n
k + ε
[
Bn (ak)− Rnk
] (5.31)
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where Bn (ak) is a N ×N matrix with elements identical to (5.15). Finally, agent
n picks her next action according to the same strategy pn as in (5.12). Simply
put, agent n follows the “regret-matching” procedure [119], summarized in Algo-
rithm 5, with the exception that fused-regret matrix Rnk replaces the regret matrix
Rnk .
The cooperative regret-matching procedure in the presence of homogeneous
social groups is summarized in Algorithm 7.
Discussion and Intuition:
Before proceeding, we should emphasize that the remarks on the “regret-matching”
procedure [119], discussed in §5.3.1, will continue to hold for the revised regret-
matching algorithm in the presence of homogeneous social groups.
(1) Diffusion of Regrets: Within each community of agents, the social group
that an agent forms may differ from that of his neighbor’s. Therefore, the cooper-
ative diffusion protocol (5.30) helps fuse information across the community into
agent n.
(2) Data Fusion Timescale: The particular choice of the weight matrix W s
allows to perform regret update and fusion of social group’s information on the
same timescale by choosing µ = ε in (5.29). This enables the agents to respond in
real-time to the evolution of the game, e.g., changes in community memberships
or payoffs of communities.
5.4 Emergence of Rational Global Behavior
This section characterizes the global behavior emergent from individuals follow-
ing the local adaption and learning algorithms in §5.3. Section 5.4.1 provides a
formal definition for the global behavior of agents. Section 5.4.2 then entails the
main theorem of this chapter that shows the global behavior manifested as the
consequence of each agent individually following algorithms in §5.3 converges to
the correlated equilibria set. Finally, §5.4.3 lays out a less technically involved
sketch of the convergence proofs that will further shed light on the dynamics of
the “regret-matching” procedure and how it could be adapted to strategic decision
making in social networks. Detailed proofs are relegated to Appendix B for clarity
of presentation.
116 CHAPTER 5. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME-THEORETIC LEARNING
Algorithm 7 Adaptation and Learning Within Homogeneous Social Groups
Initialization: Set µn > An |Unmax − Unmin|, pn0 = 1An · 1An , and Rn0 = 0.
Step 1: Action Selection. Choose ank according to the mixed strategy pnk :
pnk(i) =
{
1
µn
∣∣rnk(ank−1, i)∣∣+, i 6= ank−1
1−∑j 6=i pnk(j), i = ank−1 (5.32)
where |x|+ = max{0, x}.
Step 2: Information Exchange. Share decisions ank with others.
Step 3: Regret Update.
Rnk+1 = R
n
k + ε
[
Bn (ak)− Rnk
] (5.33)
where Bn (ak) is an As × As matrix identical to Algorithm 5.
(The first two steps implement the regret-matching procedure [117].)
Step 4: Regret Fusion.
R
n
k+1 = R
n
k + µ
[
Dn(ak)− Rnk
] (5.34)
where Dn(ak) =
[
dnij(ak)
]
is an As × As matrix:
dnij(ak) =
∑
l∈Nnc
wsnl
[
Us(j, a−lk )− Us(i, a−lk )
]
I
{
alk = i
}
. (5.35)
and s denotes the index of the community to which agent n belongs.
(This step implements the diffusion protocol [182, 225].)
Step 5: Recursion. Set k ← k + 1, and go Step 1.
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5.4.1 Global Behavior
The global behavior zk at time k is defined as the empirical frequency of joint
play of all agents up to period k. Formally,
zk =
∑
τ≤k
(1− ε)k−τeaτ (5.36)
where eaτ denotes the unit vector with the element corresponding to the joint play
aτ being equal to one. Further, ε serves as a forgetting factor to foster adaptivity
to the evolution of game. That is, the effect of the old game model on the de-
cisions of individuals vanishes as agents repeatedly take actions. Given zk, the
average payoff accrued by each agent can be straightforwardly evaluated, hence
the name global behavior. It is more convenient to define zk via the stochastic
approximation recursion
zk = zk−1 + ε [eak − zk−1] . (5.37)
The global behavior zk is a system “diagnostic” and is only used for the anal-
ysis of the emergent collective behavior of agents. That is, it does not need to be
computed by individual agents. In real-life application such as smart sensor net-
works, however, a network controller can monitor zk and use it to adjust agents’
payoff functions to achieve the desired global behavior [191].
5.4.2 Main Result: Convergence to Correlated Equilibrium
In what follows, the main theorem of this chapter is presented that reveals both
the local and the global behavior emerging from each agent individually following
the algorithms presented in §5.3. We use Rnk and zk as indicative of agent’s local
and global experience, respectively.
The main theorem simply asserts that, if an agent individually follows any of
the algorithms of §5.3 (depending on the particular game and connectivity graph
model), she will experience regret of at most ǫ (for a small number ǫ) after suf-
ficient repeated plays of the game. Indeed, the number ǫ diminishes and asymp-
totically goes to zero in Algorithms 5 and 7, where agents exhibit no exploration.
This theorem further states that if now all agents start following any of algorithms
of §5.3 independently, the global behavior converges to the correlated equilibria
set. Differently put, agents can coordinate their strategies in a distributed fashion
so that the distribution of their joint behavior belongs to the correlated equilibria
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set. From the game-theoretic point of view, we show non-fully rational local be-
havior of individuals, due to utilizing a “better-reply” rather than a “best-reply”
strategy, can lead to the manifestation of globally sophisticated behavior.
Before proceeding with the theorem, recall that weak convergence is a gener-
alization of convergence in distribution to a function space17; see Definition 3.2
in §3.5.2.
Theorem 5.4.1. Suppose the game G, defined in §5.2.1, is being repeatedly played.
Define the continuous-time interpolated sequence of the global behavior iterates
zk as follows:
zε(t) = zk for t ∈ [kε, (k + 1)ε) (5.38)
where zk is defined in (5.36). With a slight abuse of notation, denote by Rnk the
regret matrices rearranged as a vector of length (An)2, and define the continuous-
time interpolated sequence
Rn,ε(t) = Rnk for t ∈ [kε, (k + 1)ε) (5.39)
where Rnk is given in (5.11) and (5.20). Let further R− represent the negative
orthant and ‖ · ‖ denote the Euclidean norm. Then, the following results hold:
Result 1: Consider “Case I” that examines fully social players; see §5.3.1. If
every agent follows the “regret-matching” procedure [117], summarized in Algo-
rithm 5, then as ε→ 0 and t→∞:
(i) Rn,ε(t) converges weakly to the negative orthant in the sense that
dist
[
Rn,ε(t),R−
]
= inf
r∈R−
∥∥Rn,ε(t)− r∥∥⇒ 0; (5.40)
(ii) zε(t) converges weakly to the correlated equilibria set C in the sense that
dist [zε(t), C] = inf
z∈C
‖zε(t)− z‖ ⇒ 0. (5.41)
Result 2: Consider “Case II” that examines formation of social groups; see
§5.3.2. For each ǫ, there exists an upper bound δ̂(ǫ) on the exploration factor
δ such that, if every agent follows Algorithm 6 with δ < δ̂(ǫ), as ε → 0 and
t→∞:
17We refer the interested reader to [167, Chapter 7] for further details on weak convergence and
related matters.
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(i) Rn,ε(t) converges weakly to ǫ-distance of the negative orthant, i.e.,
dist
[
Rn,ε(t),R−
]− ǫ⇒ 0;
(ii) zε(t) converges weakly to the correlated ǫ-equilibria set Cǫ, i.e.,
dist [zε(t), Cǫ]⇒ 0.
Result 3: Consider “Case III” that examines formation of homogeneous social
groups; see §5.3.3. If every agent follows Algorithm 7, then as ε→ 0 and t→∞:
(i) Rn,ε(t) converges weakly to the negative orthant.
(ii) zε(t) converges weakly to the correlated equilibria set C.
Discussion:
1) Convergence to Set: Note that Theorem 5.4.1 proves convergence of zk to
the correlated equilibria set C, rather than a point in the set C. In fact, once the
convergence occurs, zk can generally move around in the polytope C. The same
argument holds for convergence of regrets Rnk to the negative orthant.
2) Time-invariant Games: If the parameters of the game G (such as the payoff
functions, action sets, etc.) do not evolve with time, one can replace the constant
adaptation rate ε with the decreasing step-size εk = 1/k in Algorithms 5–7. This
results in achieving stronger convergence results in the sense that one can now
prove almost sure convergence to the correlated equilibria set. More precisely,
there exists with probability one K(ǫ) > 0 such that for k > K(ǫ), one can find a
correlated equilibrium joint distribution π ∈ C at most at ǫ-distance of zk [117].
5.4.3 Sketch of Convergence Proof
Let us now proceed with a sketch of the proof of the main results summarized in
Theorem 5.4.1. For better readability, details for each step of the proof are post-
poned to Appendix B. Certain technical details, that are out of the scope of this
chapter, are also passed over; however, adequate citation will be provided for the
interested reader. The convergence analysis is based on [26] and is organized into
three steps as follows: First, it will be shown that the limit systems for the discrete
time iterates of the presented algorithms are differential inclusions18. Differential
18Differential inclusions are generalization of the concept of ordinary differential equation. A
generic differential inclusion is of the form dX/dt ∈ F(X, t), where F(X, t) specifies a family
of trajectories rather than a single trajectory as in the ordinary differential equations dX/dt =
F (X, t). See Appendix B for a formal definition.
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inclusions arise naturally in game-theoretic learning, since the strategies accord-
ing to which others play are unknown. Next, using Lyapunov function methods,
stability of the limit dynamical system is studied and its set of global attractors is
characterized. Accordingly, asymptotic stability of the interpolated processes as-
sociated with the discrete-time iterates is proved. Up to this point, we have shown
that each agent asymptotically experiences zero (or at most ǫ) regret by following
any of the algorithms presented in §5.3. In the final step, it will be shown that
the global behavior emergent from such limit individual dynamics in the game is
attracted to the correlated equilibria set.
For the sake of simplicity of exposition, we shall focus in what follows on the
proof for the “regret-matching” procedure (Algorithm 5). We then elaborate on
how to modify each step of the proof so as to adapt it to the assumptions made in
“Case II” and “Case III” in §5.3.
Before proceeding with the proof, we shall study properties of the sequence
of decisions {ank} made according to Algorithms 5–7. Careful consideration of
the strategy pnk in the “regret-matching” procedure indicates that the sequence
of decisions {ank} simply forms a finite-state Markov chain. Standard results on
Markov chains show that the transition probabilities in (5.12) admits (at least)
one invariant measure. Let ψn
(
Rn
)
denote such an invariant measure. Then, the
following lemma holds.
Lemma 5.1. The invariant measure ψn (Rn) satisfies19∑
i 6=j
ψni (R
n) |rn(i, j)|+ =
∑
i 6=j
ψnj (R
n) |rn(j, i)|+ . (5.42)
Proof. Lettingψn (Rn) denote the invariant measure of transition probabilities (5.12),
one can write
ψni (R
n) = ψni (R
n)
[
1−
∑
j 6=i
|rn(j, i)|+
µn
]
+
∑
j 6=i
ψnj ·
|rn(i, j)|+
µn
.
Cancelling outψni
(
Rn
)
on both sides and rearranging the equality yields the desire
result.
We shall now proceed with the proof.
19Equation (5.42) together with ψn (Rn) ≥ 0 and ∑i ψni (Rn) = 1 forms a linear feasibility
problem (null objective function). Existence of ψn (Rn) can alternatively be proved using strong
duality; see [37, Sec. 5.8.2] for details.
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Step 1: Characterization of Limit Individual Behavior
The first step characterizes the asymptotic behavior of individual agents as a dif-
ferential inclusion when they follow algorithms of §5.3. We borrow techniques
from the theory of stochastic approximations [167] and work with the piecewise-
constant continuous-time interpolations of the discrete-time iterates of regrets.
The regret matrix Rnk incorporates all information recorded in zk, however, trans-
lated to each agent’s language based on her payoff function. Since it is more
convenient to work with Rnk , we characterize the limiting process for Rnk and ana-
lyze its stability instead in the next step. Technical details are tedious and are only
provided for “Case I”. The interested reader is referred to [102], [167, Chapter 8]
for more details.
Case I: Let p−n denote a probability measure over the joint action space A−n
of all agents excluding agent n, and denote by ∆A−n the simplex of all such
measures. The expected payoff to agent n given the joint strategy p−n is then
defined as
Un
(
an,p−n
) defn
=
∑
a−n
p−n
(
a−n
)
Un
(
an, a−n
) (5.43)
where p−n
(
a−n
)
denotes the probability of all agents excluding agent n jointly
picking a−n.
Theorem 5.4.2. As ε → 0, the interpolated process Rn,ε(·) converges weakly to
Rn(·), that is a solution to the differential inclusion20
dRn
dt
∈ Hn(Rn)− Rn (5.44)
where Hn
(
Rn
)
is an An ×An matrix with elements defined below:
hnij
(
Rn
) defn
=
{[
Un
(
j,p−n
)− Un(i,p−n)]ψni (Rn);p−n ∈ ∆A−n} . (5.45)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Discussion and Intuition: The asymptotics of a stochastic approximation al-
gorithm is typically captured by an ordinary differential equation (ODE). Here,
although agents observe a−n, they are oblivious to the strategies p−n from which
a−n has been drawn. Different p−n ∈ ∆A−n form different trajectories of Rn(t).
20Since the r.h.s. in (5.44) is a compact convex set, the linear growth condition (B.2) for the
differential inclusion is trivially satisfied; see Definition B.1 for detials.
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Therefore, Rn,ε(t) converges weakly to the trajectories of a differential inclusion
rather than an ODE .
Case II: Let ν−n denote a probability measure over the joint action space of
the open neighborhood of agent n, and denote by ∆ANn the simplex of all such
measures. The expected local payoff to agent n given the joint strategy ν−n can be
defined similar to (5.43). It is straightforward to show that the invariant measure
of the transition probabilities (5.32) now takes the form
σn
(
Rn
)
= (1− δ)ψn(Rn)+ 1
An
· 1N (5.46)
where ψn
(
Rn
)
is the stationary distribution satisfying (5.42); see Lemma 5.1.
That is, ψn
(
Rn
)
corresponds to the stationary distribution of the transitions prob-
abilities (5.32) when the exploration factor δ = 0.
Theorem 5.4.3. Define the continuous-time interpolated sequence
RL,n,ε(t) = RL,nk
RG,n,ε(t) = RG,nk
for t ∈ [kε, (k + 1)ε) (5.47)
where RL,nk and R
G,n
k are given in §5.3.2. Then, as ε → 0, the interpolated pair
processes
(
RL,n,ε(·), RG,n,ε(·)) converges weakly to (RL,n(·), RG,n(·)), that is a
solution to the system of interconnected differential inclusion{
dRL,n
dt
∈ HL,n(RL,n, RG,n)− RL,n,
dRG,n
dt
∈ HG,n(RL,n, RG,n)− RG,n. (5.48)
where HL,n
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
and HG,n
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
are An × An matrices with ele-
ments defined as follows:
hL,nij
defn
=
{[
UnL
(
j,ν−n
)− UnL(i,ν−n)]σni (Rn);ν−n ∈ ∆ANn}
hG,nij
defn
=
[
UnG,t(j)− UnG,t(i)
]
σni
(
Rn
) (5.49)
where UnG,t(·) is the interpolated process of the global payoffs accrued from the
game, σn
(
Rn
)
is given in (5.46), and Rn = RL,n +RG,n.
Discussion and Intuition: The interconnection of the dynamics in (5.48) is
hidden in σn
(
Rn
)
since it is a function of the pair
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
; see (5.20).
Agents are oblivious to the strategies ν−n from which the decision aNn has been
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made. Therefore, following the same argument as in “Case I,” RL,n,ε(·) converges
weakly to the trajectories of a differential inclusion. The same argument holds
for RG,n,ε(·) except that the limit dynamics follows an ODE. This is due to agents
being oblivious to the facts: (i) non-neighbors exist, and (ii) global payoffs are
affected by non-neighbors’ decisions. However, they realize the time-dependency
of UnG,k (·) as taking the same action at various times results in different payoffs.
Case III: In light of the diffusion protocol, agents’ successive decisions affect,
not only their own future strategies, but also their social groups’ policies. This
suggests looking at the dynamics of the regret for the entire social group to account
for such collaboration. Accordingly, define
Rsk
defn
= col
{
Rn1k , . . . , R
n
Js
k
}
, ∀nj ∈ Cs (5.50)
and the associated sequence of interpolated process
Rs,ε(t) = Rsk for t ∈ [kε, (k + 1)ε). (5.51)
Let further ⊗ denote the Kronecker product.
Theorem 5.4.4. As ε → 0, the interpolated process Rs,ε(·) converges weakly to
Rs(·) that is a solution of the differential inclusion
dRs
dt
∈ Hs (Rs) + (Qs − I)Rs (5.52)
where Qs = Qs ⊗ IAs (see (5.29)), As denotes the cardinality of the action set of
community Cs, and
hsij (R
s)
defn
= {[Us(ι,p−κ)− Us(j,p−κ)]ψκι ;p−κ ∈ ∆A−κ} ,
ι = i mod As, κ =
⌊
i
As
⌋
+ 1.
(5.53)
Further, ψn represents the stationary distribution of the transition probabilities
(5.32), which satisfies (5.42).
Step 2: Stability Analysis of Limit Dynamical System
This step examines stability of the limit systems that have been shown to represent
the local dynamical behavior of agents in Step 1. The set of global attractors
of these limit systems are then shown to comprise the negative orthant R−; see
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Figure 5.4a. Therefore, agents asymptotically experience zero (or at most as small
as ǫ) regret via exhibiting the simple local behavior prescribed by Algorithms 5–7.
In what follows, we unfold the regret matrix and rearrange its elements as a
vector. With a slight abuse of notation, we continue to use the same notation for
this regret vector.
Theorem 5.4.5. The limit systems presented in Theorems 5.4.2–5.4.4 are globally
asymptotically stable. In particular,
lim
t→∞
dist
[
Rn(t),R−
]
= 0 (5.54)
where dist [·, ·] denotes the usual distance function.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The following corollary then follows from Theorems 5.4.2–5.4.4 and Theo-
rem 5.4.5. It asserts that the result of Theorem 5.4.5 also holds for the interpolated
processes associated with the regrets—they also converge to the negative orthant;
see Figure 5.4a.
Corollary 5.1. Consider the interpolated process Rn,ε(·), defined in (5.39). Then,
lim
t→∞
lim
ε→0
∣∣Rn,ε(t)∣∣+ = 0 (5.55)
where | · |+ denotes the element-wise positive operator, and 0 represents the zero
vector of the same size as Rn,ε(t).
Step 3: Convergence to Correlated Equilibria Set
In the final step of the proof we characterize the global behavior of agents whose
local behavior ensures no (or small ǫ) asymptotic regret; see Figure 5.4. It will
be shown that the regret of individual agents converging to the negative orthant
provides the necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of global behavior
to the correlated equilibria set.
Theorem 5.4.6. Recall the interpolated process for global behavior zε(·), defined
in (5.38), and the interpolated regret process Rn,ε(·), defined in (5.39). Then,
zε(·)⇒ C iff Rn,ε(·)⇒ R− for all n ∈ N . (5.56)
Proof. The detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
The above theorem, together with Corollary 5.1, completes the proof.
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Figure 5.4: (a) Asymptotic stability and convergence of regrets to the negative
orthant (Corollary 5.1). (b) A typical correlated equilibria polytope in a three-
player game. The red line depicts the trajectory of average payoff accrued by
each player (Theorem 5.4.6).
5.5 Markov Modulated Non-Cooperative Games
In this section, motivated by applications in cognitive networks [101, 161, 191],
we introduce a general class of Markov modulated noncooperative games. We
then comment on whether the results of §5.4 can be generalized to such settings.
In particular, we examine if the simple local adaptation and learning algorithms,
presented in §5.3, can lead to a global behavior that is agile enough to track the
regime-switching polytope of correlated equilibria.
Suppose the non-cooperative game model, formulated in §5.2.1, evolves with
time due to: (i) agents joining or leaving the game; (ii) changes in agents’ in-
centives (payoffs); and (iii) the connectivity graph G varying with time. Suppose
further that all time-varying parameters are finite-state and absorbed to a vector
indexed by θ. It is thus reasonable to model evolution of the game via a discrete-
time finite-state Markov chain {θk}. Without loss of generality, assume that the
Markov chain has state-space M = {1, . . . ,M} and transition probability matrix
P ρ = IM + ρQ. (5.57)
Here, ρ > 0 is the small parameter that, roughly speaking, determines the speed
of jumps of {θk}, IM denotes the M ×M identity matrix, and Q = [qij ] is the
generator of a continuous-time Markov chain satisfying
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(i) Q1M = 0M ;
(ii) qij ≥ 0 for i 6= j;
(iii) |qij| ≤ 1 for all i, j ∈ M.
Choosing ρ small enough ensures that pρij = δij + ρqij > 0 in the entries of (5.57),
where δij denotes the Kronecker δ function satisfying δij = 1 if i = j and 0
otherwise.
For better exposition, let us assume that the payoff functions vary with the
state of the Markov chain {θk} in the rest of this section. More precisely, the
payoff function for each agent n takes the form
Un
(
an, a−n, θ
)
: An ×A−n ×M→ R. (5.58)
The main assumption here is that agents do not observe the Markov chain {θk},
nor are they aware of its dynamics. Agents however may realize time-dependency
of the payoff functions as taking the same action at different time instants may
result in different payoffs. Put differently, it does not enter implementation of the
local adaptation and learning algorithms. The Markov chain dynamics are used in
analyzing the tracking capability of the algorithms.
As the payoff functions jump change according to the Markov chain {θk},
so does the correlated equilibria set as illustrated in Figure 5.5. We thus need
to modify Definition 5.3 to incorporate θ-dependency of the payoff functions as
follows:
Definition 5.5. Let p denote a probability distribution on the space of action
profiles A. The set of correlated equilibria of the regime-switching game is the
convex polytope
Cǫ(θk) =
{
p :
∑
a−n
pn
(
i,a−n
) [
Un
(
j,a−n, θk
)− Un(i,a−n, θk)] ≤ 0,∀i, j, n
}
where pn
(
i, a−n
)
denotes the probability of agent n playing action i and the rest
playing a−n.
The following theorem then provides a condition that ensures the local adap-
tation and learning algorithms of §5.3 (with no further modifications) generate
trajectories of global behavior zk that tracks the regime switching set of corre-
lated equilibrium C(θk).
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Figure 5.5: Tracking convex polytope of correlated equilibria C(θk) randomly
evolving with time according to a Markov process {θk}. Theorem 5.5.1 asserts
that such tracking is attainable by each agent individually following the regret-
matching algorithms presented in §5.3.
Theorem 5.5.1. Consider the non-cooperative game G regime switching accord-
ing to a finite-state Markov chain {θk}with transition probabilities given by (5.57).
Suppose that the step-size of Algrithms 5–7 is small, i.e., 0 < ε≪ 1. Assume fur-
ther that that
the process θk is “slow” in the sense that ρ = ε. (5.59)
Recall the interpolated sequence of regrets Rn,ε(·), defined in (5.39), and interpo-
lated global behavior zε(·), defined in (5.38). If every agent follows Algorithms 5–
7, as ε→ 0 and t→∞21:
(i) Rn,ε(t) converges weakly to the negative orthant in the sense that
dist
[
Rn,ε(t),R−
]
= inf
r∈R−
∥∥Rn,ε(t)− r∥∥⇒ 0; (5.60)
(ii) zε(·) converges weakly to the regime-switching polytope of correlated
equilibria C(θ(·)). More precisely,
dist [zε(·), C(θ(·))] = inf
z∈C(θ(·))
|zε(·)− z| ⇒ 0. (5.61)
21To be more precise, the following results hold for an ǫ neighborhood of the convergent sets in
“Case II”.
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where θ(·) is a continuous-time Markov chain with generator Q; see (5.57).
Proof. We skip the detailed proof for the sake of brevity. Here, we only provide
a descriptive sketch of the steps of the proof: First, by a combined use of updated
treatment on stochastic approximation [167], and Markov-switched systems [261,
263], we show that the limiting behavior converges weakly to the differential
inclusions presented in Theorems 5.4.2–5.4.4 modulated by a continuous-time
Markov chain with generator Q. Next, using the multiple Lyapunov function
method [53, 54], [177, Chapter 3], we show that the limiting dynamical system
is globally asymptotically stable almost surely. The interested reader is referred
to [102] for the detailed proof in “Case II.”
Discussion and Intuition: It is well known that: (i) If the underlying parameter
θk change too drastically, there is no chance one can track the time-varying prop-
erties via an adaptive stochastic approximation algorithm. (Such a phenomenon is
known as trackability [29].) b) If the parameters evolve on a slower time-scale as
compared to the stochastic approximation algorithm, they remain constant in the
fast time-scale and their variation can be asymptotically ignored. Condition (5.59)
simply ensures that the parameters of the game model evolve according to a
Markov chain that evolves on the same timescale as Algorithms 5–7. The above
theorem then asserts that, if the “matching-speed” condition holds, Algorithms 5–
7 are agile in tracking the jump changes in the correlated equilibria set. From
the game-theoretic point of view, non-fully-rational behavior of individual agents
(due to utilizing a “better-reply” rather than a “best-reply” strategy) leads to a so-
phisticated globally rational behavior that can adapt to time inhomogeneities in
the game model.
5.6 Example: Energy-Aware Sensing via Diffusion
LMS
This section provides an example of how the adaptation and learning algorithms
of §5.3 can be applied to achieve sophisticated global behavior in a social sens-
ing application. We consider energy-aware activation control of sensors aiming
to collaboratively estimate the true value of a common parameter of interest22.
We focus on the diffusion least mean square (LMS) algorithms [182, 224, 226];
22The material in this section is based on the recent paper [101].
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however, the proposed framework can applied to any collaborative non-Bayesian
estimation setting.
5.6.1 Centralized Parameter Estimation Problem
Consider a set of N sensors N = {1, . . . , N} with the objective to estimate an
unknown M × 1 parameter vector ψo via recording noisy measurements
ynk = u
n
kψ
o + vnk , n = 1, . . . , N. (5.62)
Here, {unk} and {vnk} denote the sequences of 1×M random regressor vectors and
zero-mean local measurement noises, respectively. Such linear models are well-
suited to approximate input-output relations for many practical applications [224].
The sequence {unk , vnk} can generally be correlated as long as the remote past and
distant future are asymptotically independent; see [101, Section II-C] for details
and examples of such processes. For simplicity of presentation, we assume here
that the sequence {unk , vnk} is temporally white and spatially independent such
that [182]:
E
{
[unk ]
′
ulk
}
= Rnd · δkk · δnl
E
{
vnkv
l
k
}
= σ2v,n · δkk · δnl
(5.63)
where x′ denotes the transpose of vector x, Rnd is positive-definite and δij is the
Kronecker delta function: δij = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise. The noise sequence
{vnk} is further uncorrelated with the regression data {ulk} for all {k, k, n, l}:
E
{
[unk ]
′ vlk
}
= 0. (5.64)
The network of sensors then seeks to solve the least mean square parameter esti-
mation problem
min
ψ
E ‖Y k − ukψ‖2 (5.65)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes Euclidean norm and
uk
defn
= col
(
u1k, . . . ,u
N
k
)
, Y k
defn
= col
(
y1k, . . . , y
N
k
)
.
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5.6.2 Diffusion Least Mean Squares (LMS)
We focus on the diffusion LMS algorithm [182] that adopts a peer-to-peer dif-
fusion protocol and provides a distributed solution to the centralized parameter
estimation problem (5.65). Sensors form social groups within which estimates
are exchanged. Sensors then fuse the collected data and combine it with the local
measurements to refine their estimates. Deploying such “social sensors” has been
proved to improve the estimation performance, yet yield savings in computation,
communication and energy expenditure [226, 225].
Recall the connectivity graph G = (V,E), from Definition 5.4, and the closed
neighborhood Nnc in (5.9). For simplicity of presentation, we assume the connec-
tivity graph G is fixed and strongly connected, i.e., there exists a path between
each pair of nodes23. Let 0 < µ ≪ 1 be a small positive step size and define the
weight matrix W = [wij] for the diffusion protocol as follows:
W = IK + µQ,
|qij| ≤ 1, ∀i, j, qij ≥ 0, for i 6= j,
Q1 = 0, and Q′ = Q.
(5.66)
The diffusion LMS then requires each sensor to employ a stochastic approxima-
tion algorithm of the form
(Data Assimilation) ψnk+1 = φnk + µ [unk ]′ [ynk − unkφnk ]
(Data Fusion) φnk+1 =
∑
l∈Nnc
wnlψ
l
k+1
(5.67)
where the second step is the local fusion of estimates via a linear combiner. Note
that, since each sensor has a different neighborhood, the fusion rule (5.67) helps
fuse data across the network into node’s estimate. This enables the network to
respond in real-time to the temporal and spatial variations in the statistical profile
of the data.
Define the interpolated process associated with each sensor’s estimate of the
true parameter as follows:
ψn,µ(t) = ψnk for t ∈ [kµ, (k + 1)µ).
23Intermittent sensor failures can be captured by a random graph model where the probability
that two sensors are connected is simply the probability of successful communication times the
indicator function that shows the two sensors are neighbors in the underlying fixed graph. In this
case, mean connectedness of the random graph is sufficient, i.e., λ2(L) > 0, where L = ELn, Ln
denotes the Laplacian of the random graph process {Gn}, and λ2(·) denotes the second largest
eigenvalue; see [137] for details.
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Using the well-known ODE method for convergence analysis of stochastic ap-
proximation algorithms, it is shown in [101] that, as ε→ 0,
ψn,µ(t)⇒ ψo as t→∞. (5.68)
To provide some intuition on the particular choice of the weight matrix in (5.66),
consider the standard diffusion LMS algorithm in [182]: it uses the same updates
as in (5.67), however, with weight matrix Ŵ that is only assumed to be stochastic,
i.e., Ŵ1 = 1. Define the network’s global estimate of the true parameter as
Ψk = col
(
ψ1k, . . . ,ψ
N
k
)
.
Let further
U k = diag
(
u1k, . . . ,u
N
k
)
, Ŵ = Ŵ ⊗ IM
where ⊗ represents the Kronecker product. The global recursion for the diffusion
LMS across the network can then be expressed as
Ψk+1 = ŴΨk + µINMU
′
k
[
Y k −U kŴΨk
]
. (5.69)
Remark 5.1. A classical stochastic approximation algorithm is of the formΨk+1 =
Ψk + µg(Ψk, vk), where vk denotes a noise sequence and 0 < µ ≪ 1 denotes
the step-size. Clearly, the global recursion for diffusion LMS (5.69) is not in such
form because of the data fusion captured by the first term on the r.h.s in (5.69).
The following theorem shows that the diffusion LMS (5.69) is “equivalent”
to a classical stochastic approximation algorithm. Below, we use the notation
log(A) to denote the matrix logarithm of a matrix A. Equivalently, B = log(A) if
A = exp(B) where exp(B) denotes the matrix exponential.
Theorem 5.6.1. Let Ŵ be a stochastic matrix. Then, as the sampling time
∆→ 0, the discrete-time data fusion recursion (5.69) is equivalent to a standard
stochastic approximation algorithm of the form
Ψk+1 = Ψk + µINM
[
W˜Ψk +U
′
k
[
Y k −U kŴΨk
]]
,
where W˜ = ln
(
Ŵ
)
/∆, and 0 < µ≪ 1
(5.70)
in the sense that they both form discretizations of the same ODE
dΨ
dt
= W˜Ψ.
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Proof. Suppose ∆ time units elapse between two successive iterations of (5.69).
Then, the diffusion protocol (the first term on the r.h.s of (5.69)) can be conceived
as a discretization of the ODE dΨ/dt = W˜Ψ, where exp
(
W˜∆
)
= Ŵ . Taking
Taylor expansion yields
Ŵ = I +∆W˜ + o(∆), where o(∆)→ 0 as ∆→ 0. (5.71)
Therefore, as ∆ → 0, the standard diffusion LMS (5.69) is equivalent to the
standard stochastic approximation iterate (5.70).
Further inspection of the matrix W˜ in (5.70) shows that, since W˜ =
lim∆→0(exp(W˜∆)− I)/∆,
W˜1 = 0, and w˜ij > 0 for i 6= j. (5.72)
Now, comparing (5.72) with (5.66), together with Theorem 5.6.1, confirms the
equivalence between the standard diffusion protocol [182] and the diffusion pro-
tocol constructed by using the weight matrix (5.66). The advantages of the partic-
ular choice of the weight matrix (5.66) in the adaptive filtering algorithm (5.67)
are however threefold: (i) both data assimilation and fusion takes place on the
same timescale; (ii) simpler derivation of the known results can be obtained by
employing the powerful ordinary differential equation (ODE) method [29, 167];
(iii) one can use weak convergence methods [167, Chapter 8] to show how respon-
sive the adaptive filtering algorithm is to the time-variations of the true parameter.
5.6.3 Energy-Aware Activation Control of Diffusion LMS
Can one make the above decentralized solution to the sensing problem even more
efficient by allowing sensors to activate only when their contributions outweigh
the activation costs? We equip the sensors with an activation mechanism that,
taking into account the spatial-temporal correlation of their measurements, pre-
scribes sensors to sleep when the the energy cost of acquiring new measurement
outweighs its contribution to the estimation task. When a node is active, it up-
dates its estimate and performs fusion of its own estimate with those received
from neighboring nodes, whereas inactive nodes do not update their estimates.
More precisely, each sensor runs local updates of the form
ψnk+1 =
{
φnk + µ [u
n
k ]
′ [ynk − unkφnk ] , if ank = 1 (Active)
ψnk , if ank = 0 (Sleep)
(5.73)
5.6. EXAMPLE: ENERGY-AWARE SENSING VIA DIFFUSION LMS 133
whereφnk is the fused local estimate, defined in (5.67). Due to the interdependence
of sensors’ activation behavior, a game-theoretic approach is a natural choice to
model their interaction.
The problem of each sensor n is then to successively pick action ank from the
set An = {0 (sleep), 1 (activate)} to strategically optimize a utility function. This
utility function captures the trade-off between energy expenditure and the “value”
of sensor’s contribution. Let Ψ =
[
ψ1, · · · ,ψN] denote the profile of estimates
across the network. The utility function for each sensor n can then be defined as
follows:
Un
(
an, a−n;Ψ
)
= UnL
(
an, aN
n
;Ψ
)
+ UnG
(
an, aS
n)
. (5.74)
The local utility function UnL(·) captures the trade-off between the value of
the measurements collected by sensor n and the energy costs associated with it.
If too many of sensor n’s neighbors activate simultaneously, excessive energy is
consumed due to the spatial-temporal correlation of sensor measurements—that
is, the data collected by sensor n is less valuable. On the other hand, if too few of
sensor n’s neighbors activate, their fused estimates lack “innovation.” The local
utility of sensor k is then given by
UnL
(
an, aN
n
;Ψ
)
=
[
Kl,1
(
1− exp (−γl‖ψn − φn‖2s(ηk)))
−Kl,2
(
ETx
(
ηn
)
+ EAct
)]
I {an = 1} .
(5.75)
where
ηk
(
an, aN
n)
= an +
∑
l∈Nn
al.
In addition, Kl,1 and γl are the pricing parameters related to the “reward” associ-
ated with the data collected by sensor n, Kl,2 is the pricing parameter related to
the energy costs associated with activation EAct and broadcasting measurements
ETx (·). Finally, s(ηn) denotes the probability of successful transmission24. A
24The probability of successful transmission is given by
s(ηn) =
Bmax∑
m=0
p(ηn)(1 − p(ηn))m.
Here, Bmax denotes the maximum number of back-offs, p(ηn) = (1 − qn)ηn−1 denotes the prob-
ability that the channel is clear, and qn represents the probability that sensor n is transmitting at a
given time; see [161, p. 6099] for details in the unslotted CSMA/CA scheme.
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sensor is thus motivated to activate when majority of its neighbors are in the sleep
mode and/or its estimate ψn is far from the local fused estimate φn.
The global utility function UnG(·) concerns the connectivity of the network and
diffusion of estimates. Let Rnr denote the set of sensors within radius r from
sensor n excluding the neighborhood Nnc . Define the number of active sensors in
Rnr by
ζn
(
an, aS
n)
= an +
∑
l∈Rnr
al.
The global utility of sensor n is then given by
UnG
(
an, aS
n)
= Kg
(
e−γgζ
n)
I {an = 1} (5.76)
where Kg and γg are the pricing parameters. Higher ζn lowers the global utility
due to less importance of sensor n’s contribution to the diffusion of estimates
across the network and keeping connectivity in Rkr . Sensor n is thus motivated to
activate when majority of the nodes in its geographic region Rnr are in the sleep
mode.
Each sensor n realizes ηnk = ηn
(
ank , a
Nn
k
)
as a consequence of receiving esti-
mates {ψlk}l∈Nn from neighbors, therefore, is able to evaluate its local utility at
each period k. However, it does not observe the actions of non-neighbors, there-
fore, does not realize ζnk = ζn
(
ank , a
Sn
k
)
and is unable to evaluate its global utility.
The above game-theoretic model for activation control of sensors matches the
setting of §5.3.2. Therefore, we employ Algorithm 6 with the above utility func-
tion to devise the activation mechanism. This mechanism is then embedded into
the diffusion LMS algorithm such that the overall energy-aware diffusion LMS
forms a two-timescale stochastic approximation algorithm: the fast timescale cor-
responds to the game-theoretic activation mechanism (step-size ε) and the slow
timescale is the diffusion LMS (step-size µ = O(ε2)).
The resulting energy-aware diffusion LMS algorithm is summarized in Algo-
rithm 8.
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Algorithm 8 Energy-Aware Diffusion LMS
Initialization: Set 0 < δ < 1, µn > An |Unmax − Unmin|, pn0 =
[
1
2
, 1
2
]′
, and
RL,n0 = R
G,n
0 = 02×2. Choose 0 < ε, ρ ≪ 1 such that µ = O(ε2), and
ψn0 = φ
n
0 = 0.
Step 1: Node Activation. Choose ank ∈ {1 (Activate), 0 (Sleep)} according to the
randomized strategy pnk :
pnk(i) =
{
(1− δ)min
{
1
µn
∣∣rnk(ank−1, i)∣∣+ , 12}+ δ2 , ank−1 6= i
1−∑j 6=i pnk(j), ank−1 = i (5.77)
Step 2: Diffusion LMS.
ψnk+1 =
{
φnk + µ [u
n
k ]
′ [ynk − unkφnk ] , if ank = 1 (Active),
ψnk , if ank = 0 (Sleep).
(5.78)
Step 3: Estimate Exchange. If ank = 1: (i) Transmit ψnk to neighbors Nn and
collect {ψlk}l∈Nn ; (ii) set
alk =
{
1, if node n receieves node l’s estimate ψlk,
0, otherwise, (5.79)
and
ψ̂
l
k =
{
received estimate, if alk = 1,
ψlk−1, if alk = 0.
(5.80)
If ank = 0, go to Step 5.
Step 4: Fusion of Local Estimates.
ψnk =
∑
l∈Nnc
wnlψ̂
l
k. (5.81)
Step 5: Regret Update. Run ‘Step 3’ in Algorithm 6.
Step 6: Recursion. Set k ← k + 1, and go Step 1.
In such two timescale algorithms, the fast time-scale will see the slow compo-
nent as quasi-static while the slow component sees the fast one near equilibrium.
By virtue of the results of §5.4, consistency of the diffusion LMS (5.68), and treat-
ment of asynchronous stochastic approximation algorithms, it is shown in [101]
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Figure 5.6: Energy-aware diffusion LMS is asymptotically consistent, yet the
global activation behavior along the way tracks the correlated equilibria set of
the activation control game.
that, if each sensor individually follows Algorithm 6, the following results hold:
(i) As µ→ 0, ψn,µ(t) converges weakly to ψo across the network. That is, the
energy-aware diffusion LMS is consistent.
(ii) As ε→ 0, zε(·) converges weakly to Cǫ(Ψ(·)). That is, the global activation
behavior across the network belongs to the correlated ǫ-equilibria set of the
underlying activation control game.
The local and global behavior of the energy-aware diffusion LMS in illustrated in
Figure 5.6. Note that, since the utility function (5.74) is a function of the estimates
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Figure 5.7: Network topology and sensors’ regressors statistics.
across the network, so is the correlated equilibria set of the underlying game—it
slowly evolves as the parameter estimates across the network Ψk change over
time.
5.6.4 Numerical Study
Fig. 5.7 depicts the network topology that we study in this example. It further
illustrates the statistics of each sensor’s sequence of regressors that is generated
by a Gaussian Markov source with local correlation function of the form r(τ) =
σ2u,nα
|τ |
u,n, where αu,n is the correlation index. We define Q = [qkl] in (5.66) as
qnl =

1∣∣Nnc ∣∣ , l ∈ Nnc ,
0, otherwise.
(5.82)
It is further assumed that sensors are equipped with Chipcon CC2420 transceiver
chipset which implements CSMA/CA protocol for exchanging estimates with
neighbors25. For brevity of presentation, we skip the detailed model description
and expressions for ETx(·) and EAct in (5.75); the interested reader is referred
25The ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4 standard is currently a leading choice for low-power communica-
tion in wireless sensor networks. It employs a CSMA/CA scheme for multiple access data trans-
mission. In networks with tight energy constraints, the non-beacon-enabled (unslotted CSMA/CA)
mode is more preferable as the node receivers do not need to switch on periodically to synchronize
to the beacon.
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to [101], [161, Appendix] for the details. We further assume the noise vkn is i.i.d.
with σ2v,k = 10−3, and µ = 0.01.
Define the network excess mean square error:
EMSEnet = 1
N
N∑
n=1
EMSEn (5.83)
where EMSEn denotes the EMSE for sensor n. EMSEnet is simply obtained by av-
eraging E|unk(ψo − φkk−1)|2 across all sensors in the network. Figure 5.8 demon-
strates the trade-off between energy expenditure in the network and the rate of
convergence of the diffusion LMS algorithm in terms of EMSEnet after 104 itera-
tions. Sensors become more conservative by increasing the energy consumption
parameter Kl,2 and, accordingly, activate less frequently due to receiving lower
utilities; see (5.75). This reduces the average proportion of active sensors and in-
creases EMSEnet due to recording fewer measurements and less frequent fusion of
neighboring estimates. Increasing the pricing parameters γl, in (5.75), and γg, in
(5.76), has the same effect as can be observed in Figure 5.8. The global perfor-
mance of Algorithm 8 is further compared with the standard diffusion LMS [182]
in Figure 5.9. As the pricing parameters Kl,1 in (5.75) (corresponding to the con-
tribution of sensors in local parameter estimation) andKg in (5.76) (corresponding
to the contribution of sensors in local diffusion) increase, sensors activate more
frequently. As shown in Figure 5.9, this improves the rate of convergence of the
energy-aware diffusion LMS algorithm.
5.7 Closing Remarks
In this chapter, we used non-cooperative game-theoretic learning as a model for
interactive sensing with social sensors. Besides the competitive situations, equally
abundant are interactions wherein multiple agents cooperate to reach a common
goal. For instance, family members and friends register to the same long-distance
service to take advantage of more affordable rates. Similarly, multiple airlines
may form alliances to provide convenient connections between as many airports
as possible so as to increase profit [234]. Associated with each formed group
of cooperating parties, namely, coalitions, there corresponds a productive value
which captures how fruitful their collaboration is in fulfilling the coalition’s goal.
Such a value may depend not only on parties that form a coalition and their con-
nection (influence), but also on those who are excluded from the coalition. For
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instance, registering to a particular long-distance service clearly has advantages
to the members of a family; however, due to the associated overhead costs, it
may limit communication with friends who are registered to a different service.
Therefore, any competition (if existent at all) will be among coalitions, rather than
parties.
In such situations the main issue is to obtain a fair distribution of the joint rev-
enues from cooperation so as to form stable coalitions. For instance, the produc-
tive value may be split based on the relative contributions or relations (influence)
of different parties within each coalition. In the presence of multiple coalitions,
each agent naturally favours the one that ensures the highest payoff. Allocation
of shares from the joint revenues, thus, impacts the structure of formed coalitions
and their stability.
Formation of such stable coalitions can be naturally modelled and analysed in
a particular strain of the cooperative game framework, namely, coalition forma-
tion games. Coalition formation is of particular significance in several economic,
political and social contexts such as cartel formation, lobbies, customs unions,
conflict, public goods provision, political party formation, etc. [216, 217]. The
single-valued Shapley value [230, 122], named in honour of Lloyd Shapley, and
the set-valued core26 are the most prominent solution concepts in the context of
cooperative games.
An extension of the game-theoretic learning approach to interactive sensing
is to model formation of stable coalitions of sensors that collaborate to gather
data about the same phenomenon of interest; cf. [98, 99] for two instances of
cooperative game-theoretic learning approach to target localization and resource
allocation problems.
Another direction for further research is to explore the adaptive learning al-
gorithms of game-theoretic nature in large-scale discrete optimization problems,
where the optimal solution is obtained by collecting observations from many sep-
arate sources via a social network [96, 103]. One such problem is choosing in-
fluential sets of individuals to maximize the spread of influence through a so-
cial network, which was first formulated as a discrete optimization in the seminal
work [142]: “if we can try to convince a subset of individuals to adopt a new prod-
uct or innovation, and the goal is to trigger a large cascade of further adoptions,
which set of individuals should we target?” For more recent works in this area,
the reader is referred to [57, 58].
26The formal concept of the core for cooperative games in characteristic form was first intro-
duced by Gillies [104] and Shapley [229]; see [194, Ch. 6] for additional background.
Chapter 6
Summary
The motivation for this monograph stems from understanding how individuals in-
teract in a social network and how simple local behavior can result in complex
global behavior. The underlying tools employed in this monograph are widely
used by the electrical engineering research community in the areas of signal pro-
cessing, control, information theory and network communications. In what fol-
lows, we summarize the main results discussed in detail in this monograph:
Chapter 2 considered social learning models for interaction among sensors
where agents use their private observations along with actions of other agents to
estimate an underlying state of nature. We considered extensions of the basic so-
cial learning paradigm to online reputation systems in which agents communicate
over a social network. Despite the apparent simplicity in these information flows,
the systems exhibit unusual behavior such as herding and data incest. Also, an
example of social-learning for change detection was considered.
Chapter 3 analyzed the dynamics of a duplication-deletion graph where at each
time instant, one node can either join or leave the graph (an extension to the dupli-
cation model of [62, 211]). The power law component for such graph was com-
puted. Also, a Markov-modulated random graph was proposed to model the so-
cial networks whose dynamics evolve over time according to a finite-state Markov
chain. Using the stochastic approximation algorithms, the probability mass func-
tion of degree of each node (degree distribution) was estimated. Then, an upper
bound was derived for the distance between the estimated and the expected degree
distribution. As a result of this bound, we showed that the scaled tracking error
between the expected degree distribution and the estimated one weakly converges
to a diffusion process. From that, the covariance of this error can be computed.
Finally, we presented a discussion on simulating graphical realizations of a de-
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gree sequence which is a problem of much interest in numerical studies of social
networks.
Chapter 4 discussed the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model for dif-
fusion of information in social networks. By using the mean field dynamics, the
degree distribution was shown to satisfy an ordinary differential equation. As a
result, the probability of a link pointing to an infected node satisfies a scalar dif-
ferential equation. Given these dynamics for the state of information diffusion,
sampling of the nodes in the network can be viewed as a noisy measurements of
the state. We outlined two types of sampling individuals in a network that are of
recent interest—namely, social sampling and respondent-driven sampling. Given
these noisy measurements, estimation of the underlying state was formulated as a
Bayesian filtering problem.
Chapter 5 discussed, at length, a non-Bayesian formulation, where agents
seek to achieve coordination in decision making by optimizing their own utility
functions. We adopted a non-cooperative game-theoretic formulation and con-
sidered three protocols for information exchange among interacting agents. The
well-known game-theoretic learning algorithm—namely, the Hart & Mas-Colell’s
“regret-matching” procedure—was presented and extended to accommodate the
information flow protocols that are typical in interactions among agents in social
networks. Interestingly enough, we have shown that, while each individual has
limitations in sensing the environment and communicating with other agents, the
coordinated behavior among agents can lead to the manifestation of sophisticated
behavior at the network level. More precisely, the global behavior of agents turn
out to be distributed according to randomized strategies drawn from the convex
polytope of correlated equilibria. Instances of such emergent global behavior are
even observed in nature, e.g., fish schooling and birds flight in formation [49, 246].
In this monograph, to give a flavor of the various averaging analysis meth-
ods, we used a variety of analysis tool to analyse the asymptotic properties of
the presented stochastic approximation algorithms: (a) Mean square convergence:
Chapter 3 used this method to derive bounds on the difference between the esti-
mated and the expected degree distribution of a Markov-modulated random graph;
(b) Maximum deviation bounds: Chapter 4 employed this method to derive an
exponential bound (in terms of the number of agents) for the probability of de-
viation of the sample path of the infected distribution from the mean field dy-
namics in finite time interval; (c) Weak convergence: Chapter 3 and Chapter 5
use weak convergence methods to analyze the convergence of stochastic approx-
imation algorithms. In Chapter 3 these methods were used to specify how the
empirical distribution of a Markov chain can be tracked and how the tracking er-
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rors satisfy a switched Markovian diffusion process. Finally Chapter 5 used weak
convergence methods to derive the limit system representing the asymptotics of
the game-theoretic decision making procedure. This method was shown to be
strong enough to tackle Markovian evolution of the parameters underlying the
non-cooperative game model.
There exist other important problems in the context of social networks that
have been extensively studied in the literature, hence, were not included in this
monograph. Examples include consensus formation [132, Chapter 8], [149, 240],
metrics for measuring networks (other than degree distribution) [132, Chapter 2],
[253], small world [144, 254, 255], cooperative models of network formation [131,
Chapter 1], [132, Chapter 12], [233], behavior dynamics in peer-to-peer media-
sharing social networks [112, 267], and privacy and security modeling [169, 179],
to name a few. The interested reader can find detailed discussions on these topics
in the above references and the references therein.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
The proof is based on the proof of Lemma 4.1 in [61, Chapter 4, p79]. To com-
pute the expected degree distribution of the Markov-modulated random graph, we
obtain a relation between the number of nodes with specific degree at time n and
the degree distribution of the graph at time n− 1. For the sake of notational con-
venience, we drop the dependency of probabilities of connection and deletion on
θ and we denote p(θ) and q(θ) by p and q. Given the resulting graph at time n, the
aim is to find the expected number of nodes with degree i+ 1 at time n + 1. The
following events can occur that result in a node with degree i+ 1 at time n+ 1:
• Degree of a node with degree i increments by one in the duplication step (Step 2
of Algorithm 2) and remains unchanged in the deletion step (Step 3):
– A node with degree i is chosen at the duplication step as a parent node and
remains unchanged in the deletion step. The probability of occurrence of
such an event is(
1− q(i+ 1) + q(1 + pi)− q(1 + pi)(i+ 1)/Nn
Nn
)
fn(i)
Nn
;
the probability of choosing a node with degree i is fn(i)
Nn
and the probability
of the event that this node remains unchanged in the deletion step is1
1− q(i+ 1) + q(1 + pi)− q(1 + pi)(i+ 1)/Nn
Nn
.
1The deletion step (Step 3 of Algorithm 2) comprises an edge-deletion step and a duplication
step. The probability that the degree of node with degree i changes in the edge-deletion step is
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– One neighbor of a node with degree i is selected as a parent node; the parent
node connects to its neighbors (including the node with degree i) with prob-
ability p in the edge-duplication part of Step 2. The probability of such an
event is
fn(i)pi
Nn
(
1− q(i+ 2) + q(1 + p(i+ 1))− q(1 + p(i+ 1))(i+ 2)/Nn
Nn
)
.
Note that the node whose degree is incremented by one in this event should
remain unaffected in Step 3; the probability of being unchanged in Step 3 for
such a node is
1− q(i+ 2) + q(1 + p(i+ 1))− q(1 + p(i+ 1))(i+ 2)/Nn
Nn
.
• A node with degree i + 1 remains unchanged in both Step 2 and Step 3 of
Algorithm 2:
– Using the same argument as above, the probability of such an event is
fn(i+ 1)
(
1− q i+ 3 + p(i+ 1)−
(1+p(i+1))(i+2)
Nn
Nn
)(
1− p(i+ 1) + 1
Nn
)
.
• A new node with degree i+ 1 is generated in Step 2:
– The degree of the most recently generated node (in the vertex- duplication
part of Step 2) increments to i + 1; the new node connects to “i” neighbors
of the parent node and remains unchanged in Step 3. The probability of this
scenario is
q(i+1)
Nn
; either this node or one of its neighbors should be selected in the edge-deletion step. Also
given that the degree of this node dose not change in the edge-deletion step, if either this node or
one of its neighbor is selected in the duplication step (within Step 3) then the degree of this node
increments by one with probability 1+pi
Nn
. Therefore, the probability that the degree of a node of
degree i remains unchanged in Step 3 is
1− q(i+ 1) + q(1 + pi)− q(1 + pi)(i+ 1)/Nn
Nn
.
Note that for simplicity in our analysis, we assumed that the nodes whose degrees are changed in
the edge-deletion part of Step 3, remain unchanged in the duplication part of Step 3 at that time
instant. Also, the new node, which is generated in the vertex-duplication step of Step 2, remains
unchanged in Step 3. Therefore, although the degree of parent node becomes i+1 in this case but
this node is treated as a node with degree i in Step 3 of Algorithm 2.
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(
1− q i+ 3 + p(i+ 1)−
(1+p(i+1))(i+2)
Nn
Nn
)∑
j≥i
fn(j)
Nn
(
j
i
)
pi(1− p)j−i.
• Degree of a node with degree i+ 2 decrements by one in Step 3:
– A node with degree i+ 2 remains unchanged in the duplication step and one
of its neighbors is eliminated in the deletion step. The probability of this
event is
q
(
i+ 2
Nn
)(
1− p(i+ 2) + 1
Nn
)
.
• A node with degree i+ 1 is generated in Step 3:
– The degree of the node generated in the vertex-duplication part of duplication
step within Step 3 increments to i+ 1. The probability of this event is
q
∑
j≥i
1
Nn
fn(j)
(
j
i
)
pi(1− p)j−i.
• Degree of a node with degree i increments by one in Step 3:
– A node with degree i remains unchanged in Step 2 and its degree increments
by one in the duplication part of Step 3. The corresponding probability is
q(1 + pi)
Nn
(
1− 1 + pi
Nn
)
.
Let Ω denote the set of all arbitrary graphs and Fn denote the sigma algebra gen-
erated by graphs Gτ , τ ≤ n. Considering the above events that result in a node
with degree i + 1 at time n + 1, the following recurrence formula can be derived
for the conditional expectation of fn+1(i+ 1):
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E{fn+1(i+ 1)|Fn} =(
1− q i+ 3 + p(i+ 1)−
(1+p(i+1))(i+2)
Nn
Nn
)(
1− p(i+ 1) + 1
Nn
)
fn(i+ 1)
+
(
1− q(i+ 1) + q(1 + pi)− q(1 + pi)(i+ 1)/Nn
Nn
)(
1 + pi
Nn
)
fn(i)
+
(
1− q i+ 3 + p(i+ 1)−
(1+p(i+1))(i+2)
Nn
Nn
)∑
j≥i
fn(j)
Nn
(
j
i
)
pi(1− p)j−i
+ q
∑
j≥i
fn(j)
Nn
(
j
i
)
pi(1− p)j−i + q
(
i+ 2
Nn
)(
1− p(i+ 2) + 1
Nn
)
fn(i+ 2)
+
q(1 + pi)
Nn
(
1− 1 + pi
Nn
)
fn(i). (A.1)
Let f θn(i) = E{fn(i)|θn = θ}. By taking expectation of both sides of (A.1)
with respect to trivial sigma algebra {Ω, ∅}, the smoothing property of conditional
expectations yields:
f
θ
n+1(i+ 1) =(
1− q i+ 3 + p(i+ 1)−
(1+p(i+1))(i+2)
Nn
Nn
)(
1− p(i+ 1) + 1
Nn
)
f
θ
n(i+ 1)
+
(
1− q(i+ 1) + q(1 + pi)−
q(1+pi)(i+1)
Nn
Nn
)(
1 + pi
Nn
)
f
θ
n(i)
+
(
1− q i+ 3 + p(i+ 1)−
(1+p(i+1))(i+2)
Nn
Nn
)∑
j≥i
f
θ
n(j)
Nn
(
j
i
)
pi(1− p)j−i
+ q
∑
j≥i
1
Nn
f
θ
n(j)
(
j
i
)
pi(1− p)j−i + q
(
i+ 2
Nn
)(
1− p(i+ 2) + 1
Nn
)
f
θ
n(i+ 2)
+
q(1 + pi)
Nn
(
1− 1 + pi
Nn
)
f
θ
n(i). (A.2)
Assuming that size of the graph is sufficiently large, each term like fn(i
′)
N2n
can be
neglected. Also, taking functional dependencies of p and q on θ into account, Eq.
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(A.2) can be written as
f
θ
n+1(i+ 1) =
(
1− q(θ)(i+ 2) + q(θ)
(
p(θ)(i+ 1) + 1
)
Nn
)
f
θ
n(i+ 1)
+
(
(1 + p(θ)i)q(θ)
Nn
)
f
θ
n(i) + q(θ)
(
i+ 2
Nn
)
f
θ
n(i+ 2)
+ q(θ)
∑
j≥i
1
Nn
f
θ
n(θ, j)
(
j
i
)
p(θn+1)
i(1− p(θn+1))j−i. (A.3)
Using (A.2), we can write the following recursion for the (i + 1)-th element
of gθ(n+ 1):
gθn+1(i+ 1) =
(
Nn −
(
q(θ)(i+ 2) + q(θ)
(
p(θ)(i+ 1) + 1
))
Nn+1
)
gθn(i+ 1)
+
(
(1 + p(θ)i)q(θ)
Nn+1
)
gθn(i) + q(θ)
(
i+ 2
Nn+1
)
gθn(i+ 2)
+ q(θ)
∑
j≥i
1
Nn+1
gθn(j)
(
j
i
)
p(θ)i(1− p(θ))j−i. (A.4)
Since the probability of duplication step r = 0, the number of vertices does not
increase. Thus, Nn = N0 and (A.4) can be written as
gθn+1(i+ 1) =
(
1− 1
N0
(
q(θ)(i+ 2) + q(θ)
(
p(θ)(i+ 1) + 1
)) )
gθn(i+ 1)
+
1
N0
(
(1 + p(θ)i)q(θ)gθn(i) +
1
N0
q(θ)(i+ 2)gθn(i+ 2)
)
+
1
N0
q(θ)
∑
j≥i
gθn(j)
(
j
i
)
p(θ)i(1− p(θ))j−i. (A.5)
It is clear in (A.5) that the vector gθn+1 depends on elements of gθn. In a matrix
notation, (A.5) can be expressed as
gθn+1 =
(
I +
1
N0
L(θ)
)
gθn (A.6)
where L(θ) is defined as (3.7).
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To prove that L(θ) is a generator, we need to show that lii < 0 and
∑N0
i=1 lki =
0. Accordingly,
N0∑
i=1
lki = − (q(θ)(k + 1) + q(θ)(1 + p(θ)k)) + (1 + p(θ)k)q(θ)
+ q(θ)k + q(θ)
∑
k≤i−1
(
k
i− 1
)
p(θ)i−1(1− p(θ))k−i+1
= −q(θ) + q(θ)
∑
k≤i−1
(
k
i− 1
)
p(θ)i−1(1− p(θ))k−i+1. (A.7)
Let m = i− 1. Then, (A.7) can be rewritten as
N0∑
i=1
lik =− q(θ) + q(θ)
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
p(θ)m(1− p(θ))k−m
=− q(θ) + q(θ)(1− p(θ))k
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)(
p(θ)
1− p(θ)
)m
. (A.8)
Knowing that
∑k
m=0
(
k
m
)
am = (1 + a)k, (A.8) can be written as
N0∑
i=1
lik = −q(θ) + q(θ)(1− p(θ))k
(
1
1− p(θ)
)k
= 0. (A.9)
Also, it can be shown that lii < 0. Since p(θ)i−1 ≤ 1, p(θ)i−1 < 1 + 2i +
p(θ) + p(θ)i. Consequently, iq(θ)p(θ)i−1(1 − p(θ)) − q(θ)(i + 2 + ip(θ)) < 0.
Therefore, lii < 0 and the desired result follows. It is straightforward to show
that all elements of BN0(θ)N0 are strictly greater than zero. Therefore, BN0(θ) is
irreducible and aperiodic. (Recall that BN0(θ) = I + 1N0L(θ).)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
Define the Lyapunov function V (x) = (x′x)/2 for x ∈ RN0 . Use En to de-
note the conditional expectation with respect to the σ-algebra Hn generated by
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{yj, θj, j ≤ n}. Then,
En{V (g˜n+1)− V (g˜n)} =
En
{
g˜′n[−εg˜n + ε (yn+1 − g(θn)) + g(θn)− g(θn+1)]
}
+ En
{
| − εg˜n + ε (yn+1 − g(θn)) + g(θn)− g(θn+1)|2
}
(A.10)
where yn+1 and g(θn) are vectors in RN0 with elements yn(i) and g(θn, i), 1 ≤
i ≤ N0, respectively. Due to the Markovian assumption and the structure of the
transition matrix of θn, defined in (3.2),
En{g(θn)− g(θn+1)} = E{g(θn)− g(θn+1)|θn}
=
M∑
i=1
E{g(i)− g(θn+1)|θn = i}I {θn = i}
=
M∑
i=1
[
g(i)−
M∑
j=1
g(j)Aρij
]
I {θn = i}
= −ρ
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
g(j)qijI {θn = i}
= O(ρ) (A.11)
where I(·) denotes the indicator function. Similarly, it is easily seen that
En{|g(θn)− g(θn+1)|2} = O(ρ). (A.12)
Using K to denote a generic positive value (with the notation KK = K and
K +K = K), a familiar inequality ab ≤ a2+b2
2
yields
O(ερ) = O(ε2 + ρ2). (A.13)
Moreover, we have |g˜n| = |g˜n| · 1 ≤ (|g˜n|2 + 1)/2. Thus,
O(ρ)|g˜n| ≤ O(ρ) (V (g˜n) + 1) . (A.14)
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Then, detailed estimates lead to
En
{∣∣∣− εg˜n + ε (yn+1 − g(θn)) + g(θn)− g(θn+1)∣∣∣2}
≤ KEn
{
ε2|g˜n|2 + ε2|(yn+1 − g(θn)|2 + ε2
∣∣g˜′n (yn+1 − g(θn+1)) ∣∣
+ ε|g˜′n (g(θn)− g(θn+1)) |+ ε| (yn+1 − g(θn))′ (g(θn)− g(θn+1)) |
}
+ En{|g(θn)− g(θn+1)|}2. (A.15)
It follows that
En
{∣∣∣− εg˜n + ε (yn+1 − g(θn)) + g(θn)− g(θn+1)∣∣∣2}
= O(ε2 + ρ2)(V (g˜n) + 1).
(A.16)
Furthermore,
En{V (g˜n+1)− V (g˜n)} = −2εV (g˜n) + εEn{g˜′n[yn+1 − g(θn)]}
+ En{g˜′n[g(θn+1)− g(θn)]}+O(ε2 + ρ2)(V (g˜n) + 1).
(A.17)
To obtain the desired bound, define V ρ1 and V
ρ
2 as follows:
V ρ1 (g˜, n) = ε
∞∑
j=n
g˜′En{yj+1 − g(θj)},
V ρ2 (g˜, n) =
∞∑
j=n
g˜′En{g(θj)− g(θj+1)}. (A.18)
It can be shown that
|V ρ1 (g˜, n)| = O(ε)(V (g˜) + 1),
|V ρ2 (g˜, n)| = O(ρ)(V (g˜) + 1). (A.19)
Define W (g˜, n) as
W (g˜, n) = V (g˜) + V ρ1 (g˜, n) + V
ρ
2 (g˜, n). (A.20)
This leads to
En{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)−W (g˜n, n)} = En{V ρ1 (g˜n+1, n+ 1)− V ρ1 (g˜n, n)}
+ En{V (g˜n+1)− V (g˜n)}+ En{V ρ2 (g˜n+1, n+ 1)− V ρ2 (g˜n, n)}.
(A.21)
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Moreover,
En{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)−W (g˜n, n)}
= −2εV (g˜n) +O(ε2 + ρ2)(V (g˜n) + 1).
(A.22)
Equation (A.22) can be rewritten as
En{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)−W (g˜n, n)} ≤O(ε2 + ρ2)(W (g˜n, n) + 1)
− 2εW (g˜n, n). (A.23)
If ε and ρ are chosen small enough, then there exists a small λ such that −2ε +
O(ρ2) +O(ε2) ≤ −λε. Therefore, (A.23) can be rearranged as
En{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)} ≤ (1− λε)W (g˜n, n) +O(ε2 + ρ2). (A.24)
Taking expectation of both sides yields
E{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)} ≤ (1− λε)E{W (g˜n, n)}+O(ε2 + ρ2). (A.25)
Iterating on (A.25) then results
E{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)} ≤(1− λε)n−NρE{W (g˜Nρ, Nρ)}
+
n∑
j=Nρ
O(ε2 + ρ2)(1− λε)j−Nρ. (A.26)
As the result,
E{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)} ≤ (1− λε)n−NρE{W (g˜Nρ, Nρ)}
+O
(
ε+ ρ2/ε
)
.
(A.27)
If n is large enough, one can approximate (1− λε)n−Nρ = O(ε). Therefore,
E{W (g˜n+1, n+ 1)} ≤ O
(
ε+
ρ2
ε
)
(A.28)
Finally, using (A.19) and replacing W (g˜n+1, n+ 1) with V (g˜n+1), we obtain
E{V (g˜n+1)} ≤ O
(
ρ+ ε+
ρ2
ε
)
. (A.29)
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A.3 Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 3.5.2
The proof uses weak convergence techniques [85].
Let Zk and Z be Rr-valued random vectors. We say Zk converges weakly to Z
(Zn ⇒ Z) if for any bounded and continuous function f(·), Ef(Zk)→ Ef(Z) as
k → ∞. The sequence {Zk} is tight if for each η > 0, there is a compact set Kη
such that P (Zn ∈ Kη) ≥ 1−η for all k. The definitions of weak convergence and
tightness extend to random elements in more general metric spaces. On a complete
separable metric space, tightness is equivalent to relative compactness, which is
known as the Prohorov’s Theorem [85]. By virtue of this theorem, we can extract
convergent subsequences when tightness is verified. In what follows, we use a
martingale problem formulation to establish the desired weak convergence. This
usually requires to first prove tightness. The limit process is then characterized
using certain operator related to the limit process. We refer the reader to [167,
Chapter 7] for further details on weak convergence and related matters.
Since the proof is similar to [260, Theorem 4.5], we only indicate the main
steps in what follows and omit most of the verbatim details.
Step 1: First, we show that the two component process (ĝε(·), θε(·)) is tight
in D([0, T ] : RN0 ×M), which is the space of functions defined on [0, T ] taking
values in RN0 ×M that are right continuous, have left limits, and endowed with
the Skorohod topology. Using techniques similar to [262, Theorem 4.3], it can be
shown that θε(·) converges weakly to a continuous-time Markov chain generated
by Q. Thus, we mainly need to consider ĝε(·). We show that
lim
∆→0
lim sup
ε→0
E
[
sup
0≤s≤∆
Eεt |ĝε(t+ s)− ĝε(t)|2
]
= 0 (A.30)
where Eεt denotes the conditioning on the past information up to t. Then, the
tightness follows from the criterion [165, p. 47].
Step 2: Since (ĝε(·), θε(·)) is tight, we can extract weakly convergent subse-
quence according to the Prohorov theorem; see [167]. To determine the limit,
we show that (ĝε(·), θε(·)) is a solution of the martingale problem with operator
L0. For each i ∈ M and continuously differential function with compact support
f(·, i), the operator is given by
L0f(ĝ, i) = ∇f ′(ĝ, i)[−ĝ + g(i)] +
∑
j∈M
qijf(ĝ, j), i ∈M. (A.31)
We can further demonstrate the martingale problem with operator L0 has a unique
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weak solution. Thus, the desired convergence property follows.
A.4 Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 3.5.3
The proof comprises of four steps as described below:
Step 1: First, note
νn+1 = νn − ενn +
√
ε(yn+1 − Eg(θn)) + E[g(θn)− g(θn+1]√
ε
. (A.32)
The approach is similar to that of [260, Theorem 5.6]. Therefore, we will be brief.
Step 2: Define the operator
Lf(ν, i) = −∇f ′(ν, i)ν + 1
2
tr[∇2f(ν, i)Σ(i)] +
∑
j∈M
qijf(ν, j), i ∈M, (A.33)
for function f(·, i) with compact support that has continuous partial derivatives
with respect to ν up to the second order. It can be shown that the associated
martingale problem has a unique solution (in the sense of in distribution).
Step 3: It is natural now to work with a truncated process. For a fixed, but
otherwise arbitrary r1 > 0, define a truncation function
qr1(x) =
{
1, if x ∈ Sr1 ,
0, if x ∈ RN0 − Sr1,
where Sr1 = {x ∈ RN0 : |x| ≤ r1}. Then, we obtain the truncated iterates
νr1n+1 = ν
r1
n − ενr1n qr1(νr1n ) +
√
ε(yn+1 −Eg(θn))
+
E[g(θn)− g(θn+1]√
ε
qr1(νr1n ).
(A.34)
Define νε,r1(t) = νr1n for t ∈ [εn, εn + ε). Then, νε,r1(·) is an r-truncation of
νε(·); see [167, p. 284] for a definition. We then show the truncated process
(νε,r1(·), θε(·)) is tight. Moreover, by Prohorov’s theorem, we can extract a con-
vergent subsequence with limit (νr1(·), θ(·)) such that the limit (νr1(·), θ(·)) is the
solution of the martingale problem with operator Lr1 defined by
Lr1f r1(ν, i) = −∇′f r1(ν, i)ν + 1
2
tr[∇2f r1(ν, i)Σ(i)] +
∑
j∈M
qijf
r1(ν, j) (A.35)
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for i ∈M, where f r1(ν, i) = f(ν, i)qr1(ν).
Step 4: Letting r1 →∞, we show that the un-truncated process also converges
and the limit, denoted by (ν(·), θ(·)), is precisely the martingale problem with
operator L defined in (A.33). The limit covariance can further be evaluated as
in [260, Lemma 5.2].
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 5
This appendix starts with a formal definition of differential inclusions that capture
the asymptotic local behavior of individual agents that follow the algorithms of
§5.3.
Definition B.1. Differential inclusions are generalizations of ordinary differential
equations. In this monograph, we consider differential inclusions of the form
d
dt
X ∈ F (X) (B.1)
where X ∈ Rr and F : Rr → Rr is a Marchaud map [14]. That is: (i) the graph
and domain of F are nonempty and closed, (ii) the values F (X) are convex, and
(iii) the growth of F is linear, i.e., there exists η > 0 such that for every X ∈ Rr:
sup
Y ∈F(X)
‖Y ‖ ≤ η (1 + ‖X‖) (B.2)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes any norm on Rr.
The rest of this appendix presents details on the proofs of theorems presented
in §5.4. The key tools we use are weak convergence and Lyapunov stability meth-
ods. We refer to [85, 167] for excellent textbook treatments of weak convergence
theory.
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B.1 Proof of Theorem 5.4.2
Close scrutiny of the action selection strategy (5.12) reveals that {ank , Rnk} is a
Markov chain with the transition matrix P (Rn) = [Pij (Rn)] given by
Pij
(
Rnk
)
= P
(
ank = j|ank−1 = i, Rnk
)
=
{
1
µn
∣∣rnk (i, j)∣∣+, i 6= j,
1−∑j 6=i Pij(Rnk), i = j. (B.3)
That is, the transition matrix is a function of the regret matrix Rn. It is straightfor-
ward to show that the transition matrix P (Rn) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) it is continuous in Rn;
(ii) for each Rn, it is irreducible and aperiodic.
Condition (ii) essentially indicates that the Markov chain is ergodic in the sense
that there is a unique stationary distributionψn
(
Rn
)
=
(
ψn1
(
Rn
)
, . . . , ψnAk
(
Rn
))
such that
[
P
(
Rn
)]n → 1ψn(Rn), a matrix with identical rows consisting of the
stationary distribution as n→∞. (The convergence in fact takes place exponen-
tially fast.)
Further, the sequence of opponents’ action profile
{
a−nk
}
is independent of{
ank
}
, and satisfies the following condition:
d
[
1
n
n+m−1∑
ℓ=m
Em
{
Bn
(
i, a−nℓ
)}
,Sn(i)
]
→ 0 in probability (B.4)
where d[·, ·] denotes the usual distance function, Em denotes conditional expec-
tation given the σ-algebra generated by
{
Rnℓ , a
n
ℓ−1, a
−n
ℓ−1 : ℓ ≤ m
}
, and Sn(i) =[Snpq(i)] is a set of An × An matrices, where
Snpq(i) =
{ {
Un
(
q,p−n
)− Un(i,p−n);p−n ∈ ∆A−n} p = i,
0 p 6= i. (B.5)
It is then straight forward to show that, for any stationary distribution ψn
(
Rn
)
,
the set
Hn
(
Rn
)
=
∑
i∈An
ψni
(
Rn
)Sn(i) (B.6)
is closed, convex, and upper semi-continuous; see [167, pp.108–109].
158 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
To proceed, recall the continuous-time interpolated process Rn,ε(t) = Rnk for
t ∈ [kε, (k + 1)ε). We first prove the tightness . Consider (5.14) for the sequence
of (Ak)2-valued vectors resulted after rearranging the elements of the regret matrix
Rn into a column vector. Noting the boundedness of payoff functions, and using
Ho¨lder’s and Gronwall’s inequalities, for any 0 < T <∞, we obtain
sup
k≤T/ε
E
∥∥Rnk∥∥2 <∞ (B.7)
where in the above and hereafter t/ε is understood to be the integer part of t/ε for
each t > 0. Next, considering Rn,ε(·), for any t, s > 0, δ > 0, and s < δ, it is
fairly easy to verify that
Rn,ε(t + s)−Rn,ε(t) = ε
(t+s)/ε−1∑
ℓ=t/ε
[
Bn
(
anℓ ,A−nℓ
)− Rnℓ ] . (B.8)
As a result,
lim
δ→0
lim sup
µ→0
{
E
[
sup
0≤s≤δ
Eεt ‖Rn,ε(t+ s)− Rn,ε(t)‖2
]}
= 0. (B.9)
Thus, Rn,ε(·) is tight in the space of functions that are defined in [0,∞) taking
values in R(Ak)2 ; see [167, Chapter 7] or [165, Theorem 3, p. 47].
By Prohorov theorem [167], one can extract a convergent subsequence. For
notational simplicity, we still denote this convergent subsequence by Rn,ε(·) with
limitRn(·). Thus,Rn,ε(·) converges weakly toRn(·). By Skorohod representation
theorem [167], with a slight abuse of notation, one can assume Rn,ε(·) → Rn(·)
with probability one and the convergence is uniform on any finite interval. Next,
using martingale averaging methods, we need to characterize the limit process.
Normally, one uses a smooth function f(·) with compact support to carry out the
analysis. Here, for simplicity, we suppress the dependence of f(·) and proceed
directly; see [166] for a similar argument. Choose a sequence of integers {kε}
such that kε →∞ as ε→ 0, but δε = εkε → 0. Note
Rn,ε(t+ s)− Rn,ε(t) =
t+s∑
ℓ:ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)
I {anτ = i}
−
t+s∑
ℓ:ℓδε=t
δε
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Rnτ (B.10)
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where
∑t+s
ℓ:ℓδε=t
denotes the sum over integers ℓ in the range t ≤ ℓδε ≤ t + s.
We shall use the techniques in [167, Chapter 8] to prove the desired result. Let
h(·) be any bounded and continuous function, t, s > 0, κ0 be an arbitrary positive
integer, and tι ≤ t for all ι ≤ κ0. It is readily seen that, by virtue of the weak
convergence and the Skorohod representation, as ε→ 0,
Eh(Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0) [Rn,ε(t+ s)− Rn,ε(t)]
→ Eh(Rn(tι) : ι ≤ κ0) [Rn(t+ s)−Rn(t)] . (B.11)
By using the technique of stochastic approximation (see, e.g., [167, Chapter 8]),
we also have
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
) t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Rnτ
→ Eh(Rk(tι) : ι ≤ κ0) [∫ t+s
t
Rn(u)du
]
as ε→ 0.
(B.12)
Moreover, by the independence of ank and a−nk ,
lim
ε→0
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
)
×
[
t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)
I {anτ = i}
]
= lim
ε→0
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
)
×
[
t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Eℓkε
{
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)}
EℓkεI {anτ = i}
]
= lim
ε→0
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
)[ t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
∑
j∈An
I
{
anℓkε = j
}
×
[
Eℓkε
{
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)}
ϕi
(
Rnℓnε) + Eℓkε
{
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)}
×
[
P
{τ−ℓkε}
ji
(
Rnℓkε
)− ϕi(Rnℓkε)]]
]
. (B.13)
In (B.13), P {τ−ℓkε}ji
(
Rn
)
denotes the (τ − ℓkε)-step transition probability. Except
the indicator function on the l.h.s. of (B.14), the rest of the terms in the summand
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are independent of j, therefore,∑
j∈An
I
{
anℓkε = j
}
Eℓkε
{
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)}
ϕi
(
Rnℓkε
)
= Eℓkε
{
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)}
ϕi
(
Rnℓkε
)
.
(B.14)
Recalling the properties of the transition matrix P
(
Rn
)
, regardless of the choice
of j, as ε→ 0 and τ − ℓkε →∞, for each fixed Rn,[
P
{τ−ℓkε}
ji
(
Rn
)− ϕi(Rn)]→ 0 (B.15)
exponentially fast. As the result, as ε→ 0,
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
)
×
[
t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
k=ℓkε
∑
j∈An
I
{
anℓkε = j
}
Eℓkε
{
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)}
×
[
P
{τ−ℓkε}
ji
(
Rnℓkε
)− ϕi(Rnℓkε)]
]
→ 0 in probability. (B.16)
Therefore,
lim
ε→0
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
)
×
[
t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)
I {anτ = i}
]
= lim
ε→0
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
)
×
[
t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Eℓkε
{
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)}
ϕi
(
Rnℓnε
)]
. (B.17)
Using (B.4) together with (B.17), we obtain that, as ε→ 0,
Eh
(
Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0
) [ t+s∑
ℓδε=t
δε
∑
i∈An
1
kε
ℓkε+kε−1∑
τ=ℓkε
Bn
(
i, a−nτ
)
I {anτ = i}
]
→ Eh(Rn,ε(tι) : ι ≤ κ0) [∫ t+s
t
∑
i∈An
ϕi
(
Rn(u)
)Sn(i)du] . (B.18)
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Finally, combining (B.12) and (B.18), and using (B.6) yields
dRn(t)
dt
∈ Hn(Rn)− Rn(t) (B.19)
as desired.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5.4.5
Define the Lyapunov function
V
(
Rn
)
=
1
2
[
dist
[
Rn,R−
]]2
=
1
2
∑
i,j∈An
[∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+]2 . (B.20)
For the sake of notational convenience, we drop the Rn dependency of the invari-
ant measure, and denote it simply by ψn hereafter.
Case I: Taking the time-derivative of (B.20), and substituting for drn(i, j)/dt
from (5.44)–(5.45), we obtain
d
dt
V
(
Rn
)
=
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+ · d
dt
rn(i, j)
=
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+[ [Un(j,p−n)− Un(i,p−n)]ψni − rn(i, j)]
=
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+ [Un(j,p−n)− Un(i,p−n)]ψni︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (See Lemma B.1 below)
−
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+rn(i, j)
= −V (Rn). (B.21)
In the last equality we used∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+rn(i, j) = ∑
i,j∈An
[∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+]2 = V (Rn). (B.22)
This completes the proof.
The following lemma shows that the first term in the r.h.s. of (B.21) equals
zero.
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Lemma B.1. Let p−n denote a probability measure over the joint action space
A−n of all agents excluding agent k. Then,∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+ [Un(j,p−n)− Un(i,p−n)]ψni = 0 (B.23)
where ψn =
(
ψn1 , . . . , ψ
n
An
)
represents the invariant measure of transition proba-
bilities (5.12).
Proof. Separating the summation over the two terms in (B.23) yields∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+Un(j,p−n)ψni − ∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+Un(i,p−n)ψni
=
∑
j,i∈An
∣∣rn(j, i)∣∣+Un(i,p−n)ψnj − ∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+Un(i,p−n)ψni
=
∑
i∈An
Un
(
i,p−n
) [∑
j∈An
ψnj
∣∣rn(j, i)∣∣+ − ∑
j∈An
ψni
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+] . (B.24)
In the second line we used
∑
i,j aij =
∑
j,i aji, and in the last line we changed the
order of summation both applied to the first term. Finally, applying
∣∣rn(i, i)∣∣+ =
0, for all i ∈ An, and substituting (5.42) into (B.24) completes the proof.
Case II: Define the Lyapunov function
V
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
=
[
dist
[
RL,n +RG,n,R−
]]2
=
∑
i,j∈An
[∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+]2 . (B.25)
Taking the time-derivative of (B.25) yields
d
dt
V
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
= 2
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+
×
[
d
dt
rL,n(i, j) +
d
dt
rG,n(i, j)
]
. (B.26)
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Next, replacing for drL,nij /dt and dr
G,n
ij /dt from (5.48)–(5.49),
d
dt
V
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
= 2
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+
×
[[
UnL
(
j,ν−n
)− UnL(i,ν−n)]σni
+
[
UnG,t(j)− UnG,t(i)
]
σni
− [rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)]]. (B.27)
Substituting for σn from (5.46) in (B.27) yields
d
dt
V
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
= 2(1− δ)
∑
i,j
ψni
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+
× [UnL(j,ν−n)+ UnG,t(j)− [UnL(i,ν−n)+ UnG,t(i)]]
+
2δ
An
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+
× [UnL(j,ν−n)+ UnG,t(j)− [UnL(i,ν−n)+ UnG,t(i)]] (B.28)
− 2
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+ [rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)] .
Similar to Lemma B.1, it is straightforward to show that the first term in the r.h.s.
of (B.28) is zero. Therefore,
d
dt
V
(
RL,n, RG,n
)
= −2V (RL,n, RG,n)
+
2δ
An
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+
×
[
UnL
(
j,ν−n
)
+ UnG,t(j)
− [UnL(i,ν−n)+ UnG,t(i)]]. (B.29)
Finally, noting that the payoff function UnL
(·,ν−n) + UnG,t(·) is bounded, one can
find a constant α such that
d
dt
V
(
RL,n, RG,n
) ≤2αδ
An
∑
i,j∈An
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+
− 2V (RL,n, RG,n). (B.30)
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In (B.30), α > 0 depends on the differences in payoffs for different actions i and j
and can be specified based on the particular choice of the payoff function. In this
lemma, however, we only require existence of such a bound, which is guaranteed
since the payoff functions are bounded.
Now, assuming
∣∣rL,n(i, j) + rG,n(i, j)∣∣+ > ǫ > 0 for all i, j ∈ An, one can
choose δ small enough such that
d
dt
V
(
RL,n, RG,n
) ≤ −V (RL,n, RG,n). (B.31)
This proves global asymptotic stability of the limit system (5.48) and
lim
t→∞
dist
[
RL,n +RG,n,R−
]
= 0. (B.32)
Case III: Define the Lyapunov function
V
(
Rs
)
=
[
dist
[
Rs,R−
]]2
=
∑
k∈Cs
∑
i,j∈An
[∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+]2 . (B.33)
Taking the time-derivative of (B.33) and using a similar argument to Lemma B.1,
we obtain
d
dt
V
(
Rs
)
=
∑
k∈Cs
∑
i,j∈An
|rn(i, j)|+
∑
l∈Nnc
qsnlr
l(i, j)− rn(i, j)
 . (B.34)
Recall that Rs represents the global regret matrix for social group Cs rearranged
into a vector. We consider the following cases:
(i) ∣∣Rs∣∣+ > 0. This is the worst case scenario where all agents’ regrets for
switching from action i to j is positive. It is straightforward to rewrite (B.34) as
follows
d
dt
V
(
Rs
)
=
[|Rs|+]′ (Qs − I)Rs. (B.35)
Noting that, when
∣∣Rs∣∣+ > 0, ∣∣Rs∣∣+ = Rs, we obtaine
d
dt
V
(
Rs
)
= [Rs]′ (Qs − I)Rs
= [Rs]′QsRs − [Rs]′Rs. (B.36)
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SinceQs1 = 0, it is weakly diagonally dominant. SinceQs is further symmetric,
it is well-known from linear algebra that Qs is negative semi-definite. That is,
for all vectors x ∈ RJs , xTQsx ≤ 0. This, together with (B.36), concludes
dV
(
Rs
)
/dt < 0.
(ii)
∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+ > 0 and ∣∣rl(i, j)∣∣+ = 0 for some l ∈ Cs. In (B.34), looking at
the term ∣∣rn(i, j)∣∣+
∑
l∈Nnc
qsnlr
l(i, j)− rn(i, j)
 (B.37)
it can be clearly seen that rl(i, j) < 0 actually helps pulling the regrets to the
negative orthant more forcefully since csnlrl(i, j) − rn(i, j) < 0. This concludes
the limit system (5.52) is globally asymptotically stable and (5.54) holds.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5.4.6
The proof relies on how the “regret” measure is defined. For brevity, we present
the proof for “Case I”. Similar argument can be used to prove this result for the
other cases. Recall, for t ∈ [kε, (k + 1)ε), rn,ε(i, j)(t) = rnk (i, j); hence, substi-
tuting (5.11) for rnk (i, j) on the r.h.s., we obtain
rn,ε(i, j)(t) = ε
∑
τ≤k
(1− ε)k−τ [Un(j, a−n(τ))− Un(a(τ))] I {anτ = i}
=
∑
a−n
zn,ε
(
i, a−n
)
(t)
[
Un
(
j, a−n
)− Un(i, a−n)] (B.38)
where zn,ε
(
i, a−n
)
(t) denotes the interpolated empirical distribution of agent n
choosing action i and the rest playing a−n. On any convergent subsequence
{zk}k≥0 → pi, with slight abuse of notation, let zε(t) = zk and Rn,ε(t) = Rnk for
t ∈ [kε, kε+ ε). Then,
lim
t→∞
rn,ε(i, j)(t) =
∑
a−n
πn
(
i, a−n
) [
Un
(
j, a−n
)− Un(i, a−n)] (B.39)
where πn
(
i, a−n
)
denotes the probability of agent n choosing action i and the rest
playing a−n. Next, combining (B.39) with (5.55) in Corollary 5.1, and comparing
with (5.8) in Definition 5.3, the desired result follows.
To prove (5.56) for “Case II,” one needs to look at the combined regrets
rL,n,ε(i, j)(t)+rG,n,ε(i, j)(t) instead. We first prove that the sequence
{
rG,nk (i, j)
}
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is an unbiased estimator of the sequence of regrets if agents were to observe the
action profile of those outside their social group. The rest of the proof is similar to
the above proof. The interested reader is referred to [102, Sec. IV] for the detailed
proof.
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